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On the Logic of the Social Sciences
In a provocative argument that ends with his own sharply profiled position, Jürgen Habermas considers the main lines of thought pursued by epistemologists and methodologists of the social sciences - from NeoKantianism to behaviorism. For two decades, the German edition of this classic has been a standard reference point for discussions of the social sciences.
220 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1967
About the author
Jürgen Habermas
382 books726 followersJürgen Habermas was a German sociologist and philosopher in the tradition of critical theory and American pragmatism. He is perhaps best known for his work on the concept of the public sphere, the topic of his first book entitled The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. His work focuses on the foundations of social theory and epistemology, the analysis of advanced capitalistic societies and democracy, the rule of law in a critical social-evolutionary context, and contemporary politics—particularly German politics. Habermas's theoretical system is devoted to revealing the possibility of reason, emancipation, and rational-critical communication latent in modern institutions and in the human capacity to deliberate and pursue rational interests.
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
February 4, 2020
The most insightful book I've read about everything we need to understand about social sciences philosophically, epistemologically and methodologically speaking. But in order to take advantage of every piece of wonderful knowledge that this book has, you must go through every paragraph patiently, consulting every author, theory or books that Habermas mentiones, that's why it took me so long to finished it despite of its relatively short lenght.
September 14, 2024
If the division between the hard sciences and the human sciences is so institutionalized as to render liberal arts programs obsolete in the circles of higher education, then what will happen to the ideologically-based relationships of human interaction that are fundamentally dependent on linguistic proficiency? Just a question that Habermas' book made me ponder. I found this book to be rather provoking, as it reminded me of the semester I studied sociology at Bard College in 1995, when I suddenly had the insight to see the genius it would take to portray the reality of the present as period-history. Three stars.
July 9, 2024
A “REVIEW OF LITERATURE” PERTAINING TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
Jürgen Habermas (born 1929) is a German philosopher and sociologist who is one of the leading figures of the Frankfurt School. .
He wrote in the Preface, “This review of literature pertaining to the logic of the social sciences was written in the mid-1960s, when analytic philosophy of science, with its program for a unified science, still largely dominated the self-understanding of sociologists. It contributed to the basic changes in that situation that took place in the following decade… This review was written for a particular reason. One reason for its cursory character is that I am not a specialist in this area. Moreover, the logic of research has always interested me only in connection with questions of social theory… The theory of communicative action that I have since put forward… treats the presupposition of action oriented to mutual understanding independently of the transcendental preconditions of knowledge.”
He says, “When we call the abstraction of need satisfaction and deprivation ‘reward and punishment,’ we are referring to a system of prevailing norms; and no matter how elementary the drives we distinguish qualitatively from one another by referring to ‘enemies,’ ‘prey,’ and ‘sex’ may seem to us, we shall never arrive at such a thing as drives that have not been linguistically interpreted.” (Pg. 73)
He concludes the second chapter with the statement, “Only when split-off motives and deeply internalized rules have been understood in their objective connection with the rational compulsions of collective self-preservation on the one hand and the irrational compulsions of superfluous authorities on the other, when they have been reconciled with subjectively meaningful motives in the minds of the acting subjects themselves, can social action develop as truly communicative action. But a theory that does not incorporate this understanding will make unreflected predeterminations in a matter about which we have no a priori certainty; it will be making methodological decisions about whether we more closely resemble animals or gods. Those who have prematurely concluded that we resemble gods lead their heroes through a back door into the animal realm again. The acting subjects whose intentions have been acknowledged suddenly find themselves and their cultural values yoked in systems that respond only to the fundamental biological values of survival and efficient adaptation.” (Pg. 88)
He observes, “there are no uninterpreted experiences, neither in everyday life not, especially, within the framework of scientifically organized experience. Standards of measurement are rules in accordance with which everyday experiences that have been interpreted in ordinary language are reorganized and transformed into scientific data. No such interpretation is fully determined by the experienced material itself. It could be the case that we transform sensory experiences into data through measurements differently than we communicative experiences. Perhaps the modes of transformation are different in the sciences of action than in physics; and perhaps as a consequence the relationship of data and theories is different in the latter than it is in the former.” (Pg. 97)
He states, “General linguistics is, however, not the only alternative to a linguistic analysis that proceeds historically and immerses itself in the plurality of language games without being able to justify the language of analysis itself. To break through the grammatical boundaries of individual linguistic totalities we need not follow [Noam] Chomsky and leave the dimension of ordinary language. It is not only a theoretical language’s distance from the primary languages that can guarantee the unity of analytic reason in the pluralism of language games.” (Pg. 143)
He notes, “There is good reason to conceive language as a kind of metainstitution on which all social institutions depend. For social action is constituted only in ordinary-language communication. But clearly this metainstitution of language as tradition is dependent in turn on social processes that cannot be reduced to normative relationships. Language is also a medium of domination and social power. It serves to legitimate relationships of organized force.” (Pg. 172)
He concludes the book with the statement, “the framework of a general interpretation, however saturated it may be with prior hermeneutic experience and however much it may have been confirmed in individual interpretations, retains a hypothetical moment. The truth of historically oriented functionalism is confirmed not technically but only practically, in the successful continuation and completion of a formative process. Here we are again confronted with the problem of that singular relationship to theory of practice that since the eighteenth century has appeared wherever the logic of inquiry has involved the intention of enlightenment.” (Pg. 189)
Not one of Habermas’s “major works,” this book will nevertheless have some value for anyone studying Habermas and the development of his thought.
Jürgen Habermas (born 1929) is a German philosopher and sociologist who is one of the leading figures of the Frankfurt School. .
He wrote in the Preface, “This review of literature pertaining to the logic of the social sciences was written in the mid-1960s, when analytic philosophy of science, with its program for a unified science, still largely dominated the self-understanding of sociologists. It contributed to the basic changes in that situation that took place in the following decade… This review was written for a particular reason. One reason for its cursory character is that I am not a specialist in this area. Moreover, the logic of research has always interested me only in connection with questions of social theory… The theory of communicative action that I have since put forward… treats the presupposition of action oriented to mutual understanding independently of the transcendental preconditions of knowledge.”
He says, “When we call the abstraction of need satisfaction and deprivation ‘reward and punishment,’ we are referring to a system of prevailing norms; and no matter how elementary the drives we distinguish qualitatively from one another by referring to ‘enemies,’ ‘prey,’ and ‘sex’ may seem to us, we shall never arrive at such a thing as drives that have not been linguistically interpreted.” (Pg. 73)
He concludes the second chapter with the statement, “Only when split-off motives and deeply internalized rules have been understood in their objective connection with the rational compulsions of collective self-preservation on the one hand and the irrational compulsions of superfluous authorities on the other, when they have been reconciled with subjectively meaningful motives in the minds of the acting subjects themselves, can social action develop as truly communicative action. But a theory that does not incorporate this understanding will make unreflected predeterminations in a matter about which we have no a priori certainty; it will be making methodological decisions about whether we more closely resemble animals or gods. Those who have prematurely concluded that we resemble gods lead their heroes through a back door into the animal realm again. The acting subjects whose intentions have been acknowledged suddenly find themselves and their cultural values yoked in systems that respond only to the fundamental biological values of survival and efficient adaptation.” (Pg. 88)
He observes, “there are no uninterpreted experiences, neither in everyday life not, especially, within the framework of scientifically organized experience. Standards of measurement are rules in accordance with which everyday experiences that have been interpreted in ordinary language are reorganized and transformed into scientific data. No such interpretation is fully determined by the experienced material itself. It could be the case that we transform sensory experiences into data through measurements differently than we communicative experiences. Perhaps the modes of transformation are different in the sciences of action than in physics; and perhaps as a consequence the relationship of data and theories is different in the latter than it is in the former.” (Pg. 97)
He states, “General linguistics is, however, not the only alternative to a linguistic analysis that proceeds historically and immerses itself in the plurality of language games without being able to justify the language of analysis itself. To break through the grammatical boundaries of individual linguistic totalities we need not follow [Noam] Chomsky and leave the dimension of ordinary language. It is not only a theoretical language’s distance from the primary languages that can guarantee the unity of analytic reason in the pluralism of language games.” (Pg. 143)
He notes, “There is good reason to conceive language as a kind of metainstitution on which all social institutions depend. For social action is constituted only in ordinary-language communication. But clearly this metainstitution of language as tradition is dependent in turn on social processes that cannot be reduced to normative relationships. Language is also a medium of domination and social power. It serves to legitimate relationships of organized force.” (Pg. 172)
He concludes the book with the statement, “the framework of a general interpretation, however saturated it may be with prior hermeneutic experience and however much it may have been confirmed in individual interpretations, retains a hypothetical moment. The truth of historically oriented functionalism is confirmed not technically but only practically, in the successful continuation and completion of a formative process. Here we are again confronted with the problem of that singular relationship to theory of practice that since the eighteenth century has appeared wherever the logic of inquiry has involved the intention of enlightenment.” (Pg. 189)
Not one of Habermas’s “major works,” this book will nevertheless have some value for anyone studying Habermas and the development of his thought.
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December 17, 2025a reminder to me: I have only read “the dualism of the natural and cultural sciences” section.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews