Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq

by Ahmed S. Hashim

Years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a loosely organized insurgency continues to target American and Coalition soldiers, as well as Iraqi security forces and civilians, with devastating results. In this sobering account of the ongoing violence, Ahmed Hashim, a specialist on Middle Eastern strategic issues and on irregular warfare, reveals the insurgents behind the widespread revolt, their motives, and their tactics. The insurgency, he shows, is not a united movement directed by a leadership with a single ideological vision. Instead, it involves former regime loyalists, Iraqis resentful of foreign occupation, foreign and domestic Islamist extremists, and elements of organized crime. These groups have cooperated with one another in the past and coordinated their attacks; but the alliance between nationalist Iraqi insurgents on the one hand and religious extremists has frayed considerably. The U.S.-led offensive to retake Fallujah in November 2004 and the success of the elections for the Iraqi National Assembly in January 2005 have led more "mainstream" insurgent groups to begin thinking of reinforcing the political arm of their opposition movement and to seek political guarantees for the Sunni Arab community in the new Iraq.Hashim begins by placing the Iraqi revolt in its historical context. He next profiles the various insurgent groups, detailing their origins, aims, and operational and tactical modi operandi. He concludes with an unusually candid assessment of the successes and failures of the Coalition's counter-insurgency campaign. Looking ahead, Hashim warns that ethnic and sectarian groups may soon be pitted against one another in what will be a fiercely contested fight over who gets what in the new Iraq. Evidence that such a conflict is already developing does not augur well for Iraq's future stability. Both Iraq and the United States must work hard to ensure that slow but steady success over the insurgency is not overshadowed by growing ethno-sectarian animosities as various groups fight one another for the biggest slice of the political and economic pie. In place of sensational headlines, official triumphalism, and hand-wringing, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq offers a clear-eyed analysis of the increasingly complex violence that threatens the very future of Iraq.

Genres: History, War, Military Fiction

512 pages, Hardcover

First published March 30, 2006

Reviews

[Eric Freienmuth · Rating 5 out of 5]

I think this is a very informative book and gives a good perspective of the war from as close to a third party as you can get and still be as informed about the total situation as this author is. Some might say it is biased because he works for the military but he is an academic and is from the Middle East and I think fairly impartial. This is the best book I've found that paints the big picture in the region, breaks down acadmeically the current situation, and gives several suggestions of where and how this war may go on a micro and macro level. I think this is an outstanding read and all though much tougher and more acadmic than other books I have read about the war I think the best put together. It is also obvious that this author is an expert on the region and not just a self proclaimed expert now that the war is going on.

[Stingray · Rating 4 out of 5]

„Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq” by Ahmed S. Hashim is an amazing study of the development of the insurgency in Iraq written at a time, when most of the information included had not been public knowledge and thus the study provides a well-structured analysis of the conflict in many facets.

Ahmed S. Hashim starts his study with a thorough description of the changing dynamics of warfare in Iraq from 2003 to 2005. Taking the deficiencies of the regular Iraqi military as a starting point, he describes the plans and preparations of the regime for unconventional warfare and how this could later be exploited by groups of the insurgency. Furthermore he delineates the evolution of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq with events and catalysts not least provided by the U.S. The second chapter of the book is completely devoted to the different motivations of insurgent groups, which not only shows a much more realistic appreciation for the differences in a state as heterogeneous as Iraq than most observers have, but also calls official U.S. brandings into question. Here the author already makes very interesting observations, which point to differences between insurgent groups, counterinsurgents could exploit.

In the following chapter Hashim describes different groups, with their operational areas, abilities, tactics and external support, which in fact is one of the best appreciations of the operational complexity of Iraq in 2005 publicly available. Here the reader is taken to the ground level of the insurgency as groups may be minuscule and crossing a highway may mean to be confronted by completely different forces and tactics. From this much differentiated view the reader is plunged back to the macro level, when the author discusses the general rift between Sunni, Shia and Kurds in Iraq as a major effect pulling the state apart on all levels. At last the author discusses the U.S. counterinsurgency effort, which justly and again very lonesome, has a focus on the political and administrative efforts of the CPA in basic services, building legitimacy and integrating the country. Nevertheless the activities of the security forces are also discussed and put in perspective to the insurgent’s tactics and motives. The author’s conclusions for the stability of Iraq at the end of 2005 are as realistic as they are grim and although the epilogue provide examples of successful counterinsurgency and the then ongoing constitutional debate, these parts are less analytical and more concerned with current activities.

In general this book was written for the orientation and support of readers interested in and concerned with the insurgency in Iraq at the time in 2005. In that regard it is a very thoroughly researched and well-balanced study and therefore still provides material to study counterinsurgency in the future for everybody interested in the topic as the complexities of motivation and fragmentation of effort have seldom been so well described by contemporary scholars. The average reader might find it too detailed in its academic endeavor and too voluminous though.

[Terry Cornell · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book came out in 2006. At the time the author was an army colonel and instructor at the U.S. Naval War College. This book is an analysis of the insurgency in Iraq, what led to it, and our country's policies on dealing with it. Hashim discusses the Sunni, Shi'a, Kurds, and their differing views on leadership and Iraq. He points out many errors our country made in the process, but at the end I have to wonder if in the end it would've made any difference for Iraq.

[Michael Kelley · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an essential book because the author sees insurgency and insurgents in a different context. It brings the Iraqi insurgency into focus, denying the political platitudes of our leaders who never took the time to understand Iraq and its culture.

[Ben · Rating 5 out of 5]

The best source thus far for a detailed breakdown of the various armed movements in Iraq, as well as a scathing critique of US counterinsurgency policy. A little disjointed, and probably hastily written, but the author clearly knows his subject.

[Dan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very good read, not too dry and fairly prescient for something that was written in 2005. You definitely see the origins and structure of ISIS in an embryonic stage during its beginnings in a Sunni insurgency composed of disparate groups of Islamists and Baathists

[Monte · Rating 2 out of 5]

Good information, but poor writing and a muddled thesis prevent the book from rising above the average textbook.

[Jeff Sedlak · Rating 2 out of 5]

Not worth the read unless you are needing extra detailed info regarding the Iraq insurgency. Great book for that but not for the average reader. I stopped reading about 100 pages in.

[Danyboy]

an in depth analysis of the various social and political factions of iraq during the insurgency.
there is some tactical data but the bulk of the information in there is about the social inner working of the insurgency.