What do you think?
Rate this book
Modern War Studies
The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions
The German Wehrmacht was one of the most capable fighting forces the world has ever known, but in the end it was no match for the Allies. Some historians contend that the Allies achieved victory through brute force and material superiority. But, as Peter Mansoor argues, all of the material produced by U.S. industry was useless without trained soldiers to operate it, a coherent doctrine for its use, and leaders who could effectively command the formations into which it was organized.
This book provides a comprehensive study of America's infantry combat performance in Europe during World War II, showing that the Army succeeded by developing combat effective divisions that could not only fight and win battles, but also sustain that effort over years of combat. While American industry admittedly enabled the U.S. to sustain its overseas armies, the effectiveness of those forces ultimately rested on their organizational capabilities and ability to adapt to combat in a variety of lethal environments and to learn from their mistakes.
Mansoor analyzes the impact of personnel and logistical systems on the Army's strength, explaining how leaders used these systems to keep a small number of divisions at a high state of combat effectiveness. During the critical battles of 1944-45, American divisions were able to sustain this high level while their Wehrmacht counterparts disintegrated, demonstrating that the Army's endurance in extended combat was the most critical factor in its ultimate success. Mansoor also takes a close look at the personalities and capabilities of division commanders, infantry tactics and operations, logistics, and the benefits and weaknesses of stateside training.
The American army won, asserts Mansoor, because unit for unit at the division level it was more effective than its adversaries. By showing how U.S. infantry developed more quickly and fought better than commonly believed, The GI Offensive in Europe contributes significantly to the history of the U.S. Army in the European theater and to our overall understanding of military effectiveness.
This book provides a comprehensive study of America's infantry combat performance in Europe during World War II, showing that the Army succeeded by developing combat effective divisions that could not only fight and win battles, but also sustain that effort over years of combat. While American industry admittedly enabled the U.S. to sustain its overseas armies, the effectiveness of those forces ultimately rested on their organizational capabilities and ability to adapt to combat in a variety of lethal environments and to learn from their mistakes.
Mansoor analyzes the impact of personnel and logistical systems on the Army's strength, explaining how leaders used these systems to keep a small number of divisions at a high state of combat effectiveness. During the critical battles of 1944-45, American divisions were able to sustain this high level while their Wehrmacht counterparts disintegrated, demonstrating that the Army's endurance in extended combat was the most critical factor in its ultimate success. Mansoor also takes a close look at the personalities and capabilities of division commanders, infantry tactics and operations, logistics, and the benefits and weaknesses of stateside training.
The American army won, asserts Mansoor, because unit for unit at the division level it was more effective than its adversaries. By showing how U.S. infantry developed more quickly and fought better than commonly believed, The GI Offensive in Europe contributes significantly to the history of the U.S. Army in the European theater and to our overall understanding of military effectiveness.
360 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 1999
89 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
June 24, 2017
This book makes a nice companion to Rick Atkinson's Liberation Trilogy. Atkinson explains how the US Army evolved from a green force to a seasoned, veteran juggernaut capable of facing any army in the world on even terms. Mansoor shows us why the Army was able to learn from its mistakes (in most cases) and overcome its initial ineptitude.
The simple answers are training and leadership. Given the same human material, a US Army division would almost always fail or take heavy casualties if it were poorly led by officers at the divisional and regimental level; likewise, replacing those officers with men of proven talent (combat experience not necessarily needed, but it never hurt) could turn that same division around.
The other factor, training, was something not all divisions got to experience equally. The Army's training plan was sound, and when allowed to complete it uninterrupted, those divisions so trained tended to perform very well, even their first time in combat. But unfortunately, the Army—desperate for reinforcements for divisions already overseas—repeatedly plundered units still in training for replacements, meaning the divisions back home had to start the training process all over again...or more likely, get deployed with less training time and unit cohesion than the plan called for.
A better way to keep divisions in the field than this practice of combing out replacements, deleterious as it was, was never devised during the war, so the triumph of the American Army has to be considered in that light. Yes we tended to have material superiority when the logistics chain permitted it; but material alone can't explain the almost uniformly (no pun intended) splendid performance of US divisions in the ETO by 1945.
Don't read this book as a battle history. The maps are barely sufficient to support the narrative, and the battles and campaigns are described in the barest outline necessary to make the author's points. This was a wise choice. Histories of the US Army's battles, down to the smallest level of action, are available in abundance. Read those first, if you wish; then pick up Mansoor's excellent book to learn the back story about the leaders, the training history, and the development of fighting skill and spirit in the divisions involved. This book is a must for the shelves of any serious reader about World War II in the ETO.
The simple answers are training and leadership. Given the same human material, a US Army division would almost always fail or take heavy casualties if it were poorly led by officers at the divisional and regimental level; likewise, replacing those officers with men of proven talent (combat experience not necessarily needed, but it never hurt) could turn that same division around.
The other factor, training, was something not all divisions got to experience equally. The Army's training plan was sound, and when allowed to complete it uninterrupted, those divisions so trained tended to perform very well, even their first time in combat. But unfortunately, the Army—desperate for reinforcements for divisions already overseas—repeatedly plundered units still in training for replacements, meaning the divisions back home had to start the training process all over again...or more likely, get deployed with less training time and unit cohesion than the plan called for.
A better way to keep divisions in the field than this practice of combing out replacements, deleterious as it was, was never devised during the war, so the triumph of the American Army has to be considered in that light. Yes we tended to have material superiority when the logistics chain permitted it; but material alone can't explain the almost uniformly (no pun intended) splendid performance of US divisions in the ETO by 1945.
Don't read this book as a battle history. The maps are barely sufficient to support the narrative, and the battles and campaigns are described in the barest outline necessary to make the author's points. This was a wise choice. Histories of the US Army's battles, down to the smallest level of action, are available in abundance. Read those first, if you wish; then pick up Mansoor's excellent book to learn the back story about the leaders, the training history, and the development of fighting skill and spirit in the divisions involved. This book is a must for the shelves of any serious reader about World War II in the ETO.
August 28, 2013
A tremendous history that combines operational narrative with analysis of force-generation policies and the strategic direction of the war. Mansoor does an outstanding job of combining the dry facts of standard operational histories (unit designations, commanders' names, casualty figures, and so on) with biographical details, contextual information from memoirs and other non-official sources, and poignant, challenging historiographic assessment. His brief summary of the related literature is worth the price of the book on its own. Mansoor definitely has a take, and he never fails to remind you of it, but I consider that a strength of the book. A must-read for students of ground combat in the European theater and of force generation/personnel management in the Second World War.
January 4, 2014
Excellent historical study. Dr. Mansoor refutes the contention of authors like T. N. Dupuy and S.L.A.Marshall that the Allies won World War II in Europe because of our overwhelming materiel advantage. He contends that these other authors arrived at their conclusions by comparing "vanilla" US infantry divisions with the Wehrmacht elite, a comparison much akin to comparing apples and oranges. A valuable contribution to the literature on World War II.
May 28, 2012
Very informative, fact filled. Somewhat dry.
November 14, 2016
A decent book that focuses primarily on the standard infantry divisions that fought in the ETO.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews