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The Sword and the Scepter; The Problem of Militarism in Germany #1
The Sword and the Scepter; The Problem of Militarism in Germany- Volume I: The Prussian Tradition 1740-1890
English, German (translation)
337 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1969
70 people want to read
About the author
Gerhard Ritter
82 books4 followersGerhard Ritter nacque in Turingia,nel 1888.Professore universitario a partire dal 1924,durante gli ultimi anni della seconda guerra mondiale entrò in contatto con i gruppi di opposizione al regime,e fu imprigionato dalla Gestapo.Ripreso l'insegnamento universitario,morì a Friburgo il 1 luglio 1967.
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
June 30, 2023
Gerhard Ritter, the one time dean of German historians, led a controversial and event-laden life, especially for an academic. A brief flirtation with Nazism eventually evolved into opposition and involvement in the July 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler. He escaped execution but not imprisonment.
In his writings, Ritter always maintained a traditionalist, conservative approach. This became a fervent cause following World War II, when he built upon prior theses that defended German nationalism and criticized democratic institutions. Part of that argument can be seen in this volume. For Ritter, the French Revolution ushered in an era of radicalization, especially of radicalized militarism. And Germany was no different from France or other European expansionist powers. It would be the German defeat in World War I and the unleashing of what Ritter considered radical populism expressed through democratic institutions that would make Hitler possible.
In this latter notion, Ritter essentially made the victors of World War I equally responsible for totalitarianism--not just in Germany but elsewhere in Europe, too. He was following a path first laid down during the interwar years, when it became fashionable among historians in general to argue that Europe had slid into World War I due to events beyond the ability of individual nations to control. Everyone was equally guilty.
All this would culminate in the 1960s with Ritter's opposition to and argument with Fritz Fischer, who held that Germany was uniquely responsible for the war.
Quite interesting today is that it is Ritter's notions that have held sway. Fischer remains somewhat hidden in the shadows. After more than 50 years, contemporary political aims regarding European unity have converged with Ritter's arguments defending German nationalism.
Note: I still have all four volumes of Ritter's history on my bookshelf. But even as the "equally guilty" thesis of First World War I "war guilt" has taken on permanent root, the individual merits and weaknesses of those historians involved in the debate have faded from view. Ritter and the others of his time dealt in political, economic, and military history organized around "great men." That approach is much out of fashion today. So even as Ritter sort of won the battle on the issue of war guilt, he and his works have largely begun to disappear, especially in the English speaking world. A pity. Because there is still much there to be learned.
In his writings, Ritter always maintained a traditionalist, conservative approach. This became a fervent cause following World War II, when he built upon prior theses that defended German nationalism and criticized democratic institutions. Part of that argument can be seen in this volume. For Ritter, the French Revolution ushered in an era of radicalization, especially of radicalized militarism. And Germany was no different from France or other European expansionist powers. It would be the German defeat in World War I and the unleashing of what Ritter considered radical populism expressed through democratic institutions that would make Hitler possible.
In this latter notion, Ritter essentially made the victors of World War I equally responsible for totalitarianism--not just in Germany but elsewhere in Europe, too. He was following a path first laid down during the interwar years, when it became fashionable among historians in general to argue that Europe had slid into World War I due to events beyond the ability of individual nations to control. Everyone was equally guilty.
All this would culminate in the 1960s with Ritter's opposition to and argument with Fritz Fischer, who held that Germany was uniquely responsible for the war.
Quite interesting today is that it is Ritter's notions that have held sway. Fischer remains somewhat hidden in the shadows. After more than 50 years, contemporary political aims regarding European unity have converged with Ritter's arguments defending German nationalism.
Note: I still have all four volumes of Ritter's history on my bookshelf. But even as the "equally guilty" thesis of First World War I "war guilt" has taken on permanent root, the individual merits and weaknesses of those historians involved in the debate have faded from view. Ritter and the others of his time dealt in political, economic, and military history organized around "great men." That approach is much out of fashion today. So even as Ritter sort of won the battle on the issue of war guilt, he and his works have largely begun to disappear, especially in the English speaking world. A pity. Because there is still much there to be learned.
November 18, 2012
This is a good background on the origins of German militarism. Of particular interest is the final third of the book that focuses on the conflict between Moltke, the head of the German military command, and Bismarck.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews