Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet that Defeated the Japanese Navy

by John T. Kuehn

Agents of Innovation examines the influence of the General Board of the Navy as agents of innovation during the period between World Wars I and II. The General Board, a formal body established by the Secretary of the Navy to advise him on both strategic matters with respect to the fleet, served as the organizational nexus for the interaction between fleet design and the naval limitations imposed on the Navy by treaty during the period. Particularly important was the General Board's role in implementing the Washington Naval Treaty that limited naval armaments after 1922. The General Board orchestrated the efforts by the principal Naval Bureaus, the Naval War College, and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in ensuring that the designs adopted for the warships built and modified during the period of the Washington and London Naval Treaties both met treaty requirements while attempting to meet strategic needs. The leadership of the Navy at large, and the General Board in particular, felt themselves especially constrained by Article XIX (the fortification clause) of the Washington Naval Treaty that implemented a status quo on naval fortifications in the Western Pacific. The treaty system led the Navy to design a measurably different fleet than it might otherwise have in the absence of naval limitations. Despite these limitations, the fleet that fought the Japanese to a standstill in 1942 was predominately composed of ships and concepts developed and fostered by the General Board prior to the outbreak of war.

Genres: History, Military History, Military Fiction, World War II, Naval History

296 pages, Hardcover

First published November 1, 2008

Reviews

[Jonathan · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book providing a small interesting insight into how the US Navy, specifically through the mechanism of their General Board, adjusted and planned their fleet composition through the inter-war Naval Treaty era, and how that led them to the fleet and mobile base concepts that allowed them to fight across the vast Pacific after all bases west of Midway were overrun.

However it suffers a bit from repetition, telling the readers what its about to tell them, then telling them in a bit more detail, or with some examples, and then summarizing what it just told them. The relative sparsity of specific examples or detail contributed to this feeling that it was all summarizing.
I feel either it could have been further edited down to trim out some of this feeling of redundancy or, my preference, expanded with more specific examples and more scope so that the introductions and summaries didn't feel so similar to the main portions.

For example it mentions how the General Board recommendations would go to the War College and get incorporated into Fleet Problems to experiment with possible solutions. But I think the book would have benefited from showing this round trip from the General Board to covering how the suggestions were incorporated in the Fleet Problem, describing how it went and what the results were, then showing how those finding were fed back to the General Board and used to shape its guidance to the various Bureaus.

Or in another it makes the point several times that the General Board could solicit testimony from anybody willing to travel to Washington DC, where it met. But the book failed to provide many examples of non-Navy people providing such testimony, nor how such testimony did (or didn't) contributed to the plans for a Treaty optimized navy.

Another missed opportunity, seems to be that for all it's talk of how the US Navy pursued the mobile base concept, the only part of it covered in detail was mobile floating drydocks. I think the other logistics behind sea-basing, or at least quickly setting up bases in unimproved lagoons, should have been touched on; even if only to explain cases where the pre-Treaty plans and designs were sufficient and the General Board focused on gaps like floating drydocks. Certainly there were oilers, supply ships, hospital ships, repair ships, etc. during World War I - but this book doesn't even touch on whether the Navy had to adjust the designs, endurance, or numbers of those to support the logistics of fighting without nearby permanent bases.
I also wonder how much the General Board was informed or, or involved in, the design and experimintation with various forms of underway refueling; which ultimately concluded with Nimitz's successful tests of alongside refusing of even Battleships in '39 - '40. But the only significant mention I recall of tankers was a proposal to build and experimental submarine tanker (like the later German miltch cows) and that it was ultimately dropped due to scarcity of funds during the Great Depression.

Still, despite these specific issues with the book, overall I did find it interesting and am glad to have read it. I just wish it could have been even more than it was.

[Casey · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good book, providing a history of the US Navy’s General Board and it’s important role in developing the force which fought WWII. The author, historian John T. Kuehn, makes a strong case that the General Board’s pragmatic processes were the primary mover for most of the Navy’s pre-WWII developments in technology, logistics, and warfighting. Kuehn paints a picture of the General Board, a small group of senior Naval officers serving as an advisory committee to the Secretary of the Navy, as being at the center of the Navy’s innovation to maturation cycle. Their prime motivator was a desire to create the capability needed for strategic plans against Japan despite the restrictions imposed by the naval limitation treaties of 1922 and 1930. The treaties’ stipulations against additional fortifications west of Hawaii were a particular influencer to innovation. Kuehn shows that the Board’s actions resulted in strategic naval thinking shifting away from established, fortified ports and to the more mobile Navy that matured in WWII and which still exists today. A great book for understanding a methodology of innovation maturation in a military bureaucracy. Highly recommended for anyone wanting to better understand the US Navy’s development prior to WWII.

[Packard Mills · Rating 3 out of 5]

Worth a read. Interesting the postulate that the Fortification Clause initiated innovation in the US Navy, such as at-sea aviation and long-range ships. Without forward bases, the US Navy had to innovate to find solutions. In addition, the information about the General Board was interesting. It really brought to the fore Admiral Dewey's longterm influence on the navy. There was on annoyance, it was the author's continual use of the word: Ameliorate.

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting perspective on the role of the General Board and its success in changing from a Mahanian concept fleet which relied on pre-existing advanced bases to a entirely new concept of a fleet that could support itself with at sea replenishment and deployable bases. Hindsight can be perfect especially when things work out, but there is a ring of plausibility to the author's theses that the Board moved the design of the US Fleet in the right direction following the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty and that it was conscious decisions not serendipity that led the US to adopt a fast carrier cruiser striking force concept with battleships in a supplemental role.

[John · Rating 2 out of 5]

I am sorry to say that the writing style of this particular work took a dry subject and rendered it drier, to the point of unpalatability for me. As a rule I enjoy works from the Naval Institute Press but this particular book is better suited for classroom study where specific pieces are discussed in the context of some larger class.