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The Union, the Confederacy, and the Atlantic Rim
These four essays by Howard Jones, R. J. M. Blackett, Thomas Schoonover, and James M. McPherson reconsider why the Confederacy never received the foreign aid that it counted on, and trace the war's impact upon European and Latin nations and dependencies. The book provides fresh perspectives regarding Britain's refusal to recognize the Confederacy, the role abroad of pro-Union African-American lecturers, French emperor Napoleon III's intervention in Mexico, and the Civil War's meaning to peoples all over the world.
169 pages, Hardcover
First published May 1, 1995
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April 30, 2008
Perhaps no period in American history has received more academic scrutiny than the Civil War. One aspect that remains little studied, however, has been the international diplomacy of this oft cited “domestic” struggle. A mid-1990s conference at Purdue University addressed the diplomatic struggles of both the Union and the Confederacy, and these essays comprise The Union, the Confederacy, and the Atlantic Rim. Editor Robert E. May begins the collection and his introduction is a solid compendium of Civil War Foreign Relations. It includes summaries of piracy in the Atlantic, the “Trent Affair,” and other “diplomatic complications deriving from wartime European challenges” (13). In short, it’s a great starting point for those unfamiliar for the diplomatic intricacies of the period and would be ideal reading material in an introductory class focusing on the diplomacy of the Civil War.
Howard Jones’ next chapter, “History and Mythology: The Crisis over British Intervention in the Civil War,” exposes just how involved the British were in this “domestic” struggle. Jones examines “what may well be the Civil War diplomatic question that has most intrigued historians: What kept Great Britain from recognizing the Confederacy or otherwise intervening in the conflict” (20)? His chapter reads as a straightforward diplomatic history, one that recalls the shifting British stance on entering the war. Jones’ conclusion: “the Union victory at Antietam and Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation…heightened European interest in intervention,” but ultimately the extreme bloodshed of the battle fueled an interest in British mediation [and] not involvement (21).
R.J.M. Blackett’s third chapter also deals with Britain, but more specifically with issues of “African Americans, British Public Opinion, and Civil War Diplomacy.” This chapter is an example of “new social history,” as it examines how former southern slaves influenced British public opinion. These individuals traveled to Britain during the war and gave anti-slavery speeches. He notes the immense economic influence of the Confederacy’s cotton market on British textile workers, but also emphasizes public opinion on slavery. Blackett’s analysis concludes that these “pro-Union African American orators played a key role in neutralizing efforts by Confederate propaganda agents and British sympathizers of the South to convey an image that British textile workers favored intervention on behalf of the South” (21).
The third chapter, by Thomas Schoonover, is framed around a Wallersteinian approach, better known as “world-systems theory.” He attempts to show how U.S. diplomatic historians have maintained a narrow perspective when studying the Civil War. He emphasizes the importance of the Gulf-Caribbean, a highly contested region for the Union, the Confederacy and European powers. He states that “since the days of the buccaneers, North Americans had participated in a multinational competition to dominate the Gulf-Caribbean” (102). In other words, Europeans did not jump at a chance to intervene in the region because of the Civil War. Instead, the conflict had little influence on European machinations in the region. Schoonover also explains the importance of French intervention in Mexico, the maneuvering of Austrian Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian in Central America, and other European “initiatives involving Spain, Prussia, and other countries.” He concludes that, with regards to America’s minor influence in the region, “the Confederacy …made a poor diplomatic showing” in the region by putting too much emphasis on stealing Union gold shipments from the region. If the Confederacy had more cash, they might have focused on commercial trade in the region instead. In short, the Union had a clear financial advantage that helped reformers around the Atlantic to side with them and not the south. Editor Robert May concludes that this essay “serves as a caution against any ethnocentric reading of the American past” (22).
James M. McPherson’s final essay analyzes the meaning of the Civil War to other nations. It contrasts Schoonover’s essay by emphasizing American influence in global affairs, not downplaying it. He argues that European powers carefully followed the unfolding events in America. To McPherson, conservatives, liberals and radicals Europeans alike all “drew inspiration from the United States before the war.” After the emancipation proclamation, however, they diverged. Liberal Europeans viewed the Union as the “embodiment of democracy and of the hopes of oppressed peoples everywhere” while conservative elites sided with the Confederacy. Yet, public opinion kept European leaders from siding with the Confederacy, as the tide of popular sentiment sided with the Union. Finally, he provides a look into Russia’s role in the Civil War through Russian minister to the United States Edouard de Stoeckl. This final character examination is brief, but aims to provide a look into world opinion, one that “gave renewed inspiration to liberals abroad” (23).
The Union, the Confederacy, and the Atlantic Rim also reprinted the question and answer sessions from the Purdue conference and these Q&A sessions provide a dialog often omitted from the printed page. For example, while Blackett’s chapter deals with pro-union popular sentiment in Britain, a question from another conference panel reveals James McPherson’s contention that “British papers, such as the Times of London…and Punch, the British humor magazine…carried their hostile attitude toward Lincoln almost to the end” of the war (151). Such dialog shows the contested nature of historical arguments in this collection and room for future scholarship.
This collection adds a number of new aspects to Civil War global diplomacy. Public opinion shines through as an important and less-examined aspect of Civil War diplomacy. These scholars take into account the domestic tides of public opinion in shaping foreign relations towards the Union and the Confederacy, revealing a new trend in the historiography to consider social history’s influence on foreign relations. Thomas Schoonover’s essay on world system’s theory is another welcome addition to the historiography and makes a historical statement on the state of Civil War scholarship; namely, that America was in fact part of a larger, global political schema, and that American scholarship has been too focused on America itself and not global political affairs of the era.
Scholarly reviews of this collection were for the most part positive. In a Historian review, Douglas R. Egerton of Le Moyne College chides the collection for putting footnotes at the end of the chapters and not at the bottom of the page, but admittedly this is a forgivable stylistic choice. Robert Cook (of the University of Sheffield) applauds Howard Jones’ traditional, diplomatic approach but dismisses Schoonover’s attempt at a world systems theory. Yet his critique of Schoonover’s approach is devoid of any nuance; I’m not sure Cook understood the chapter at all. In the Journal of Southern History, University of Tennessee – Martin professor Daniel McDonough states that Blackett’s chapter is far from proving African American influence on public opinion, but this is a stock critique: public opinion is always a difficult sentiment to measure.
In short, The Union, the Confederacy, and the Atlantic Rim is a successful addition to the historiography of the Civil War. It adds an international perspective to a conflict often viewed as a domestic struggle. It also provides interesting new methods to analyzing the period, including “world systems theory” and “new social history.” Still, there remains an old-school diplomatic approach in Howard Jones’ second chapter. In short, this brief collection adds new perspectives on one of the most analyzed conflicts in modern history. In doing so, it shows that there is still much work left to be done on the deadliest war in American history.
Howard Jones’ next chapter, “History and Mythology: The Crisis over British Intervention in the Civil War,” exposes just how involved the British were in this “domestic” struggle. Jones examines “what may well be the Civil War diplomatic question that has most intrigued historians: What kept Great Britain from recognizing the Confederacy or otherwise intervening in the conflict” (20)? His chapter reads as a straightforward diplomatic history, one that recalls the shifting British stance on entering the war. Jones’ conclusion: “the Union victory at Antietam and Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation…heightened European interest in intervention,” but ultimately the extreme bloodshed of the battle fueled an interest in British mediation [and] not involvement (21).
R.J.M. Blackett’s third chapter also deals with Britain, but more specifically with issues of “African Americans, British Public Opinion, and Civil War Diplomacy.” This chapter is an example of “new social history,” as it examines how former southern slaves influenced British public opinion. These individuals traveled to Britain during the war and gave anti-slavery speeches. He notes the immense economic influence of the Confederacy’s cotton market on British textile workers, but also emphasizes public opinion on slavery. Blackett’s analysis concludes that these “pro-Union African American orators played a key role in neutralizing efforts by Confederate propaganda agents and British sympathizers of the South to convey an image that British textile workers favored intervention on behalf of the South” (21).
The third chapter, by Thomas Schoonover, is framed around a Wallersteinian approach, better known as “world-systems theory.” He attempts to show how U.S. diplomatic historians have maintained a narrow perspective when studying the Civil War. He emphasizes the importance of the Gulf-Caribbean, a highly contested region for the Union, the Confederacy and European powers. He states that “since the days of the buccaneers, North Americans had participated in a multinational competition to dominate the Gulf-Caribbean” (102). In other words, Europeans did not jump at a chance to intervene in the region because of the Civil War. Instead, the conflict had little influence on European machinations in the region. Schoonover also explains the importance of French intervention in Mexico, the maneuvering of Austrian Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian in Central America, and other European “initiatives involving Spain, Prussia, and other countries.” He concludes that, with regards to America’s minor influence in the region, “the Confederacy …made a poor diplomatic showing” in the region by putting too much emphasis on stealing Union gold shipments from the region. If the Confederacy had more cash, they might have focused on commercial trade in the region instead. In short, the Union had a clear financial advantage that helped reformers around the Atlantic to side with them and not the south. Editor Robert May concludes that this essay “serves as a caution against any ethnocentric reading of the American past” (22).
James M. McPherson’s final essay analyzes the meaning of the Civil War to other nations. It contrasts Schoonover’s essay by emphasizing American influence in global affairs, not downplaying it. He argues that European powers carefully followed the unfolding events in America. To McPherson, conservatives, liberals and radicals Europeans alike all “drew inspiration from the United States before the war.” After the emancipation proclamation, however, they diverged. Liberal Europeans viewed the Union as the “embodiment of democracy and of the hopes of oppressed peoples everywhere” while conservative elites sided with the Confederacy. Yet, public opinion kept European leaders from siding with the Confederacy, as the tide of popular sentiment sided with the Union. Finally, he provides a look into Russia’s role in the Civil War through Russian minister to the United States Edouard de Stoeckl. This final character examination is brief, but aims to provide a look into world opinion, one that “gave renewed inspiration to liberals abroad” (23).
The Union, the Confederacy, and the Atlantic Rim also reprinted the question and answer sessions from the Purdue conference and these Q&A sessions provide a dialog often omitted from the printed page. For example, while Blackett’s chapter deals with pro-union popular sentiment in Britain, a question from another conference panel reveals James McPherson’s contention that “British papers, such as the Times of London…and Punch, the British humor magazine…carried their hostile attitude toward Lincoln almost to the end” of the war (151). Such dialog shows the contested nature of historical arguments in this collection and room for future scholarship.
This collection adds a number of new aspects to Civil War global diplomacy. Public opinion shines through as an important and less-examined aspect of Civil War diplomacy. These scholars take into account the domestic tides of public opinion in shaping foreign relations towards the Union and the Confederacy, revealing a new trend in the historiography to consider social history’s influence on foreign relations. Thomas Schoonover’s essay on world system’s theory is another welcome addition to the historiography and makes a historical statement on the state of Civil War scholarship; namely, that America was in fact part of a larger, global political schema, and that American scholarship has been too focused on America itself and not global political affairs of the era.
Scholarly reviews of this collection were for the most part positive. In a Historian review, Douglas R. Egerton of Le Moyne College chides the collection for putting footnotes at the end of the chapters and not at the bottom of the page, but admittedly this is a forgivable stylistic choice. Robert Cook (of the University of Sheffield) applauds Howard Jones’ traditional, diplomatic approach but dismisses Schoonover’s attempt at a world systems theory. Yet his critique of Schoonover’s approach is devoid of any nuance; I’m not sure Cook understood the chapter at all. In the Journal of Southern History, University of Tennessee – Martin professor Daniel McDonough states that Blackett’s chapter is far from proving African American influence on public opinion, but this is a stock critique: public opinion is always a difficult sentiment to measure.
In short, The Union, the Confederacy, and the Atlantic Rim is a successful addition to the historiography of the Civil War. It adds an international perspective to a conflict often viewed as a domestic struggle. It also provides interesting new methods to analyzing the period, including “world systems theory” and “new social history.” Still, there remains an old-school diplomatic approach in Howard Jones’ second chapter. In short, this brief collection adds new perspectives on one of the most analyzed conflicts in modern history. In doing so, it shows that there is still much work left to be done on the deadliest war in American history.
November 24, 2023
As usual with these kind of books that include a collection of articles, it's very irregular and some of the articles are brilliant and other not so much.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews