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Written on the Heart: The Case for Natural Law
With uninterrupted clarity, frequent eloquence and occasional humor, J. Budziszewski presents and defends the natural-law tradition in what is at once a primer for students and a vigorous argument for scholars. Written on the Heart expounds the work of the leading architects of theory on natural law, including Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and John Locke. It also takes up contemporary philosophy, theology and political science, colorfully running against the intimidating tide of advanced pluralism that finds natural law so difficult to tolerate.
252 pages, Paperback
First published May 14, 1997
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About the author
J. Budziszewski
30 books65 followersJ. Budziszewski (born 1952) is professor of government at the University of Texas, Austin, where he has taught since 1981. He specializes in ethics, political philosophy and the interaction of these two fields with religion and theology.
Budziszewski has written widely, in both scholarly and popular venues, about a variety of moral and political issues including abortion, marriage, sexuality, capital punishment, and the role of judges in a constitutional republic. His principal area of publication is the theory of natural law.
Apart from his scholarly philosophical work, Budziszewski is known for articles and books of Christian apologetics, addressed to a broad audience including young people and college students.
Ph.D., Political Science, Yale University, 1981.
M.A., Political Science, University of Florida, 1977.
B.A., Political Science, University of South Florida, 1975.
2002-present: Professor, Departments of Government and Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin.
1995-2002: Associate Professor, Departments of Government and Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin.
1988-1995: Associate Professor, Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin.
1981-1988: Assistant Professor, Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin.
1980-1981: Acting Instructor, Departments of Political Science, Yale University.
Budziszewski has written widely, in both scholarly and popular venues, about a variety of moral and political issues including abortion, marriage, sexuality, capital punishment, and the role of judges in a constitutional republic. His principal area of publication is the theory of natural law.
Apart from his scholarly philosophical work, Budziszewski is known for articles and books of Christian apologetics, addressed to a broad audience including young people and college students.
Ph.D., Political Science, Yale University, 1981.
M.A., Political Science, University of Florida, 1977.
B.A., Political Science, University of South Florida, 1975.
2002-present: Professor, Departments of Government and Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin.
1995-2002: Associate Professor, Departments of Government and Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin.
1988-1995: Associate Professor, Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin.
1981-1988: Assistant Professor, Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin.
1980-1981: Acting Instructor, Departments of Political Science, Yale University.
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
March 19, 2007
My dad's book!
December 11, 2017
Having spent the last year reading through the works of Theonomists, I thought it would wise to return to reading on natural law. I happened upon J. Budziszewski’s Written on the Heart in my father’s library and picked it up. Budziszewski is obviously a very intelligent and well-learned man. He knows the material and is well acquainted with the thought of Aristotle, Aquinas (who he refers to as “Thomas”), Locke, and Bentham and Mill. The first portion of the book reviews these philosophers. In the second part of the book, Budziszewski tells us why it matters—what is natural law for?
To begin, I really appreciated much of what Budziszewski articulates. He is explicitly Christian in this book and makes many statements with which I fully agree. For example, he argues that “it is impossible to legislate without legislating morality.” (p. 44) On page 54 he writes, “Reason itself presupposes faith… a defense of reason by reason is circular, therefore worthless. Our only guarantee that human reason works is the God who made it.” He almost sounds like a disciple of Van Til!
He agrees with Aquinas (who he argues is confusing about these matters) that we “indulge in special pleading” because “Ethics threatens us in a way that geometry does not because it reminds us that we are not gods, that we are subject to a law that we did not make.” p. 69 Again, this is great stuff—very much in accord with Vantillian presuppositionalism—which I believe to be the most Scriptural understanding of epistemology and law.
In his analysis of natural law he begins by saying, “…I am a Christian before I am a philosopher.” He puts presuppositions first—as he ought. He elaborates, “There is a foundation in every house of thought, a prephilosophical faith in every philosophy.” p. 179
But what of the all-important ‘point of contact’ between the believer and unbeliever? He writes, “Our point of contact with nonbelievers is established by God himself. That point is general revelation, which ‘penetrates the very mind of man even in his revolt’ so that his conscience bears witness despite himself. Natural law is but the moral aspect of this penetrating arrow.” This is all great and I fully agree with him in all these ideas.
In the first half of the book, when he’s articulating natural law philosophy, the reader is given too sympathetic a reading of natural law. This may be my own prejudice, but I simply felt as though Budziszewski had too great of an appreciation for the autonomous philosophy of Aristotle, and the confused and often schizophrenic philosophy of Aquinas and Locke.
For example, writing of Aquinas, he seems to endorse without critique his belief that human law is not derived from “Divine law” but from natural law”. This seems inconsistent when he later writes, that special revelation is “superior” to natural law. p. 210 He seems to follow Aquinas here, saying, “…government is charged with directing the community to its natural rather than its supernatural good, so God does not intend the enforcement of Divine law upon nonbelievers.”
Now, it is one thing to argue that “government is charged with directing the community to its natural” good. But it is another to argue from this to discard Divine law in favor of natural law in the civil realm. Natural law philosophers privilege natural law over Divine law in the civil realm. They do so despite acknowledging the difficulties in finding consensus in what the natural law is.
In critiquing Aquinas he writes that he, “sometimes gives the impression that the mind has not fallen as far as the rest of us. Though he knows that the text on our hearts is overwritten by sin, he sometimes gives the impression that it is just as plain to the sinful eye as a traffic light in the middle of the road.” p. 190 So he seems to agree with Van Til that the Fall has a ‘noetic effect’—the Fall makes an ethical divide between man and God.
More fundamentally, in discussing Aristotle, he never forces Aristotle to define the “good”. How can “good” be defined apart from presupposing God? To my recollection, Budziszewski never makes the necessary connection from God to Aristotle’s “good.” He seems to just take Aristotle at his word without forcing the presupposition. He never puts this in the category of common grace and never shows the logical disconnect between Aristotle’s assumption and his paganism. He simply leaves us to believe that there is an ethical connection between man and God through natural law. He makes this ethical connection explicit with his analogy of “iron ring of the mind” and God as the ‘divine magnet’ in his examination of Aquinas.
Budziszewski writes that Aquinas reminds us that “high-minded men of every civilization have concurred in what is right.” He adds that it is not just historians label these men so, but “their own civilizations”. He concludes, “Apparently the iron rings do retain some traces of their original magnetism, reminding them of the magnet and calling them back.” He labels this remaining link “teleology.” p.70
Now, following his analogy, he acknowledges the connection is too weak for the ‘divine magnet’ to hold the ‘iron ring of the mind’—there is only enough of a connection left for us to see there was once a connection, and perhaps could be again. There is no force to the “natural law” only a remnant—or, to use Calvin’s phrase “sensus divinitatis”. Suddenly we find ourselves back with the Vantillians who reject natural law. But rather than follow Calvin here, Budziszewski stays with teleology and the Aristotelian synthesis.
Here again is the schizophrenia of the natural law position. Budziszewski gives us Aquinas’ five ways reason is perverted: passion, evil habit, evil disposition of nature, vicious custom, and evil persuasion. p. 72 This is a good list, maybe not complete, but very good. Here is seems to follow Aquinas in thinking that without perversion, human reason can attain to right understanding of natural law. As though these perversions come and go, or can are not a part of the human condition.
With Locke, he acknowledges that Locke “stakes his entire argument for natural law and natural rights on the existence of God.” So Locke presupposes God, but then seeks to prove God’s existence with human reason. Locke’s ‘Argument from Design’ “shows magnificent order and design: however, design presupposes a Designer.” The theory uses natural arguments to argue that God exists. Budziszewski writes that Locke does this because “he is trying to make his arguments stronger by showing that you ought to accept them even if you don’t believe that the Bible is the Word of God.” p. 105-106 But Budziszewski seems to miss the circularity of Locke’s argument. Locke presupposes God at the outset of his argument, assumes the validity of reason, logic, and human senses and then uses those tools to demonstrate God exists. He then erases his presupposition of God from the equation and believes his argument can still stand. Herein is where natural law fails—it cuts itself off from the tree, to prove the tree exists.
Natural law presupposes God, but then covers him up, argues he’s there because of the remaining shadow, and then is indignant when the unbeliever tries to ignore him. If you want the unbeliever to acknowledge God, perhaps you shouldn’t have covered him up to begin with! Now, this is all probably a bit unfair to Budziszewski. He writes so very explicitly throughout the book that his foundation is “the gospel of Jesus Christ.” p. 179 But there is confusion here because he simply doesn’t sufficiently critique Aquinas and Locke. He lets them speak without a more thorough refutation.
So while Budziszewski affirms the authority of Scripture and the presupposition of the Creator God, he seems to fall prey to the very same criticism he has of Aquinas: “Though he knows that everything other than God is utterly dependent on God, he sometimes gives the impression that what goes on in nature is somehow less dependent on him than are the effects of his grace.” p. 190
I must examine Budziszewski’s views on the purpose or natural law before concluding. He writes that its “main use” is “apologetics” giving “a reason for the hope that lies within us.” p. 184 He writes of “three main varieties” of apologetics: evangelical, moral, and political. Evangelical apologetics is sharing your faith with another. Moral apologetics is when we “engage in ethical persuasion or counsel.” And political apologetics is when we “leaven the civil law” with natural law.
It is unfortunate that he doesn’t expand this section of the book more, as it seems to me that much more could have been said to elaborate on these ideas, but I suppose he’s written other books on these matters.
Though he doesn’t go into great depth on these three varieties of apologetics, I do question the wisdom and the Scriptural justification for these approaches. Instead, I follow Van Til here. Van Til argues that our reason became corrupted through the Fall, and that we suppress the truth in unrighteousness. We only accept the truth and act upon the truth when our minds are renewed through God’s grace. Apart from that grace, we will continue in unbelief and in rejection of God and God’s law.
Interestingly enough, it is here that Budziszewski responds to Karl Barth and the contact point with the unbeliever. He chooses Barth, rather than Van Til—perhaps because Barth is more easily refuted. Here he argues that Barth’s criticism is that “the affirmations of believers and nonbelievers will have no meaning in common even when they use identical terms.” This is so “because every term and every proposition gains its meaning from the system of thought to which it belongs.” p. 184-185
Budziszewski then argues, similar to Van Til, that “general revelation…‘penetrates the very mind of man even in his revolt’ so that his conscience bears witness despite himself. Natural law is but the moral aspect of this penetrating arrow.” p. 185 But Van Til argues that though this is the contact point, unbelieving man operates as though he did not know this knowledge and only comes under the yoke of God’s law when he is born again. Budziszewski argues, seemingly with Aquinas, that man may still agree to at least part of the natural law while rejecting the sum of it. Indeed the pagan nations of today and antiquity do hold to much of the natural law—but it is natural law according to their tradition and not in submission to God.
Natural law proponents argue inconsistently when they argue that natural law is the focal point for moral and civil law—they seem to fail to understand the impact of Christ’s incarnation, death, and resurrection in their accounting of common grace, law, and social order.
Prior to the incarnation, only Israel had God’s special revelation and they were to be a blessing to the nations—calling their neighbors to account and holding them to God’s law—as revealed in nature and through his prophets. The pagan nations were characterized by viciousness, anarchy, blood feuds, violence, human sacrifice, licentiousness, cultural frustration, tyranny, and so on. This was a fundamentally different order than reigns today after the dawn of Christendom.
Christendom brought the Christian leavening and redeeming of culture. Christendom was the result of the nations submitting to God’s special revelation, not natural revelation. The laws of a nation were the result of applying biblical law to the laws of the nations. This new social order brought a transformation to the societies where Christ reigned. The birth pangs of Christendom were marked by conflict and the raging of the dying pagan order against the new Christian order.
Christendom has never been a perfect Christian society, and we still see the leaven of Christ at work around us. But the transformation has begun and we’ve accumulated two millennia of Christian capital around us. This is significant because it has only been with the arrival of Christendom that natural law thinkers have come to the foreground.
Natural law only has force behind it when argued within the confines of a predominantly Christian society. Without the Christian order, natural law loses its force because of competing pagan claims—something we see today. Budziszewski says essentially this when he confesses that the new paganism of our day is a more difficult foe than the paganism of old. At least the pagans of old operated out of the belief that good and evil were objective and real. Today’s pagans believe no such thing.
Darwin, as others have argued—especially in the tradition of Van Til, demolished natural law through his materialist philosophy. If all is matter, good and evil cannot exist—they are mere social constructions that serve a purpose in providing social stability and species continuity.
Natural law advocates are right to argue for the necessity of natural law. As Greg Bahnsen writes, “The knowledge that all men have of God because of natural revelation provides the framework or foundation for any other knowledge they are able to attain. The knowledge of God is the necessary context for learning anything else.” Van Til’s Apologetic, p. 181
Or as Van Til himself, has written:
“But since man has become a sinner, he has become a willing slave of sin (ethelodoulos). (Calvin’s Institutes, II, 2.). He therefore never reads the ‘book of nature’ aright even with respect to ‘natural’ things. He may, to be sure, by virtue of the sense of deity within him, give involuntary, adventitious interpretations of natural revelation that are, so far forth, correct. In this sense every man knows God and knows himself to be a creature of God (Rom. 1:19). But to the extent that he interprets nature according to his own adopted principles, he does not speak the truth on any subject.” Van Til’s Apologetic, p. 208
Natural law is part of revelation, but to attempt to use it alone will never suffice in an argument with an unbeliever. Even Budziszewski uses Scripture to refute John Stuart Mill and his mathematical formulas for social utility. To rely upon natural law is to handicap ourselves. We have God’s special revelation—let’s use it, and not tie a hand behind our back in our battle against paganism.
Now that I’ve critiqued the book, I must confess that there is much good to glean from the book. It is not as though it is all bad by any means. There is much we can take away from natural law—but it all must be done with an explicitly Christian imagination. We can gain much wisdom from the logic and thought of natural law thinkers. But as Budziszewski writes, “we should not demand too much from the natural law, for what we need most is made known to us only in the gospel.” Let’s keep our focus there, not on what Aristotle has to say.
To begin, I really appreciated much of what Budziszewski articulates. He is explicitly Christian in this book and makes many statements with which I fully agree. For example, he argues that “it is impossible to legislate without legislating morality.” (p. 44) On page 54 he writes, “Reason itself presupposes faith… a defense of reason by reason is circular, therefore worthless. Our only guarantee that human reason works is the God who made it.” He almost sounds like a disciple of Van Til!
He agrees with Aquinas (who he argues is confusing about these matters) that we “indulge in special pleading” because “Ethics threatens us in a way that geometry does not because it reminds us that we are not gods, that we are subject to a law that we did not make.” p. 69 Again, this is great stuff—very much in accord with Vantillian presuppositionalism—which I believe to be the most Scriptural understanding of epistemology and law.
In his analysis of natural law he begins by saying, “…I am a Christian before I am a philosopher.” He puts presuppositions first—as he ought. He elaborates, “There is a foundation in every house of thought, a prephilosophical faith in every philosophy.” p. 179
But what of the all-important ‘point of contact’ between the believer and unbeliever? He writes, “Our point of contact with nonbelievers is established by God himself. That point is general revelation, which ‘penetrates the very mind of man even in his revolt’ so that his conscience bears witness despite himself. Natural law is but the moral aspect of this penetrating arrow.” This is all great and I fully agree with him in all these ideas.
In the first half of the book, when he’s articulating natural law philosophy, the reader is given too sympathetic a reading of natural law. This may be my own prejudice, but I simply felt as though Budziszewski had too great of an appreciation for the autonomous philosophy of Aristotle, and the confused and often schizophrenic philosophy of Aquinas and Locke.
For example, writing of Aquinas, he seems to endorse without critique his belief that human law is not derived from “Divine law” but from natural law”. This seems inconsistent when he later writes, that special revelation is “superior” to natural law. p. 210 He seems to follow Aquinas here, saying, “…government is charged with directing the community to its natural rather than its supernatural good, so God does not intend the enforcement of Divine law upon nonbelievers.”
Now, it is one thing to argue that “government is charged with directing the community to its natural” good. But it is another to argue from this to discard Divine law in favor of natural law in the civil realm. Natural law philosophers privilege natural law over Divine law in the civil realm. They do so despite acknowledging the difficulties in finding consensus in what the natural law is.
In critiquing Aquinas he writes that he, “sometimes gives the impression that the mind has not fallen as far as the rest of us. Though he knows that the text on our hearts is overwritten by sin, he sometimes gives the impression that it is just as plain to the sinful eye as a traffic light in the middle of the road.” p. 190 So he seems to agree with Van Til that the Fall has a ‘noetic effect’—the Fall makes an ethical divide between man and God.
More fundamentally, in discussing Aristotle, he never forces Aristotle to define the “good”. How can “good” be defined apart from presupposing God? To my recollection, Budziszewski never makes the necessary connection from God to Aristotle’s “good.” He seems to just take Aristotle at his word without forcing the presupposition. He never puts this in the category of common grace and never shows the logical disconnect between Aristotle’s assumption and his paganism. He simply leaves us to believe that there is an ethical connection between man and God through natural law. He makes this ethical connection explicit with his analogy of “iron ring of the mind” and God as the ‘divine magnet’ in his examination of Aquinas.
Budziszewski writes that Aquinas reminds us that “high-minded men of every civilization have concurred in what is right.” He adds that it is not just historians label these men so, but “their own civilizations”. He concludes, “Apparently the iron rings do retain some traces of their original magnetism, reminding them of the magnet and calling them back.” He labels this remaining link “teleology.” p.70
Now, following his analogy, he acknowledges the connection is too weak for the ‘divine magnet’ to hold the ‘iron ring of the mind’—there is only enough of a connection left for us to see there was once a connection, and perhaps could be again. There is no force to the “natural law” only a remnant—or, to use Calvin’s phrase “sensus divinitatis”. Suddenly we find ourselves back with the Vantillians who reject natural law. But rather than follow Calvin here, Budziszewski stays with teleology and the Aristotelian synthesis.
Here again is the schizophrenia of the natural law position. Budziszewski gives us Aquinas’ five ways reason is perverted: passion, evil habit, evil disposition of nature, vicious custom, and evil persuasion. p. 72 This is a good list, maybe not complete, but very good. Here is seems to follow Aquinas in thinking that without perversion, human reason can attain to right understanding of natural law. As though these perversions come and go, or can are not a part of the human condition.
With Locke, he acknowledges that Locke “stakes his entire argument for natural law and natural rights on the existence of God.” So Locke presupposes God, but then seeks to prove God’s existence with human reason. Locke’s ‘Argument from Design’ “shows magnificent order and design: however, design presupposes a Designer.” The theory uses natural arguments to argue that God exists. Budziszewski writes that Locke does this because “he is trying to make his arguments stronger by showing that you ought to accept them even if you don’t believe that the Bible is the Word of God.” p. 105-106 But Budziszewski seems to miss the circularity of Locke’s argument. Locke presupposes God at the outset of his argument, assumes the validity of reason, logic, and human senses and then uses those tools to demonstrate God exists. He then erases his presupposition of God from the equation and believes his argument can still stand. Herein is where natural law fails—it cuts itself off from the tree, to prove the tree exists.
Natural law presupposes God, but then covers him up, argues he’s there because of the remaining shadow, and then is indignant when the unbeliever tries to ignore him. If you want the unbeliever to acknowledge God, perhaps you shouldn’t have covered him up to begin with! Now, this is all probably a bit unfair to Budziszewski. He writes so very explicitly throughout the book that his foundation is “the gospel of Jesus Christ.” p. 179 But there is confusion here because he simply doesn’t sufficiently critique Aquinas and Locke. He lets them speak without a more thorough refutation.
So while Budziszewski affirms the authority of Scripture and the presupposition of the Creator God, he seems to fall prey to the very same criticism he has of Aquinas: “Though he knows that everything other than God is utterly dependent on God, he sometimes gives the impression that what goes on in nature is somehow less dependent on him than are the effects of his grace.” p. 190
I must examine Budziszewski’s views on the purpose or natural law before concluding. He writes that its “main use” is “apologetics” giving “a reason for the hope that lies within us.” p. 184 He writes of “three main varieties” of apologetics: evangelical, moral, and political. Evangelical apologetics is sharing your faith with another. Moral apologetics is when we “engage in ethical persuasion or counsel.” And political apologetics is when we “leaven the civil law” with natural law.
It is unfortunate that he doesn’t expand this section of the book more, as it seems to me that much more could have been said to elaborate on these ideas, but I suppose he’s written other books on these matters.
Though he doesn’t go into great depth on these three varieties of apologetics, I do question the wisdom and the Scriptural justification for these approaches. Instead, I follow Van Til here. Van Til argues that our reason became corrupted through the Fall, and that we suppress the truth in unrighteousness. We only accept the truth and act upon the truth when our minds are renewed through God’s grace. Apart from that grace, we will continue in unbelief and in rejection of God and God’s law.
Interestingly enough, it is here that Budziszewski responds to Karl Barth and the contact point with the unbeliever. He chooses Barth, rather than Van Til—perhaps because Barth is more easily refuted. Here he argues that Barth’s criticism is that “the affirmations of believers and nonbelievers will have no meaning in common even when they use identical terms.” This is so “because every term and every proposition gains its meaning from the system of thought to which it belongs.” p. 184-185
Budziszewski then argues, similar to Van Til, that “general revelation…‘penetrates the very mind of man even in his revolt’ so that his conscience bears witness despite himself. Natural law is but the moral aspect of this penetrating arrow.” p. 185 But Van Til argues that though this is the contact point, unbelieving man operates as though he did not know this knowledge and only comes under the yoke of God’s law when he is born again. Budziszewski argues, seemingly with Aquinas, that man may still agree to at least part of the natural law while rejecting the sum of it. Indeed the pagan nations of today and antiquity do hold to much of the natural law—but it is natural law according to their tradition and not in submission to God.
Natural law proponents argue inconsistently when they argue that natural law is the focal point for moral and civil law—they seem to fail to understand the impact of Christ’s incarnation, death, and resurrection in their accounting of common grace, law, and social order.
Prior to the incarnation, only Israel had God’s special revelation and they were to be a blessing to the nations—calling their neighbors to account and holding them to God’s law—as revealed in nature and through his prophets. The pagan nations were characterized by viciousness, anarchy, blood feuds, violence, human sacrifice, licentiousness, cultural frustration, tyranny, and so on. This was a fundamentally different order than reigns today after the dawn of Christendom.
Christendom brought the Christian leavening and redeeming of culture. Christendom was the result of the nations submitting to God’s special revelation, not natural revelation. The laws of a nation were the result of applying biblical law to the laws of the nations. This new social order brought a transformation to the societies where Christ reigned. The birth pangs of Christendom were marked by conflict and the raging of the dying pagan order against the new Christian order.
Christendom has never been a perfect Christian society, and we still see the leaven of Christ at work around us. But the transformation has begun and we’ve accumulated two millennia of Christian capital around us. This is significant because it has only been with the arrival of Christendom that natural law thinkers have come to the foreground.
Natural law only has force behind it when argued within the confines of a predominantly Christian society. Without the Christian order, natural law loses its force because of competing pagan claims—something we see today. Budziszewski says essentially this when he confesses that the new paganism of our day is a more difficult foe than the paganism of old. At least the pagans of old operated out of the belief that good and evil were objective and real. Today’s pagans believe no such thing.
Darwin, as others have argued—especially in the tradition of Van Til, demolished natural law through his materialist philosophy. If all is matter, good and evil cannot exist—they are mere social constructions that serve a purpose in providing social stability and species continuity.
Natural law advocates are right to argue for the necessity of natural law. As Greg Bahnsen writes, “The knowledge that all men have of God because of natural revelation provides the framework or foundation for any other knowledge they are able to attain. The knowledge of God is the necessary context for learning anything else.” Van Til’s Apologetic, p. 181
Or as Van Til himself, has written:
“But since man has become a sinner, he has become a willing slave of sin (ethelodoulos). (Calvin’s Institutes, II, 2.). He therefore never reads the ‘book of nature’ aright even with respect to ‘natural’ things. He may, to be sure, by virtue of the sense of deity within him, give involuntary, adventitious interpretations of natural revelation that are, so far forth, correct. In this sense every man knows God and knows himself to be a creature of God (Rom. 1:19). But to the extent that he interprets nature according to his own adopted principles, he does not speak the truth on any subject.” Van Til’s Apologetic, p. 208
Natural law is part of revelation, but to attempt to use it alone will never suffice in an argument with an unbeliever. Even Budziszewski uses Scripture to refute John Stuart Mill and his mathematical formulas for social utility. To rely upon natural law is to handicap ourselves. We have God’s special revelation—let’s use it, and not tie a hand behind our back in our battle against paganism.
Now that I’ve critiqued the book, I must confess that there is much good to glean from the book. It is not as though it is all bad by any means. There is much we can take away from natural law—but it all must be done with an explicitly Christian imagination. We can gain much wisdom from the logic and thought of natural law thinkers. But as Budziszewski writes, “we should not demand too much from the natural law, for what we need most is made known to us only in the gospel.” Let’s keep our focus there, not on what Aristotle has to say.
November 7, 2008
Budziszewski (try saying that 10 times fast!) offers a good introduction to the Natural Law tradition in this book. He begins by looking first at Aristotle. He notes that Aristotle has many good things to say and makes positive contributions to the natural law case, but is - strictly speaking - not a natural law thinker but a natural rights thinker. Budziszewski points out that there's some in Aristotle that a Christian just can't accept, either.
He then moves on to Aquinas. He points out that Aquinas based a lot of his natural law views on Aristotelian concepts, but also adds some Christian elements to it so as to avoid some of the problems inherent in Aristotle. He shows how Aquinas moved the discussion forward and made positive contributions to the natural law thesis. He also rebuts many misunderstandings of Thomas. But he notes that for all his good, Aquinas's acceptance of Aristotelian metaphysics leads to problems for the Christian. (Budziszewski wrote this book while still and evangelical Christian. He has since converted to Roman Catholicism. It would be interesting to see if his criticisms have remained the same.)
Next, Budziszewski discusses Locke's role in the natural law tradition. He notes Locke's unique contributions and points out where he diverges from previous natural law thinkers like Aquinas.
Budziszewski then offers a critique of a competing ethical theory - Utilitarianism. He takes on both Bentham and Mill and subjects utilitarianism to the standard critiques as in an easy-to-digest way.
Budziszewski closes out his book by offering a Christian appraisal of natural law theory. He notes that the theory is basically correct but that Scripture should play a bigger role than it seemed to in previous formulations. He notes that one's natural law theory must be constrained by the things the Bible tells us about God, the world, and us. He then briefly offers a reprise of the older thinkers and ends by looking at a sampling of recent thinkers - both "new" natural law theorists and secular natural law theorists.
Al-in-all this book was a fine introduction to natural law and some of its biggest proponents. The first four units (comprising 12 chapters) were by far the best, the book went down hill a bit in unit 5 (the last three chapters). I was surprised some of the more interesting facets of and questions regarding natural law were not discussed either at all or in anyway other than passing. To pick two related examples, competing absolutes and the law of double-effect was not discussed.
Budziszewski tackles some of the more basis objections to natural law but not the more sophisticated objections one finds in the literature. This is fine as far as it goes since this is an introductory work.
He then moves on to Aquinas. He points out that Aquinas based a lot of his natural law views on Aristotelian concepts, but also adds some Christian elements to it so as to avoid some of the problems inherent in Aristotle. He shows how Aquinas moved the discussion forward and made positive contributions to the natural law thesis. He also rebuts many misunderstandings of Thomas. But he notes that for all his good, Aquinas's acceptance of Aristotelian metaphysics leads to problems for the Christian. (Budziszewski wrote this book while still and evangelical Christian. He has since converted to Roman Catholicism. It would be interesting to see if his criticisms have remained the same.)
Next, Budziszewski discusses Locke's role in the natural law tradition. He notes Locke's unique contributions and points out where he diverges from previous natural law thinkers like Aquinas.
Budziszewski then offers a critique of a competing ethical theory - Utilitarianism. He takes on both Bentham and Mill and subjects utilitarianism to the standard critiques as in an easy-to-digest way.
Budziszewski closes out his book by offering a Christian appraisal of natural law theory. He notes that the theory is basically correct but that Scripture should play a bigger role than it seemed to in previous formulations. He notes that one's natural law theory must be constrained by the things the Bible tells us about God, the world, and us. He then briefly offers a reprise of the older thinkers and ends by looking at a sampling of recent thinkers - both "new" natural law theorists and secular natural law theorists.
Al-in-all this book was a fine introduction to natural law and some of its biggest proponents. The first four units (comprising 12 chapters) were by far the best, the book went down hill a bit in unit 5 (the last three chapters). I was surprised some of the more interesting facets of and questions regarding natural law were not discussed either at all or in anyway other than passing. To pick two related examples, competing absolutes and the law of double-effect was not discussed.
Budziszewski tackles some of the more basis objections to natural law but not the more sophisticated objections one finds in the literature. This is fine as far as it goes since this is an introductory work.
January 2, 2026
Written on the Heart Book Review
Romans 20 “……..so that they are without excuse.”
The best overview is written on the book’s back cover. I won’t attempt to duplicate what already exists.
What I will attempt to present is what might be called steppingstones that will touch upon the essential elements making up the author’s line of reasoning. To make his case for Natural Law the author formats this work in sections which he terms “Units” which he believes leads to a more orderly approach to the subject.
Consider these “Units” as steps for viewing the essential peak points. To get there requires the reader to trek up a series of intellectual pathways in each Unit starting at the base and climbing upward passing other necessary and important tangential concepts.
The heart of this book is grounded in Aristotelian thought informed by Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Aristotle’s Polity Unit 1 and Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica in Unit 2.
Units 3&4 cover John Locke and John Stuart Mill respectively with the latter’s alternative theory of Utilitarianism. These Units bring the discussion into modernity, providing historical continuity and background to the author’s essential points.
Unit 1: Here the author points out that Aristotle locates the highest good worthy of human pursuit as held universally by Mankind in general as being simply happiness. Utilizing tight reasoning Aristotle goes on to refine happiness as that which is the highest good. Continuing step by step logic, Aristotle determines “the good of the human soul lies in the activity of using reason, and its highest good lies in the activity of using it (reason)and following it excellently”.
Virtue, according to Aristotle, plays heavily in this journey. Accordingly, in the pursuit of virtue, he refers to the application of ‘practical wisdom’ which the author distinguishes from ‘theoretical wisdom’. Practical wisdom is grounded in what Aristotle identifies as the four cardinal virtues: Temperance, Justice, Prudence and Courage.
One aside worth mentioning is a section titled Making Men Good. The author presents Aristotle’s view of the primary role parents have in raising their own children. This Aristotelian belief provides timely support to parents fighting school boards or government bureaucrats on the issue of parental rights.
Unit 2: Here the author extends Aristotle’s pagan conceptual thinking through the prism of Aquinas’s enveloping theological thought in which Natural Law is rationally constructed under the premise that it was God that imbued “a rational pattern… a nature which causes it to work in a particular way… and for the sake of a particular good that God has purposed”. This is the wisdom of God. Wisdom inherent in the natural order and discernable to the mind of man as it is in fact “A Law Written on the Heart”.
Unit 3: The author walks you through Locke’s theory of the Social Contract agreed to by those who choose to leave their original State of Nature. Presupposing the existence of God, Locke accepts this as the basis of Natural Law as confirmed by the “magnificent order & design of nature”. From Natural Law, according to Locke, flow manifold rights, the most essential being private property. What Locke really brings to the table, according to the author, is his rational destruction of the concept of the ‘Divine Right of Kings’; as all men according to Locke are created equal. Gone forever is the historic justification for the one (or for that matter the few) to rule over the many. The author then describes Locke completing the circle by his explicit philosophical justification for revolution.
Unit 4: In this unit the author confronts the declared atheist John Stuart Mill. Distilling Mill’s philosophy down to “the good is nothing but the desirable, and the desirable is nothing but what we actually desire”. And everything we desire, according to Mill, we desire either as part of our pleasure, or as means to our pleasure. Pain and suffering relative to happiness and human fulfillment provide polarity in this system. In the end we ultimately just desire pleasure and not pain. A reader may find useful the author’s delineation of the distinction between happiness and pleasure.
The aggregate of how one feels per any array of possible pleasures establishes a hierarchy of pleasures. The means to establish this hierarchy is a simple survey. One which assigns a numerical value to any set or array of pleasures. The reader should think of the many surveys one may have been asked to complete utilizing a 1 to 10 scale. In brief the adding up of “Calculation Units” in establishing the corporate good (pleasure according to Mill) via a numerical value tallying system is supposedly how this is determined. Intellectual pleasure, according to Mill, would rank higher than the lower pleasures of the flesh.
It remains simply an irony that Mill’s version of Utilitarianism itself, in its described (theoretical) application, fails any actual real-world utility (my opinion). The application of such a system should be evident to the reader to be completely disconnected from the sphere of actual human activity and hence barren in actual application. That doesn’t mean there are not some useful concepts in Utilitarianism. “The Greatest Good for the Greatest Number” being an example whether you accept it or not.
Mill himself has a place of honor in history for his political philosophy that championed individual freedom where he championed woman’s equality, support for organized labor and representative government.
There remains some 60 more pages after the section Units are completed. Much of which is dedicated to the author’s application of his personal belief system, that being Biblical Christianity, which he applies to the subject at hand. Whether you identify with this belief system or not it serves a valuable purpose in helping one understand that which underpins the Christian worldview of an estimated 700 million adherents worldwide. In these latter pages the author juxtaposes an array of current modern thinking on the topic of Natural Law as expounded by others as he seeks to illuminate truth from fiction as it pertains to that which is Written on the Heart.
Romans 20 “……..so that they are without excuse.”
The best overview is written on the book’s back cover. I won’t attempt to duplicate what already exists.
What I will attempt to present is what might be called steppingstones that will touch upon the essential elements making up the author’s line of reasoning. To make his case for Natural Law the author formats this work in sections which he terms “Units” which he believes leads to a more orderly approach to the subject.
Consider these “Units” as steps for viewing the essential peak points. To get there requires the reader to trek up a series of intellectual pathways in each Unit starting at the base and climbing upward passing other necessary and important tangential concepts.
The heart of this book is grounded in Aristotelian thought informed by Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Aristotle’s Polity Unit 1 and Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica in Unit 2.
Units 3&4 cover John Locke and John Stuart Mill respectively with the latter’s alternative theory of Utilitarianism. These Units bring the discussion into modernity, providing historical continuity and background to the author’s essential points.
Unit 1: Here the author points out that Aristotle locates the highest good worthy of human pursuit as held universally by Mankind in general as being simply happiness. Utilizing tight reasoning Aristotle goes on to refine happiness as that which is the highest good. Continuing step by step logic, Aristotle determines “the good of the human soul lies in the activity of using reason, and its highest good lies in the activity of using it (reason)and following it excellently”.
Virtue, according to Aristotle, plays heavily in this journey. Accordingly, in the pursuit of virtue, he refers to the application of ‘practical wisdom’ which the author distinguishes from ‘theoretical wisdom’. Practical wisdom is grounded in what Aristotle identifies as the four cardinal virtues: Temperance, Justice, Prudence and Courage.
One aside worth mentioning is a section titled Making Men Good. The author presents Aristotle’s view of the primary role parents have in raising their own children. This Aristotelian belief provides timely support to parents fighting school boards or government bureaucrats on the issue of parental rights.
Unit 2: Here the author extends Aristotle’s pagan conceptual thinking through the prism of Aquinas’s enveloping theological thought in which Natural Law is rationally constructed under the premise that it was God that imbued “a rational pattern… a nature which causes it to work in a particular way… and for the sake of a particular good that God has purposed”. This is the wisdom of God. Wisdom inherent in the natural order and discernable to the mind of man as it is in fact “A Law Written on the Heart”.
Unit 3: The author walks you through Locke’s theory of the Social Contract agreed to by those who choose to leave their original State of Nature. Presupposing the existence of God, Locke accepts this as the basis of Natural Law as confirmed by the “magnificent order & design of nature”. From Natural Law, according to Locke, flow manifold rights, the most essential being private property. What Locke really brings to the table, according to the author, is his rational destruction of the concept of the ‘Divine Right of Kings’; as all men according to Locke are created equal. Gone forever is the historic justification for the one (or for that matter the few) to rule over the many. The author then describes Locke completing the circle by his explicit philosophical justification for revolution.
Unit 4: In this unit the author confronts the declared atheist John Stuart Mill. Distilling Mill’s philosophy down to “the good is nothing but the desirable, and the desirable is nothing but what we actually desire”. And everything we desire, according to Mill, we desire either as part of our pleasure, or as means to our pleasure. Pain and suffering relative to happiness and human fulfillment provide polarity in this system. In the end we ultimately just desire pleasure and not pain. A reader may find useful the author’s delineation of the distinction between happiness and pleasure.
The aggregate of how one feels per any array of possible pleasures establishes a hierarchy of pleasures. The means to establish this hierarchy is a simple survey. One which assigns a numerical value to any set or array of pleasures. The reader should think of the many surveys one may have been asked to complete utilizing a 1 to 10 scale. In brief the adding up of “Calculation Units” in establishing the corporate good (pleasure according to Mill) via a numerical value tallying system is supposedly how this is determined. Intellectual pleasure, according to Mill, would rank higher than the lower pleasures of the flesh.
It remains simply an irony that Mill’s version of Utilitarianism itself, in its described (theoretical) application, fails any actual real-world utility (my opinion). The application of such a system should be evident to the reader to be completely disconnected from the sphere of actual human activity and hence barren in actual application. That doesn’t mean there are not some useful concepts in Utilitarianism. “The Greatest Good for the Greatest Number” being an example whether you accept it or not.
Mill himself has a place of honor in history for his political philosophy that championed individual freedom where he championed woman’s equality, support for organized labor and representative government.
There remains some 60 more pages after the section Units are completed. Much of which is dedicated to the author’s application of his personal belief system, that being Biblical Christianity, which he applies to the subject at hand. Whether you identify with this belief system or not it serves a valuable purpose in helping one understand that which underpins the Christian worldview of an estimated 700 million adherents worldwide. In these latter pages the author juxtaposes an array of current modern thinking on the topic of Natural Law as expounded by others as he seeks to illuminate truth from fiction as it pertains to that which is Written on the Heart.
January 21, 2022
A Casualty of Postmodernism?
Natural law, according to author J. Budziszweski, is an objective moral code "written on the heart" that is the same for everyone and equally known by all. But here is the catch: because of the Fall, sin has "overwritten" this code with the result that many people are unaware that they know it or suppress their knowledge of it. These effects of sin create serious epistemological problems for natural law theory including: (1) how can one be certain that there even is an objective moral code known by all, and (2) how can one be certain that they have rightly discovered the requirements of this moral code.
Unlike many natural law theorists, the author does not ground natural law on natural principles. Rather, his solution to the epistemological problem is to rely on the authority of the Bible: he knows there is a natural law because the Bible says so, and he knows he has accurately described the natural law insofar as his statements of it conform to the moral commands of the Bible. For those who do not have the Bible, or who do not recognize its authority, the author has no solution to the epistemological problems. It should come as no surprise then that the author observes: "Most recent secular thinkers reject the natural law." (212). They reject it because they have no way of knowing for certain what it is or whether it even exists.
Even with the Bible, there remain holes in natural law theory the author is unable to fill. He does not describe any detailed, reliable method for discovering and articulating natural law. He speaks of it primarily with metaphors: natural law is a "text written on the heart" and sin "overwrites" and "blots out" this text. But he provides no practical methods for reading this text or compensating for the overwritten and blotted out parts. It is this shortcoming that leaves many Bible believing Christians questioning the validity and viability of natural law theory.
Given the absence of any natural explanation for natural law and the author's incomplete supernatural explanation, combined with his admission that natural law is "utterly inferior" to the Scriptures and provides only dimly and in part what the Scriptures provide clearly and in whole, the question arises: What use is it to those remaining Christians who still promote it? The author says it is useful for three varieties of apologetics: evangelical, moral, and political.
In evangelical apologetics, the author says that natural law is a point of contact with unbelievers as it provides a personal awareness of wrongdoing that may lead to acceptance of the gospel message. But a theory of natural law is not needed for this. Recognition of a mere moral sense of right and wrong is a better point of contact with unbelievers because they are keenly aware of their own personal moral sense even while they justifiably reject the philosophical proposition of an internal but objective natural law known to all people at all times.
With regard to the second use of natural law, the author writes, "The moral variety of apologetics finds its occasion when we engage in ethical persuasion or counsel." Again, because the Scriptures provide clearer and more comprehensive statements on morality, why attempt to derive "utterly inferior" versions of these statements through the uncertain methods of discerning natural law?
On the third use, the author writes: "We use the political variety ... to leaven the civil law we share with our nonbelieving neighbors - for instance, when we seek agreement that life in the womb should not be destroyed, that sodomy should not be granted legal equivalence with marriage, or that sick people should be cared for and comforted instead of starved or pressured into suicide. In this area we can hardly get far by proclaiming to nonbelievers 'The Bible says!' But we can get somewhere by proclaiming extrabiblical truths which we know, on biblical authority, that the nonbeliever really knows too."
The author's political use of natural law appears to be a bait and switch; a means of having his biblical principles enacted into civil law without claiming the Bible as the basis for the law. This attempt to keep one's Bible in the closet does not seem well thought out. Were someone to ask the author how he knows his particular interpretations of natural law are correct, he must answer "The Bible says!" because, according to the author, the Bible is the only means of determining whether one has accurately derived and formulated a principle of natural law.
The author states that natural law is "enjoying a hard-won renaissance" but this is wishful thinking. Natural law theory reached its zenith when secular philosophers still held out the hope that there were existing, knowable universal truths that could be discovered through reason and observation. That hope has since perished. Those who grounded natural law theory on rationalism and empiricism have seen the theory relegated to the dust-bin of other failed Modernist projects. By grounding natural law theory in the Bible the author limits its appeal to Bible-believing Christians, and even then there are many Christians who accept the authority of Scripture but reject natural law theory based on legitimate epistemological and ontological objections which, at least in this book, the author has not answered.
Natural law, according to author J. Budziszweski, is an objective moral code "written on the heart" that is the same for everyone and equally known by all. But here is the catch: because of the Fall, sin has "overwritten" this code with the result that many people are unaware that they know it or suppress their knowledge of it. These effects of sin create serious epistemological problems for natural law theory including: (1) how can one be certain that there even is an objective moral code known by all, and (2) how can one be certain that they have rightly discovered the requirements of this moral code.
Unlike many natural law theorists, the author does not ground natural law on natural principles. Rather, his solution to the epistemological problem is to rely on the authority of the Bible: he knows there is a natural law because the Bible says so, and he knows he has accurately described the natural law insofar as his statements of it conform to the moral commands of the Bible. For those who do not have the Bible, or who do not recognize its authority, the author has no solution to the epistemological problems. It should come as no surprise then that the author observes: "Most recent secular thinkers reject the natural law." (212). They reject it because they have no way of knowing for certain what it is or whether it even exists.
Even with the Bible, there remain holes in natural law theory the author is unable to fill. He does not describe any detailed, reliable method for discovering and articulating natural law. He speaks of it primarily with metaphors: natural law is a "text written on the heart" and sin "overwrites" and "blots out" this text. But he provides no practical methods for reading this text or compensating for the overwritten and blotted out parts. It is this shortcoming that leaves many Bible believing Christians questioning the validity and viability of natural law theory.
Given the absence of any natural explanation for natural law and the author's incomplete supernatural explanation, combined with his admission that natural law is "utterly inferior" to the Scriptures and provides only dimly and in part what the Scriptures provide clearly and in whole, the question arises: What use is it to those remaining Christians who still promote it? The author says it is useful for three varieties of apologetics: evangelical, moral, and political.
In evangelical apologetics, the author says that natural law is a point of contact with unbelievers as it provides a personal awareness of wrongdoing that may lead to acceptance of the gospel message. But a theory of natural law is not needed for this. Recognition of a mere moral sense of right and wrong is a better point of contact with unbelievers because they are keenly aware of their own personal moral sense even while they justifiably reject the philosophical proposition of an internal but objective natural law known to all people at all times.
With regard to the second use of natural law, the author writes, "The moral variety of apologetics finds its occasion when we engage in ethical persuasion or counsel." Again, because the Scriptures provide clearer and more comprehensive statements on morality, why attempt to derive "utterly inferior" versions of these statements through the uncertain methods of discerning natural law?
On the third use, the author writes: "We use the political variety ... to leaven the civil law we share with our nonbelieving neighbors - for instance, when we seek agreement that life in the womb should not be destroyed, that sodomy should not be granted legal equivalence with marriage, or that sick people should be cared for and comforted instead of starved or pressured into suicide. In this area we can hardly get far by proclaiming to nonbelievers 'The Bible says!' But we can get somewhere by proclaiming extrabiblical truths which we know, on biblical authority, that the nonbeliever really knows too."
The author's political use of natural law appears to be a bait and switch; a means of having his biblical principles enacted into civil law without claiming the Bible as the basis for the law. This attempt to keep one's Bible in the closet does not seem well thought out. Were someone to ask the author how he knows his particular interpretations of natural law are correct, he must answer "The Bible says!" because, according to the author, the Bible is the only means of determining whether one has accurately derived and formulated a principle of natural law.
The author states that natural law is "enjoying a hard-won renaissance" but this is wishful thinking. Natural law theory reached its zenith when secular philosophers still held out the hope that there were existing, knowable universal truths that could be discovered through reason and observation. That hope has since perished. Those who grounded natural law theory on rationalism and empiricism have seen the theory relegated to the dust-bin of other failed Modernist projects. By grounding natural law theory in the Bible the author limits its appeal to Bible-believing Christians, and even then there are many Christians who accept the authority of Scripture but reject natural law theory based on legitimate epistemological and ontological objections which, at least in this book, the author has not answered.
June 15, 2017
An intriguingly tough read. Makes one truly take off some blinders in order to follow precisely what is being stated! A worthwhile read for anyone who likes philosophy and desires to expand one's horizons for argumentation or educational purposes!
June 25, 2018
Our society would be more intellectually sound and emotionally whole if more people studied the content presented on natural law in this book. After reading, natural law will become as recognizable as primary colors.
December 15, 2021
Clear, Concise, Very understandable.
Finally, a clear view on major philosophies, that is not only well-presented, but gives helpful discussion questions at the end of each chapter. Read and Enjoy!
Finally, a clear view on major philosophies, that is not only well-presented, but gives helpful discussion questions at the end of each chapter. Read and Enjoy!
February 14, 2015
It's good, but don't get carried away. Budziszewski does a superb job in presenting the Natural Law Theory. The book is remarkably clear and gives a number of pointed legal applications. It is easy reading, and sometimes quite fun.
I have a few qualifications and comments on the book.
*I still remain unconvinced to a degree. On one level I agree with Budziszewski--as a medievalist in the tradition of Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, and Aquinas, I believe there exists an objective moral realm and that natural man is accountable before God for his actions. However, one wonders if other ethical positions, especially in our nihilistic age, might not give a better alternative than Natural Law. I am not saying Budziszewski is wrong, however.
*Budziszewski scores major points in pointing out the differences in natural law theory. Many Reformed scholars think they can posit some vague natural law theory and everything is just peachy, not realizing the major differences in natural law over the centuries.
*Budziszewski gives a higher view of Locke than I do. While Budziszewski has some insightful comments on private property and the rights (or not) of armed rebellion, I simply must disagree with him that John Locke's liberalism promotes an ultimately free society. Locke wanted religious freedom for all groups provided--and this is the key point--they underwrote the State. Simply, as long as they are not annoying they can have religious freedom. He also didn't mention the current warfare in Thomist studies concerning the neo-platonism and participatory ontologies. In other words, for Thomas natural law participates in the divine law. For Hugo Grotius, natural law could be true even if God were false. The latter secularized the former.
Also, if God's nature isn't contradictory, then would not natural law and biblical law agree?
I have a few qualifications and comments on the book.
*I still remain unconvinced to a degree. On one level I agree with Budziszewski--as a medievalist in the tradition of Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, and Aquinas, I believe there exists an objective moral realm and that natural man is accountable before God for his actions. However, one wonders if other ethical positions, especially in our nihilistic age, might not give a better alternative than Natural Law. I am not saying Budziszewski is wrong, however.
*Budziszewski scores major points in pointing out the differences in natural law theory. Many Reformed scholars think they can posit some vague natural law theory and everything is just peachy, not realizing the major differences in natural law over the centuries.
*Budziszewski gives a higher view of Locke than I do. While Budziszewski has some insightful comments on private property and the rights (or not) of armed rebellion, I simply must disagree with him that John Locke's liberalism promotes an ultimately free society. Locke wanted religious freedom for all groups provided--and this is the key point--they underwrote the State. Simply, as long as they are not annoying they can have religious freedom. He also didn't mention the current warfare in Thomist studies concerning the neo-platonism and participatory ontologies. In other words, for Thomas natural law participates in the divine law. For Hugo Grotius, natural law could be true even if God were false. The latter secularized the former.
Also, if God's nature isn't contradictory, then would not natural law and biblical law agree?
July 31, 2014
I must confess I am disappointed by this book. It is not a *case* for natural law as much as it is an introductory history of the concept. The title misled me to believe that there would be developed arguments for and against natural law, but it only offered brief accounts of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, John Locke, and JS Mill. Even after reading it I didn't feel like a case had been made per se, and I only had a marginally better understanding of the thoughts of each author. I would recommend this book to freshmen poli sci students, and pretty much no one else. Three stars is generous.
November 1, 2018
Easy to read, easy to understand, Budziszewski hits on the key points to understand natural law in a really down to earth way. I was a little disappointed with his last section, though, where he tries to draw threads together for natural law in contemporary discussions. His discussion of the place of natural law for Christians today is quite limiting, only really having a place in apologetics, as far as he’s concerned.
In sum, helpful for understanding natural law, especially as expressed by Aristotle and Aquinas; not so helpful for the contemporary significance of natural law.
In sum, helpful for understanding natural law, especially as expressed by Aristotle and Aquinas; not so helpful for the contemporary significance of natural law.
Read
November 21, 2009None
Read
April 22, 2011what if I present this book? it seems good
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