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This is a well-researched and highly detailed account of L’Affaire Dreyfus. Unfortunately with so much mind-numbing detail, it is hard to see the forest for the trees. Much of the book deals with the political climate in France during the last decade of the 19th Century where there was a weak central government and many competing factions. In his “reassessment,” Chapman claims that “anti-semitism appears to have played no part in the case…” This is contrary to the majority of the literature on the Affair, including that of Emile Zola, which Chapman chalks up to the Dreyfusard (pro Dreyfus) faction having finally won in the end. Chapman concedes that there were some anti-Semites in the army, in the rabid press (particularly Edouard Drumant) and in the public at large. Initially Dreyfus may have been singled out by Col. Sandherr due to antisemitism, but, according to Chapman, he was suspected because he was an a not very well-liked artillery officer with access to classified information. Once charged, the Statistical Section (the spy department) did everything in its power to protect its reputation and officers. Despite evidence to the contrary, the Statistical Section created a conspiracy of lies and forgeries to manufacture evidence against Dreyfus. Chief among the villains was Major Hubert-Joseph Henry who forged the incriminating bordereau and petit bleu papers. Military politics played a big part in the Dreyfus court-martials. On the other side, Major Marie-Georges Picquart should be applauded for following his conscience (despite being an anti-Semite) to the detriment of his reputation and military career. According to Chapman, Zola’s “J’Accuse” and the subsequent libel case seems to be a small footnote in the ongoing battle for public opinion. While other foreign press correspondents are mentioned, Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism, is omitted. I don’t believe that Chapman himself was an anti-Semite, and I am certainly no expert on this period. But given the weight of most scholarly opinion, Chapman’s “reassessment” smacks of revisionist history.
Dit boek werd in Nederland uitgegeven onder de titel ‘de zaak Dreyfus’, vertaald en bewerkt door de schrijver Albert Alberts. Dreyfus werd verdacht van en veroordeeld voor het lekken van staatsgeheimen naar Duitsland. Hij werd gevangen en gedeporteerd. Dit alles berustte op een gerechtelijke dwaling die door de machthebbers van toen jarenlang in stand werd gehouden. De schrijver Emile Zola was een van degenen die hier tegen protesteerde met zijn beroemde pamflet J’accuse’. Uiteindelijk kreeg Dreyfus na een voor hem slopende periode eerherstel en kon hij opnieuw aan het werk. De zaak Dreyfus hield de gemoederen bezig en zorgde voor veel verdeeldheid die bijna tot een nationale crisis uitgroeide. Ook internationaal schaadde de reputatie van Frankrijk als een rechtsstaat. Daarbij speelde ook antisemitisme een rol omdat Dreyfus als jood als onderdeel van een complot werd beschouwd. Het boek is door Chapman met historische distantie geschreven, ruim vijftig jaar na de gebeurtenissen rond de zaak Dreyfus. Hij behandelt het onderwerp van begin tot aan de nasleep nauwkeurig. Er komen veel dramatische details aan de orde, waaronder enkele zelfdodingen van betrokkenen. Ook is het onthullend om te lezen dat sommigen aan de schuld van Dreyfus bleven vasthouden terwijl ze wisten dat de beschuldigingen vals waren.
As a history book that accounts this event, it's unimpeachable in it's thoroughness and coverage. I read it because I kept hearing about this event in other historical contexts and I wanted to know more about it. It's really an astounding piece of history, if you ever wanted to see what a real instance of espionage intrigue and political drama looked like. All that being said, I do not recommend just reading straight through this book like I did. The advice I'd give my past self if I could would actually be to take notes, at least on all of the names that come up. You should mark the names, what each person's position is in government, and what their relation is to the case, because there are ever so many names and I was often lost. Maybe take notes on all the important documents too. It certainly isn't a mass market consumer history book. It was written by an old British historian in the 50s, and clearly, he expects a certain academic audience, since he expects readers to already be familiar with recent French history, how a parliamentary government works, and the general political assumptions of late 19th century continental Europe. I can't complain too hard, since this book was written to be academic history and not necessarily "fun" to read, but I was definitely ready to get onto something else as I made my way through this one.