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Ethical Writings of Maimonides
Text: English, Hebrew (translation)
182 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1944
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December 9, 2021
Maimonides is one of the foremost authorities in medieval Judaism and the best representative within Judaism of the synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy with Torah. This short text, a collection of his ethical work, draws from the Guide for the Perplexed, the Mishneh Torah, and his Commentary on the Mishnah. It therefore offers a suitable, if somewhat impressionistic, portrait of Maimonidean moral philosophy and its major themes.
To articulate his ethics, Maimonides conjoins Aristotelian eudaimonism with Jewish Law, or Torah. Predictably, then, he endorses the Aristotelian notion of the Golden Mean: one should aim to cultivate character traits between the two extremes relative to a particular trait. Likewise, with Aristotle, he claims that one “should habituate himself in these character traits until they are firmly established in him. Time after time, he shall perform actions in accordance with the character traits that are in the mean. He shall repeat them continually until . . . they are not burdensome and these character traits are firmly established in his soul” (30). Yet in a notable departure from Aristotle, he imports into this virtue ethics a robust notion of law derived from Torah, and in fact claims that the aim of Torah is for humans to perform their natural function in accordance with what he terms “the middle way” (70). Obedience to Torah, then, is a most efficacious means to train the soul in its pursuit of the Golden Mean, and in this way law is ordered toward virtue and ultimately eudaimonia (not unlike the natural law as conceived by Thomas Aquinas).
More specifically, Maimonides interprets Torah to be ordered toward both the welfare of the soul and the welfare of the body, both of which are conditions for eudaimonia (138). The former consists in individuals’ acquisition of correct opinions that correspond to their respective intellectual capacities. The latter consists in the improvement of the manner in which people live with one another, and is achieved, Maimonides claims, in two ways: first, by the abolition of injustice, which requires that each individual is not permitted to act up to the limits of their power and in accordance with their individual will, but must do what is useful for the whole (i.e. for the common good); and second, by individuals’ acquisition of moral qualities that are useful for life in society so that the political community is well-ordered. While the welfare of the soul is the summum bonum, since it implicates the final end of the human person, the welfare of the body is “prior in nature and time” (139).
Much like Aristotle, Maimonides understands the summum bonum in relation to contemplation of the divine, which demands the exercise of the intellectual virtues. While the moral virtues perfect humans in their relations with one another, only the intellectual virtues truly perfect the individual in a way that is entirely their own (147). Notably, and in yet another contrast with Aristotle, contemplative activity for Maimonides entails a conception of imitatio Dei with clear implications for human ethical life. That is, imitatio Dei on his account properly entails practical moral and intellectual activity, not just pure contemplation, even if the moral virtues themselves are inferior to the intellectual virtues. At the end of the Guide, Maimonides introduces the concept of imitatio Dei with respect to contemplation’s apprehension of the ways of God, and claims that “those [divine] actions that ought to be known and imitated are loving-kindness [hesed], judgment [mishpat], and righteousness [sedaqah].” Later, he claims that “[God’s] purpose [is] that there should come from you loving-kindness, righteousness, and judgment in the earth in the way we have explained . . . namely, that the purpose should be assimilation to them and that this should be our way of life” (150). Divine actions, then, provide a normative model for how humans are to live—and this model can only be properly apprehended by those who contemplate God. For Maimonides, to apprehend God necessarily entails the imitation of God, who only superficially resembles the unmoved mover of Aristotle.
Another major theme from Maimonides’ ethical work is his insistence, once more reflective of Aristotle, that reason is properly tutored in a community with shared and authoritative moral norms. In this, he effectively rejects a Thomistic notion of natural law whose first-principle is self-evident to natural human reason; to the contrary, Maimonides insists that “the rational matter in the Law is received through tradition and is not demonstrated by the methods of speculation” (145). In other words, while Torah is certainly rational, one cannot discern its precepts by recourse to mere reason alone; rather, one must first learn Torah, then come to understand its rationality in communal study with others. Only then is one properly equipped to apply what one knows about Torah to the particularities of the moral life—i.e. to know “what is incumbent upon [one] with regard to the legal science of the Law” (145). Maimonides’ quasi-communitarianism here is comparable with the Augustinian notion that one must first submit to the authority of the Catholic Church before one can reason well; it is only within the tradition that one learns how to reason and what, in fact, is rational in the first place.
For those interested in the history of ethics, and especially the relationship between Aristotelian virtue ethics and the medieval philosophical tradition, this short edited volume is very instructive. It also offers a helpful introduction to Maimonides’ philosophical work and Talmudic commentary.
To articulate his ethics, Maimonides conjoins Aristotelian eudaimonism with Jewish Law, or Torah. Predictably, then, he endorses the Aristotelian notion of the Golden Mean: one should aim to cultivate character traits between the two extremes relative to a particular trait. Likewise, with Aristotle, he claims that one “should habituate himself in these character traits until they are firmly established in him. Time after time, he shall perform actions in accordance with the character traits that are in the mean. He shall repeat them continually until . . . they are not burdensome and these character traits are firmly established in his soul” (30). Yet in a notable departure from Aristotle, he imports into this virtue ethics a robust notion of law derived from Torah, and in fact claims that the aim of Torah is for humans to perform their natural function in accordance with what he terms “the middle way” (70). Obedience to Torah, then, is a most efficacious means to train the soul in its pursuit of the Golden Mean, and in this way law is ordered toward virtue and ultimately eudaimonia (not unlike the natural law as conceived by Thomas Aquinas).
More specifically, Maimonides interprets Torah to be ordered toward both the welfare of the soul and the welfare of the body, both of which are conditions for eudaimonia (138). The former consists in individuals’ acquisition of correct opinions that correspond to their respective intellectual capacities. The latter consists in the improvement of the manner in which people live with one another, and is achieved, Maimonides claims, in two ways: first, by the abolition of injustice, which requires that each individual is not permitted to act up to the limits of their power and in accordance with their individual will, but must do what is useful for the whole (i.e. for the common good); and second, by individuals’ acquisition of moral qualities that are useful for life in society so that the political community is well-ordered. While the welfare of the soul is the summum bonum, since it implicates the final end of the human person, the welfare of the body is “prior in nature and time” (139).
Much like Aristotle, Maimonides understands the summum bonum in relation to contemplation of the divine, which demands the exercise of the intellectual virtues. While the moral virtues perfect humans in their relations with one another, only the intellectual virtues truly perfect the individual in a way that is entirely their own (147). Notably, and in yet another contrast with Aristotle, contemplative activity for Maimonides entails a conception of imitatio Dei with clear implications for human ethical life. That is, imitatio Dei on his account properly entails practical moral and intellectual activity, not just pure contemplation, even if the moral virtues themselves are inferior to the intellectual virtues. At the end of the Guide, Maimonides introduces the concept of imitatio Dei with respect to contemplation’s apprehension of the ways of God, and claims that “those [divine] actions that ought to be known and imitated are loving-kindness [hesed], judgment [mishpat], and righteousness [sedaqah].” Later, he claims that “[God’s] purpose [is] that there should come from you loving-kindness, righteousness, and judgment in the earth in the way we have explained . . . namely, that the purpose should be assimilation to them and that this should be our way of life” (150). Divine actions, then, provide a normative model for how humans are to live—and this model can only be properly apprehended by those who contemplate God. For Maimonides, to apprehend God necessarily entails the imitation of God, who only superficially resembles the unmoved mover of Aristotle.
Another major theme from Maimonides’ ethical work is his insistence, once more reflective of Aristotle, that reason is properly tutored in a community with shared and authoritative moral norms. In this, he effectively rejects a Thomistic notion of natural law whose first-principle is self-evident to natural human reason; to the contrary, Maimonides insists that “the rational matter in the Law is received through tradition and is not demonstrated by the methods of speculation” (145). In other words, while Torah is certainly rational, one cannot discern its precepts by recourse to mere reason alone; rather, one must first learn Torah, then come to understand its rationality in communal study with others. Only then is one properly equipped to apply what one knows about Torah to the particularities of the moral life—i.e. to know “what is incumbent upon [one] with regard to the legal science of the Law” (145). Maimonides’ quasi-communitarianism here is comparable with the Augustinian notion that one must first submit to the authority of the Catholic Church before one can reason well; it is only within the tradition that one learns how to reason and what, in fact, is rational in the first place.
For those interested in the history of ethics, and especially the relationship between Aristotelian virtue ethics and the medieval philosophical tradition, this short edited volume is very instructive. It also offers a helpful introduction to Maimonides’ philosophical work and Talmudic commentary.
February 23, 2019
Aristotle and Judaism combined..
Definition of justice (sedaqah)- "the granting to everyone to whom something is due, that which is due to him, and giving to every being what it deserves."
"Between this perfection (material possessions) and the individual himself there is no connection whatever; there is only a certain relation, and most of the pleasure taken in the relation is purely imaginary. I refer to one's saying: This is my house; this is my slave; this money is mine; these are my soldiers. For if he considers his own individual self, he will find that all this is outside his essence and that each of these possessions subsits as it is by itself. Therefore when the relation referred to has been abolished, there is no difference between an individual who has been a great king and the most contemptible of men, though nothing may have changed in the things that were attributed to him."
"If there were knowledge, whose relation to the human form is like that of the power of sight to the eye, they would refrain from doing any harm to themselves and to others. For through cognition of the truth, enmity and hatred are removed and the inflicting of harm by people on one another is abolished."
Definition of justice (sedaqah)- "the granting to everyone to whom something is due, that which is due to him, and giving to every being what it deserves."
"Between this perfection (material possessions) and the individual himself there is no connection whatever; there is only a certain relation, and most of the pleasure taken in the relation is purely imaginary. I refer to one's saying: This is my house; this is my slave; this money is mine; these are my soldiers. For if he considers his own individual self, he will find that all this is outside his essence and that each of these possessions subsits as it is by itself. Therefore when the relation referred to has been abolished, there is no difference between an individual who has been a great king and the most contemptible of men, though nothing may have changed in the things that were attributed to him."
"If there were knowledge, whose relation to the human form is like that of the power of sight to the eye, they would refrain from doing any harm to themselves and to others. For through cognition of the truth, enmity and hatred are removed and the inflicting of harm by people on one another is abolished."
January 28, 2025
Finished in a day straight up got me hooked. Was already familiar with Maimonides through lectures and general research and reading on my own volition and was familiar with many of the ideas already presented whether it be through my knowledge on Judaism and Aristotelianism but I straight up didn’t realise how skilled of a writer and mediator he is between the two. His way of using the Greek Eudomonia in Jewish practise is amazing that gets you hooked straight away if you’re familiar with what he’s speaking about. His explanation of Aristotles thought is simply amazing and simple, I loved how he says the soul uses the overall body as an instrument as the whole idea of a soul was making my head scratch when reading Plato. Maimonides social commentary I also like I think he is fair to people of all backgrounds he points out as I remember reading in The 5 dialogue’s of Plato I think so anyway that we aren’t born virtuous. I loved how Maimonides emphasises chasing the mean the list goes on. When he talks about the Moshiach he also brings up things that originally confused me a lot and pointed out they were metaphors I just think the RamBams interpretations are unmatched. In his letter to Joseph he throws away in a line that he only studied on Shabbat at this point he was an elderly guy at this point but wow that fact he was still retaining all this whilst only studying on Shabbat when the rest is helping out with Egypt and ect is simply unbelievable. Maimonides has always influenced me since I’ve known him but reading his work has just lit that spark truly one of the greatest thinkers of all time.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews