Following the disastrous Russian campaign of 1812, Napoleon found himself facing a new coalition of his old enemies. With incredible speed he raised an army of 200,000 men and marched to join the remnants of the old Grande Armee in Germany. However, he no longer faced the brittle enemies of 1805 and 1806 and at Lützen on 2 May the inexperience of his new army began to show. Faulty reconnaissance by raw cavalry allowed Ney’s Corps to be surprised by Wittgenstein’s Russians. This book describes the last realistic chance Napoleon had to regain his empire by defeating the allies in Germany before Austria stirred and the tide turned even more against him.
This brief Osprey volume treats Napoleon's campaign against Russian and Prussian forces in 1813. It is amazing, in one sense, that this campaign occurred at all. After the disastrous invasion of Russia, much of Napoleon's forces had ceased to exist. Yet, in a short period of time, he remobilized and was able to engage Prussian and Russian forces on a pretty even basis (he actually could claim having won the final battlefield). I do not claim to be an expert on Napoleonic warfare, but I do review this as an interested amateur.
Some general comments: (a) Sometimes there is so much detail in what brigade did what that one can get lost on the detail; (b) the maps, sometimes, are not as illuminating as would be desired.
The volume examines the two battles at issue--Lutzen and Bautzen. Problems facing Napoleon? A substantial number of his troops were raw and not well trained. Also, he lacked the quality (and quantity) of cavalry that he had often had. While he had numerical superiority over his opponents, he did not have thew quality that he normally possessed.
As such, it is telling that, despite these issues, he did win (tactically) the campaign. In the long run, his forces' performance did suggest problems. But the end result would become manifest only later--at Leipzig.
Overall, a useful volume, albeit with some issues.
Unlike other Hofschröer's books, the pro-Prussia bias is held in some check. That said, each battle is discussed in surprisingly little detail. The idea that these battles signaled a shift in the tide of war is debatable. Certainly Napoleon lost his best chance at a quick victory, but I think the defeat at Kulm, which came after the triumph at Dresden, was the true turning point, transforming a strategic victory into at best a draw just when Napoleon needed it to be more.