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Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy
The first edition of this landmark work is one of the Brookings Institution's most successful titles. Since that original publication, authors Morton Halperin and Priscilla Clapp, with Arnold Kanter have been significant participants in America's foreign policy community. This thoroughly revised book updates their classic analysis of the role played by the federal bureaucracy--civilian career officials, political appointees, and military officers--in formulating U.S. national security policy, illustrating how policy decisions are actually made. The second edition also includes an expanded analysis of Congress's role in the politics of foreign policy making.
Government agencies, departments, and individuals all have certain interests to preserve and promote. Those priorities, and the conflicts they sometimes spark, heavily influence the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy provides numerous examples of bureaucratic maneuvering and reveals how they have influenced U.S. international relations. The revised edition includes examples of bureaucratic politics from the past three decades, from Jimmy Carter's view of the State Department to conflicts between George W. Bush and the bureaucracy regarding Iraq.
340 pages, Paperback
First published April 1, 1974
About the author
Morton H. Halperin
53 books2 followersFrom Wikipedia: Morton H. Halperin (born June 13, 1938) is an American expert on foreign policy and civil liberties. He served in the Johnson, Nixon, and Clinton administrations and in a number of roles with think tanks and universities such as the Council on Foreign Relations and Harvard University. He is currently Senior Advisor for the Open Society Institute, founded by George Soros.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
December 5, 2014
This book ‘Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy’ essentially pertains to decision making in the National Security Council, State Department and Department of Defense in the US. The book is categorized into four parts namely: interests, participants, decisions and actions.
In the first category i.e. interests, the author summarizes that in every department there’s a Shared Image among the members which shapes their attitudes and behaviors towards official decision making that might create hurdles or at times smoothen the functionality with respect to other departments. However, at the same time the image could shift given that some bureaucratic hurdle had led to a bigger impasse or some event such as the 9/11 happens; this somehow changes the shared image gradually. But at the same time the survival instincts of every department are to represent their departmental interests in every crucial decision making at the national level and also the members of every department perceive most of the messages in their own departmental context i.e. how will the respective decision or order impact the department at large.
In the second part of the first category i.e. participants, it’s been said that the departmental stance on a national or otherwise issue could have ideological basis i.e. the department strictly believes what it's advocating for. Or it could be ‘Grooved Thinking’ that is purely motivated by the departmental/organizational interests. Grooved thinking usually happens when a department is less significant or is to be restructured in the near future to smoothen its functionality etc. in the larger national security fabric of the country. However, individual cognitive processes usually have a greater impact upon the overall shared image of the department e.g. head of the department specific bureaucratic experiences will dictate its terms with the white house, department of defense etc. However, despite these survival instincts the bureaucratic culture in the us is to prefer more control to less funds and not vice versa. Also, for politicians or bureaucrats to say that they motivated by some domestic concern is a political taboo but most of the presidential and/or non-presidential decisions are usually motivated by domestic concern. However, in a national emergency a presidential decision could disregard the norms of decision making landscape though it seldom happens. In normal situations, the president might logroll different parties, interest groups etc. into agreement but it could be influenced by presidential aides who have political ambitions of holding some big office in the future.
The second category of the book i.e. decisions, starts with relations with the president; rules can change, shared image could be attempted upon to shift if a secretary enjoys good informal relations with the president. It can also happen if a cabinet member is assertive enough backed by good relations with the president. The president, in this regard, could reduce or expand his close circles depending upon the intensity of the decision. The terms ‘in’ and ‘out’ tells us who’s close to the president and who is not. However, mostly the bureaucracy the consumed by the routine it follows and that gives it discretion over what to report to the white house and what not to, keeping their organizational interests in mind. The culture usually is of deference towards expertise which means that its part of the shared image to let the experts do their specialized tasks; there could be a token opposition to experts taking the lead however they could be bought in. Important characteristic of the departments is that they could circumvent formal channels if needed be but sometimes it isn’t that effective so the information that needs to be put across is carefully leaked to the press to gain presidential attention and the president may then announce a ‘trial balloon’ to see whether that policy is effectively cater to the class it intends and whether there’s a political backlash to the announced policy; if the situation is manageable the decree is maintained otherwise amended according or taken back altogether if the organizational push behind the move is not reinforced adequately.
In the third category i.e. actions, the presidential actions are explained. The presidential speeches and statements are always very meaningful; he conveys impliedly the entire bureaucratic notion towards an upcoming event or decision. The statements could be intended upon foreign governments or his own governments and also it might contain implied orders for certain departments in it. However, bureaucratic impasse could persists in a way that only a decision could be followed in letter and not spirit or reconsideration of the proposed presidential decision might be suggested. To prolong the impasse, the department could suggest the congress to consider the issue but these tactics could only be effective if the department in question is insignificant or the president is disinterested to pursue the matter. And the bureaucrats in such matters could command significant discretion as the following statement summarizes:
‘never ask for instructions from Washington if you can help it’.
The last part of the book pertains to congress; it says that congress has its own interests such as the executive branch. Institutional interests could be lobbied for in the congress and in the congressional committees. However, the most significant of the interests are the interests of the committees and there’s usually a tug of war between the executive and congressional committees for the jurisdiction of certain crucial matters e.g. funding for foreign governments activities etc., that could reinforce any party’s influence over the other. Also, such characters, be that in executive or in the congressional committees, are not that conspicuous and seldom gets media’s attention so these characters see fighting for jurisdiction as there chance to get the wanted attention to reinforce their political survival and give out an immortal legacy to the upcoming political generations.
Conclusion
The author concludes that the ultimate decision represents a number of compromises by various organizational actors; the decision is also influenced by the standard operating procedures and interests of the implementors still. Moreover, the global implication of the final decision depends upon the perception of the US abroad and their respective domestic conflicts.
In the first category i.e. interests, the author summarizes that in every department there’s a Shared Image among the members which shapes their attitudes and behaviors towards official decision making that might create hurdles or at times smoothen the functionality with respect to other departments. However, at the same time the image could shift given that some bureaucratic hurdle had led to a bigger impasse or some event such as the 9/11 happens; this somehow changes the shared image gradually. But at the same time the survival instincts of every department are to represent their departmental interests in every crucial decision making at the national level and also the members of every department perceive most of the messages in their own departmental context i.e. how will the respective decision or order impact the department at large.
In the second part of the first category i.e. participants, it’s been said that the departmental stance on a national or otherwise issue could have ideological basis i.e. the department strictly believes what it's advocating for. Or it could be ‘Grooved Thinking’ that is purely motivated by the departmental/organizational interests. Grooved thinking usually happens when a department is less significant or is to be restructured in the near future to smoothen its functionality etc. in the larger national security fabric of the country. However, individual cognitive processes usually have a greater impact upon the overall shared image of the department e.g. head of the department specific bureaucratic experiences will dictate its terms with the white house, department of defense etc. However, despite these survival instincts the bureaucratic culture in the us is to prefer more control to less funds and not vice versa. Also, for politicians or bureaucrats to say that they motivated by some domestic concern is a political taboo but most of the presidential and/or non-presidential decisions are usually motivated by domestic concern. However, in a national emergency a presidential decision could disregard the norms of decision making landscape though it seldom happens. In normal situations, the president might logroll different parties, interest groups etc. into agreement but it could be influenced by presidential aides who have political ambitions of holding some big office in the future.
The second category of the book i.e. decisions, starts with relations with the president; rules can change, shared image could be attempted upon to shift if a secretary enjoys good informal relations with the president. It can also happen if a cabinet member is assertive enough backed by good relations with the president. The president, in this regard, could reduce or expand his close circles depending upon the intensity of the decision. The terms ‘in’ and ‘out’ tells us who’s close to the president and who is not. However, mostly the bureaucracy the consumed by the routine it follows and that gives it discretion over what to report to the white house and what not to, keeping their organizational interests in mind. The culture usually is of deference towards expertise which means that its part of the shared image to let the experts do their specialized tasks; there could be a token opposition to experts taking the lead however they could be bought in. Important characteristic of the departments is that they could circumvent formal channels if needed be but sometimes it isn’t that effective so the information that needs to be put across is carefully leaked to the press to gain presidential attention and the president may then announce a ‘trial balloon’ to see whether that policy is effectively cater to the class it intends and whether there’s a political backlash to the announced policy; if the situation is manageable the decree is maintained otherwise amended according or taken back altogether if the organizational push behind the move is not reinforced adequately.
In the third category i.e. actions, the presidential actions are explained. The presidential speeches and statements are always very meaningful; he conveys impliedly the entire bureaucratic notion towards an upcoming event or decision. The statements could be intended upon foreign governments or his own governments and also it might contain implied orders for certain departments in it. However, bureaucratic impasse could persists in a way that only a decision could be followed in letter and not spirit or reconsideration of the proposed presidential decision might be suggested. To prolong the impasse, the department could suggest the congress to consider the issue but these tactics could only be effective if the department in question is insignificant or the president is disinterested to pursue the matter. And the bureaucrats in such matters could command significant discretion as the following statement summarizes:
‘never ask for instructions from Washington if you can help it’.
The last part of the book pertains to congress; it says that congress has its own interests such as the executive branch. Institutional interests could be lobbied for in the congress and in the congressional committees. However, the most significant of the interests are the interests of the committees and there’s usually a tug of war between the executive and congressional committees for the jurisdiction of certain crucial matters e.g. funding for foreign governments activities etc., that could reinforce any party’s influence over the other. Also, such characters, be that in executive or in the congressional committees, are not that conspicuous and seldom gets media’s attention so these characters see fighting for jurisdiction as there chance to get the wanted attention to reinforce their political survival and give out an immortal legacy to the upcoming political generations.
Conclusion
The author concludes that the ultimate decision represents a number of compromises by various organizational actors; the decision is also influenced by the standard operating procedures and interests of the implementors still. Moreover, the global implication of the final decision depends upon the perception of the US abroad and their respective domestic conflicts.
February 6, 2016
Not a page turner. Acceptably broad analysis of the bureaucracy surrounding foreign policy decisions in the US. Has a slight bent against the military bureaucracy and culture. not a stand alone book on the subject, but useful for gaining a broad understanding.
September 15, 2017
Full disclosure - one of the authors of this book, Priscilla Clapp, is a current colleague at USIP, although our work generally does not overlap and I haven’t discussed this book with her yet. Her interview with Mark Leon Goldberg on the Global Dispatches podcast a few months prompted me to pick this up, however.
The book itself examines, in plain language and through case studies drawn primarily from the Cold War and second Bush administration, how the U.S. government makes and implements (or does not) foreign policy decisions. Principal-agent problems and clashing bureaucratic incentive structures abound, and the unitary actor model is thoroughly demolished. The book is not really presented as a generalizable theory of organizational decision-making but much of the processes described can also be applied to other states (as the authors note in their concluding section) and indeed also to non-state organizations. Most of this was fairly familiar from other readings in the field (hence the rating), but again explained in a clear and succinct way that would make this a very good introduction to the subject if that is what you are looking for.
The book itself examines, in plain language and through case studies drawn primarily from the Cold War and second Bush administration, how the U.S. government makes and implements (or does not) foreign policy decisions. Principal-agent problems and clashing bureaucratic incentive structures abound, and the unitary actor model is thoroughly demolished. The book is not really presented as a generalizable theory of organizational decision-making but much of the processes described can also be applied to other states (as the authors note in their concluding section) and indeed also to non-state organizations. Most of this was fairly familiar from other readings in the field (hence the rating), but again explained in a clear and succinct way that would make this a very good introduction to the subject if that is what you are looking for.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews