The Defence and Fall of Singapore

by Brian Farrell

Shortly after midnight on 8 December 1941, two divisions of crack troops of the Imperial Japanese Army began a seaborne invasion of southern Thailand and northern Malaya. Their assault developed into a full-blown advance towards Singapore, the main defensive position of the British Empire in the Far East. The defending British, Indian, Australian and Malayan forces were outmanoeuvred on the ground, overwhelmed in the air and scattered on the sea. By the end of January 1942, British Empire forces were driven back onto the island of Singapore Itself, cut off from further outside help. When the Japanese stormed the island with an an-out assault, the defenders were quickly pushed back into a corner from which there was no escape. Singapore s defenders finally capitulated on 15 February, to prevent the wholesale pillage of the city itself. Their rapid and total defeat was nothing less than military humiliation and political disaster. Based on the most extensive use yet of primary documents in Britain, Japan, Australia and Singapore, Brian Farrell provides the fullest picture of how and why Singapore fell and its real significance to the outcome of the Second World War."

Genres: History, World War II

896 pages, Kindle Edition

Published January 1, 2017

Reviews

[Wai Zin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Prior WW2, British propaganda made really big deal about Fortress Singapore. But Imperial Japanese Army overrun Malaya and captured the vaunted fortresses within two months.

Except in a few engagements, British empire forces were always outfought and outgeneralled by IJA.

Why were British performed so miserably?

In this book author try to answer that question. Author analysed the British defense policy and pointed out why it didn't work. Also he tells us about how British, Indian and Australian units were repeatedly crumpled under relentless Japanese driving charge. He mostly placed the blame on political leaderships.

It was compelling read.

[James Jacob · Rating 4 out of 5]

Some excellent analysis I had not considered but skirts over a few key moments. The sinking of the battleships takes a page and (a minor point) but there’s no mention of Patrick Heenan.

[GrabAsia · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is different from the many others on the fall of Singapore. At every stage it explains the gap between Britains global strategy & its capabilities - Britain could not defend its global empire, but refused to admit this & kept making unrealistic plans, such as trying to defend Singapore when it clearly could not. Britain also assumed Japan would not dare to attack the Allies, and even if they were foolish enough to do so, were not capable to inflict lasting damage. This belief pervaded through the entire civilian and military leadership & filtered downwards. There was also no strong leadership - the civilians refused to disrupt life by preparations for war and the military kept ordering retreats to keep forces intact for “later”. When later came they surrendered anyway. There are of course exceptions, but not enough to have made a difference.

The authors book brings this out v clearly. He also describes the battles in a friendlier way for a general reader like me - so we can follow the general outline of what’s going on rather than the details of individual units.

It's a long book (400+ pg) and so some of us may hesitate to pick it up, but DO. Its worth it.

[Cpen · Rating 4 out of 5]

A nice book that assesses the fall of Singapore from the perspective of British imperial defence rather than simply playing Arthur Percival as a scapegoat. The defeat was a failure of overall defence policy that even the war hero Winston Churchill was partly accountable for.

One of the thoughts after reading this book is, despite the military failure, how successful is the powerless defence of Malaya and Singapore prompted the participation of United States in the Pacific War, which was one of the important motives of British holding Singapore?

Judging from the viewpoint of imperial defence, if the holding of Malaya and Singapore was indispensable in securing support from the United States and dominions in Europe and Pacific, which help to protect/recover British interests, was it a success given British incapability of maintaining strong military presence in all of her territory?

Furthermore, what was the role of the colonised people in the war efforts and how did the racial/national snobbery influenced the preparation and outcome of the war?