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Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience
In this clear and provocative account of the epistemology of religious experience, William P. Alston argues that the perception of God―his term for direct experiential awareness of God―makes a major contribution to the grounds of religious belief. Surveying the variety of reported direct experiences of God, Alston demonstrates that a person can be justified in holding certain beliefs about God on the basis of mystical experience.
336 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1991
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About the author
William P. Alston
32 books8 followersWilliam Payne Alston (November 29, 1921 – September 13, 2009) was an American philosopher. He made influential contributions to the philosophy of language, epistemology, and Christian philosophy. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago and taught at the University of Michigan, Rutgers University, University of Illinois, and Syracuse University.
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April 7, 2015
Alston gives a bold and somewhat convincing argument for religious experience as a source of belief and knowledge. In doing so, he surveys the current crisis and options in epistemology. He notes that modern epistemology cannot give noncircular defenses for the most basic accounts of knowledge and that religious experience (or Christian Mystical Perception, CP/M beliefs) are far less problematic in terms of epistemic justification.
Thesis: “The chief aim of this book is to defend the view that putative direct awareness of God can provide justification for certain kinds of beliefs about God” (Alston 9). Ironically, discussing religious perception raises questions about sense perception (SP). Therefore, Alston gives us his Theory of appearing: the notion of X’s appearing to S as so-and so is fundamental and unanalyzable (55). For S to perceive X is simply for X to appear to S as so-and-so. Applied to religious experience, this means:
*Is it possible that “God” should be appearing to S in y experience?
**Is it possible that God should figure in causation in that experience in such a way as to count as what is perceived?
***Is it possible that that experience should give rise to beliefs about God?
Alston then takes a brief detour to give an account of current epistemology. This is where the true "money" of the book is. I have some doubts as to how far his M-belief justification can be taken. But the book is worth it in terms of his Reidian epistemology.
Doxastic practices:
The problem of criterion and regress will face every scheme (146-147). However, we seek the justification of beliefs on adequate grounds. These ground are certain doxastic practices (belief-forming practices).
Enter Thomas Reid,
“For belief is of such a nature that, if you leave any root, it will spread; and you may more easily put it up altogether, than say, “Hitherto shalt thou go and no further: the existence of impressions and ideas I give up to thee; but see thou pretend to nothing more. A thorough and consistent skeptic will never yield to this point. To such a skeptic I have nothing to say; but of the semi-skeptic, I should beg to know, why they believe the existence of their impressions and ideas. The true reason I take to be, because they cannot help it; and the same reason will lead them to believe many other things. (An Enquiry in the Human Mind, VI, 20, p. 207).
I am very impressed with Alston on this section. I had feared that his previous argument: SP-beliefs are warranted because they take place within doxastic practices” would lead to a kind of coherentism. Alston is aware of this problem, but counters it by saying we have a “negative coherentism with regard to doxastic practices, but not with regard to our beliefs” (152-154).
The Nature of Doxastic Practices
practice: a system or constellation of dispositions, habits, or “mechanisms” which yields a belief as “output” (153).
summary of argument so far: Since a doxastic practice is essentially the exercise of a family of belief-forming mechanisms, the unity of a doxastic practice is most centrally a function of important similarities in the constiutent mechanisms. And since a belief-forming mechanism is simply the realization of an input-output function, the unity of a doxastic practice most basically consists in important similarities in input, in output, and in the function connecting the two (165).
Evaluation and Conclusion:
Some of this book is dated. It appeared before Plantinga's celebrated trilogy. Further, Alston appears a bit trusting on the validity of other religious perception/traditions. Of course, he can always say those traditions are subject to "overriders" (what Plantinga calls "defeaters"). And that's a fair point. I have no problem in saying the Catholic or the Buddhist is prima-facie justified in believing he/she has a real religious experience. I say "prima-facie" justified. This is before we bring in defeaters. Of course, the Protestant Christian position is also subject to defeaters. Fair enough. I think there are defeaters to those defeaters, so I am not too worried.
The book was mostly excellent. The conclusions kind of spun out of control at the end.
Thesis: “The chief aim of this book is to defend the view that putative direct awareness of God can provide justification for certain kinds of beliefs about God” (Alston 9). Ironically, discussing religious perception raises questions about sense perception (SP). Therefore, Alston gives us his Theory of appearing: the notion of X’s appearing to S as so-and so is fundamental and unanalyzable (55). For S to perceive X is simply for X to appear to S as so-and-so. Applied to religious experience, this means:
*Is it possible that “God” should be appearing to S in y experience?
**Is it possible that God should figure in causation in that experience in such a way as to count as what is perceived?
***Is it possible that that experience should give rise to beliefs about God?
Alston then takes a brief detour to give an account of current epistemology. This is where the true "money" of the book is. I have some doubts as to how far his M-belief justification can be taken. But the book is worth it in terms of his Reidian epistemology.
Doxastic practices:
The problem of criterion and regress will face every scheme (146-147). However, we seek the justification of beliefs on adequate grounds. These ground are certain doxastic practices (belief-forming practices).
Enter Thomas Reid,
“For belief is of such a nature that, if you leave any root, it will spread; and you may more easily put it up altogether, than say, “Hitherto shalt thou go and no further: the existence of impressions and ideas I give up to thee; but see thou pretend to nothing more. A thorough and consistent skeptic will never yield to this point. To such a skeptic I have nothing to say; but of the semi-skeptic, I should beg to know, why they believe the existence of their impressions and ideas. The true reason I take to be, because they cannot help it; and the same reason will lead them to believe many other things. (An Enquiry in the Human Mind, VI, 20, p. 207).
I am very impressed with Alston on this section. I had feared that his previous argument: SP-beliefs are warranted because they take place within doxastic practices” would lead to a kind of coherentism. Alston is aware of this problem, but counters it by saying we have a “negative coherentism with regard to doxastic practices, but not with regard to our beliefs” (152-154).
The Nature of Doxastic Practices
practice: a system or constellation of dispositions, habits, or “mechanisms” which yields a belief as “output” (153).
summary of argument so far: Since a doxastic practice is essentially the exercise of a family of belief-forming mechanisms, the unity of a doxastic practice is most centrally a function of important similarities in the constiutent mechanisms. And since a belief-forming mechanism is simply the realization of an input-output function, the unity of a doxastic practice most basically consists in important similarities in input, in output, and in the function connecting the two (165).
Evaluation and Conclusion:
Some of this book is dated. It appeared before Plantinga's celebrated trilogy. Further, Alston appears a bit trusting on the validity of other religious perception/traditions. Of course, he can always say those traditions are subject to "overriders" (what Plantinga calls "defeaters"). And that's a fair point. I have no problem in saying the Catholic or the Buddhist is prima-facie justified in believing he/she has a real religious experience. I say "prima-facie" justified. This is before we bring in defeaters. Of course, the Protestant Christian position is also subject to defeaters. Fair enough. I think there are defeaters to those defeaters, so I am not too worried.
The book was mostly excellent. The conclusions kind of spun out of control at the end.
April 6, 2013
This is simply the best book ever written on a hugely important question: Can the claim that "I have perceived God" have any epistemological justification, or must others receive such a claim as simply a report of the testifier's state of mind? (As in, "How nice/awful for you.") To put this another way, do reports of mystical encounters, and particularly encounters with God, have any truth content to convey--again, beyond indicating something about the psychic excitement the reporters have experienced? Do mystical encounters, in short, give us knowledge and can we defend claims to such knowledge philosophically?
The late William Alston is one of the greatest Christian philosophers of the twentieth century and was recognized in the forefront of his guild (he was president of the American Philosophical Association in 1979) although he has been undeservedly neglected outside philosophy seminars.
This is his masterwork, a book he says he had been thinking about for fifty years (!) before writing it. Clearly written, not too technical for non-specialists in all but a few places, carefully argued, and boldly asserted, this book is a landmark in modern Christian thought.
Apologists and pastors definitely should try to read it, as should psychologists and other counselors as well as spiritual directors--anyone who is dealing seriously with claims of mystical experience.
The late William Alston is one of the greatest Christian philosophers of the twentieth century and was recognized in the forefront of his guild (he was president of the American Philosophical Association in 1979) although he has been undeservedly neglected outside philosophy seminars.
This is his masterwork, a book he says he had been thinking about for fifty years (!) before writing it. Clearly written, not too technical for non-specialists in all but a few places, carefully argued, and boldly asserted, this book is a landmark in modern Christian thought.
Apologists and pastors definitely should try to read it, as should psychologists and other counselors as well as spiritual directors--anyone who is dealing seriously with claims of mystical experience.
June 29, 2009
Read this for a religious studies class in college. I wrote a stereotypically jerky young militant atheist paper about it. It probably deserved better.
April 21, 2019
The two central points that can be taken away for me are the following. The first is the rational way in which faith can be argued for from a philosophical position, via justified true belief in the mystical perceptibility of God, the second is what to look for in supposed personal mystical perceptual revelations - of Christ and/or God - brought about via faith.
The former puts forward the argument that all perceptual systems of belief forming are inherently cyclical when it comes to understanding what it is that one perceives via that sight (e.g. seeing a red tie and believing that I justifiably see a red tie (p.45)) - and thus the concept of sight in general (i.e. I believe that sight gives me access to the world in way ‘x’ (assuming one is rational and not delusional etc.) - and that this same system of belief forming can thus be applied to what the author calls mystical perception (e.g. I perceive God, in so far as I am justified in believing that God has “directly” (p.286) appeared as a perceptual experience ‘x’ (p.70-1);* though indirect perception of God is mentioned as epistemically justifiable as well (p.288).
Since sensorial or sensory sight and mystical perception are both rational on these same exact logical grounds according to the theory, mystical perception can therefore be rational (regardless of whether or not there really is a God (this book does not cover that topic directly as it is about the nature of perceptual experience. “The aim is rather to rebut objections to the conviction of the subjects that they are directly aware of God, and to point out that if their conviction is correct they are also properly taken to be perceiving God” (p.5)).
The second point takes account of first hand experiences. Namely, it puts forward that there are certain ‘checkers’ which can be used to discern true - or likely to be true (i.e. justified) - actual mystical perceptions. These are: God as being “Good, powerful, plentiful, loving, compassionate, wise and glorious” (p.43) and doing the actions of “speaking, forgiving, strengthening, sympathising” (p.44). Concerning the intellect they should be about or involve “useful affairs and discretion”, and regarding the will they should be “internally peaceful, trusting in God, patient in pains, simple and sincere and [involve] charity that is meek, kindly and self-forgetful” (p.203), and should be discerned from false and misleading ones; such as the intellect having or being “futile, useless, vain preoccupations, exaggerations and excessive”, and of concerning the will as having “perturbation, disquiet, presumption or despair, impatience with trails, duplicity, dissimulation and false bitter pharisaical zeal” (p.203).
There is more to book than these two points I have chosen, such as the Christian background and the chapter on religious diversity, but these are the two I find specifically most important.
4/5 as the book is a bit long winded in places, though I understand the desire, in its place, to want to fully articulate and explain a position.
All errors in reconstructing the argumentation of the author, especially in regards to the first point in this review, are completely my own. Though I have attempted to provide the essence of the author’s arguments, there may have been some nuances missed.
* Since “M[ystical]-beliefs are a particular species of perceptual beliefs…to the effect that God has some perceivable property or is engaging in some perceivable activity,” (p.77) the argument therefore is: if we can justifiably be able to say that perception of God is possible, then those that meet the criteria for justifiable mystical belief can therefore be logically said to hold verifiable epistemic beliefs about God via perception.
The former puts forward the argument that all perceptual systems of belief forming are inherently cyclical when it comes to understanding what it is that one perceives via that sight (e.g. seeing a red tie and believing that I justifiably see a red tie (p.45)) - and thus the concept of sight in general (i.e. I believe that sight gives me access to the world in way ‘x’ (assuming one is rational and not delusional etc.) - and that this same system of belief forming can thus be applied to what the author calls mystical perception (e.g. I perceive God, in so far as I am justified in believing that God has “directly” (p.286) appeared as a perceptual experience ‘x’ (p.70-1);* though indirect perception of God is mentioned as epistemically justifiable as well (p.288).
Since sensorial or sensory sight and mystical perception are both rational on these same exact logical grounds according to the theory, mystical perception can therefore be rational (regardless of whether or not there really is a God (this book does not cover that topic directly as it is about the nature of perceptual experience. “The aim is rather to rebut objections to the conviction of the subjects that they are directly aware of God, and to point out that if their conviction is correct they are also properly taken to be perceiving God” (p.5)).
The second point takes account of first hand experiences. Namely, it puts forward that there are certain ‘checkers’ which can be used to discern true - or likely to be true (i.e. justified) - actual mystical perceptions. These are: God as being “Good, powerful, plentiful, loving, compassionate, wise and glorious” (p.43) and doing the actions of “speaking, forgiving, strengthening, sympathising” (p.44). Concerning the intellect they should be about or involve “useful affairs and discretion”, and regarding the will they should be “internally peaceful, trusting in God, patient in pains, simple and sincere and [involve] charity that is meek, kindly and self-forgetful” (p.203), and should be discerned from false and misleading ones; such as the intellect having or being “futile, useless, vain preoccupations, exaggerations and excessive”, and of concerning the will as having “perturbation, disquiet, presumption or despair, impatience with trails, duplicity, dissimulation and false bitter pharisaical zeal” (p.203).
There is more to book than these two points I have chosen, such as the Christian background and the chapter on religious diversity, but these are the two I find specifically most important.
4/5 as the book is a bit long winded in places, though I understand the desire, in its place, to want to fully articulate and explain a position.
All errors in reconstructing the argumentation of the author, especially in regards to the first point in this review, are completely my own. Though I have attempted to provide the essence of the author’s arguments, there may have been some nuances missed.
* Since “M[ystical]-beliefs are a particular species of perceptual beliefs…to the effect that God has some perceivable property or is engaging in some perceivable activity,” (p.77) the argument therefore is: if we can justifiably be able to say that perception of God is possible, then those that meet the criteria for justifiable mystical belief can therefore be logically said to hold verifiable epistemic beliefs about God via perception.
September 19, 2025
Postmodern Mysticism
The thesis of William Alston's book is that, with minimal caveats, people who purportedly have mystical experiences of God are rationally justified in believing whatever they have mystically perceived. Alston sets the bar so low for this rational justification that it may be claimed with equal force by those with contradictory perceptions of God. This inevitably leads to the "true for you but not for me" scenario that has become the calling card of postmodern relativism.
Alston begins by taking mystical experiences at face value. If someone claims a mystical experience of God, Alston accepts that experience as supporting a prima facie justified belief in God as possessing the quality or performing the act mystically perceived, unless it runs afoul of an "overrider system."
An overrider system is a socially accepted set of beliefs that negate (override) a particular perception when the perception is contrary to the accepted beliefs. For Christianity, "the Bible, the ecumenical councils of the undivided church, Christian experience through the ages, Christian thought, and more generally the Christian tradition are normative sources of its overrider system." (Location 4844.) Overrider systems vary by religion, and this throws Alston's theory into a morass of relativism.
Depending on the overrider system, the same mystical perception could produce a rationally justified belief within one religion while producing an identical but unjustified belief within another. Under Alston's theory, the mystical experience that Jesus is God would provide a Christian with a rationally justified belief that Jesus is God while a Muslim with the same mystical experience would not be rationally justified in so believing based on the respective overrider systems of Christianity and Islam. Conversely, Alston's theory provides rational justification for antithetical beliefs. A mystical experience that God only exists as spirit could be justified by Islamic overriders while the contrary belief that Jesus was God incarnate would be justified by a mystical experience to that effect under Christianity. If, however, the Muslim and Christian had each other's mystical experience, neither of their beliefs would be justified because of their respective overriders (unless they converted to the other's religion).
Alston attempts to resolve this relativism in a chapter devoted to it, but his efforts are ineffective. First he offers the "all paths lead to God" approach. He writes that Christians, Jews and Muslims all "take themselves to be in contact with the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob" and "it is not implausible to suppose that if their adherents are perceiving anything like what they take themselves to be perceiving, it is the same being." (Loc. 6374.) Even if this were true, Altson's theory would fare none the better. On the one hand, mystics of the three different religions would be justified in holding antithetical beliefs about the same being and, on the other hand, were the mystics to receive identical revelations of the same being, one could be justified in his belief and the other not even though the beliefs were identical and were based on identical mystical perceptions.
Alston takes another shot at resolving the problem of relativism by suggesting that the Christian belief system is superior to other religions and, therefore, Christian beliefs based on mystical practices have greater justification than the others. This is, quite literally, a "holier than thou" argument. Alston claims that Christian mystical perceptions result in greater "growth in sanctity, peace, joy, fortitude, love, and other 'fruits of the spirit'" as compared to other religions and this provides "significant self-support" over and above what non-Christian mysticism provides. No compelling empirical evidence is presented for this assertion, nor are any concessions cited from non-Christians as to its validity.
Another major flaw in Alston's theory of justified belief appears when he tries to resolve conflicts in beliefs formed by different "doxastic practices," which are the various ways in which beliefs are formed and justified. Doxastic practices past and present include witchcraft, the practice of divination, reliance on the authority of sacred texts or of mystical visions, and reliance on the authority of science. Where two doxastic practices produce conflicting beliefs, Alston defers to the more "firmly established" practice and, for him, that is the scientific doxastic practice. He says that when religious beliefs contradict scientific beliefs, "the less firmly established practice, the religious one, can be preserved [only] by sacrificing some of its beliefs and/or by modifying its belief-forming procedures." (Loc. 4261.) By making modern scientism the ultimate arbiter of justified beliefs, Alston ends up throwing out the baby with the bath water.
Today's predominant scientistic doxastic practice has an overrider system that negates all beliefs suggesting the existence of a non-material, intelligent cause of any perceived effect. For example, Alston views the religious belief of God's creation of life ex nihilio as conflicting with, and being negated by, the modernist scientistic belief that life originates from inanimate material through natural causes. (Loc. 5931-938.) Belief in the Resurrection would also be negated on the basis of it being a supposed effect of a supernatural cause, and so would all beliefs based on mystical perceptions that purportedly involved a non-material supernatural being presenting itself to a person's consciousness. By placing contemporary scientific method, with its Modernist overriders, at the top of his hierarchy of doxastic practices, Alston leaves nothing left for mystical doxastic practices to justify.
In summary, Alston's theory of justified belief devolves into unmitigated relativism and is ultimately self-defeating. (The Kindle version of this book is also the worst I have seen for typos and misprints.)
The thesis of William Alston's book is that, with minimal caveats, people who purportedly have mystical experiences of God are rationally justified in believing whatever they have mystically perceived. Alston sets the bar so low for this rational justification that it may be claimed with equal force by those with contradictory perceptions of God. This inevitably leads to the "true for you but not for me" scenario that has become the calling card of postmodern relativism.
Alston begins by taking mystical experiences at face value. If someone claims a mystical experience of God, Alston accepts that experience as supporting a prima facie justified belief in God as possessing the quality or performing the act mystically perceived, unless it runs afoul of an "overrider system."
An overrider system is a socially accepted set of beliefs that negate (override) a particular perception when the perception is contrary to the accepted beliefs. For Christianity, "the Bible, the ecumenical councils of the undivided church, Christian experience through the ages, Christian thought, and more generally the Christian tradition are normative sources of its overrider system." (Location 4844.) Overrider systems vary by religion, and this throws Alston's theory into a morass of relativism.
Depending on the overrider system, the same mystical perception could produce a rationally justified belief within one religion while producing an identical but unjustified belief within another. Under Alston's theory, the mystical experience that Jesus is God would provide a Christian with a rationally justified belief that Jesus is God while a Muslim with the same mystical experience would not be rationally justified in so believing based on the respective overrider systems of Christianity and Islam. Conversely, Alston's theory provides rational justification for antithetical beliefs. A mystical experience that God only exists as spirit could be justified by Islamic overriders while the contrary belief that Jesus was God incarnate would be justified by a mystical experience to that effect under Christianity. If, however, the Muslim and Christian had each other's mystical experience, neither of their beliefs would be justified because of their respective overriders (unless they converted to the other's religion).
Alston attempts to resolve this relativism in a chapter devoted to it, but his efforts are ineffective. First he offers the "all paths lead to God" approach. He writes that Christians, Jews and Muslims all "take themselves to be in contact with the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob" and "it is not implausible to suppose that if their adherents are perceiving anything like what they take themselves to be perceiving, it is the same being." (Loc. 6374.) Even if this were true, Altson's theory would fare none the better. On the one hand, mystics of the three different religions would be justified in holding antithetical beliefs about the same being and, on the other hand, were the mystics to receive identical revelations of the same being, one could be justified in his belief and the other not even though the beliefs were identical and were based on identical mystical perceptions.
Alston takes another shot at resolving the problem of relativism by suggesting that the Christian belief system is superior to other religions and, therefore, Christian beliefs based on mystical practices have greater justification than the others. This is, quite literally, a "holier than thou" argument. Alston claims that Christian mystical perceptions result in greater "growth in sanctity, peace, joy, fortitude, love, and other 'fruits of the spirit'" as compared to other religions and this provides "significant self-support" over and above what non-Christian mysticism provides. No compelling empirical evidence is presented for this assertion, nor are any concessions cited from non-Christians as to its validity.
Another major flaw in Alston's theory of justified belief appears when he tries to resolve conflicts in beliefs formed by different "doxastic practices," which are the various ways in which beliefs are formed and justified. Doxastic practices past and present include witchcraft, the practice of divination, reliance on the authority of sacred texts or of mystical visions, and reliance on the authority of science. Where two doxastic practices produce conflicting beliefs, Alston defers to the more "firmly established" practice and, for him, that is the scientific doxastic practice. He says that when religious beliefs contradict scientific beliefs, "the less firmly established practice, the religious one, can be preserved [only] by sacrificing some of its beliefs and/or by modifying its belief-forming procedures." (Loc. 4261.) By making modern scientism the ultimate arbiter of justified beliefs, Alston ends up throwing out the baby with the bath water.
Today's predominant scientistic doxastic practice has an overrider system that negates all beliefs suggesting the existence of a non-material, intelligent cause of any perceived effect. For example, Alston views the religious belief of God's creation of life ex nihilio as conflicting with, and being negated by, the modernist scientistic belief that life originates from inanimate material through natural causes. (Loc. 5931-938.) Belief in the Resurrection would also be negated on the basis of it being a supposed effect of a supernatural cause, and so would all beliefs based on mystical perceptions that purportedly involved a non-material supernatural being presenting itself to a person's consciousness. By placing contemporary scientific method, with its Modernist overriders, at the top of his hierarchy of doxastic practices, Alston leaves nothing left for mystical doxastic practices to justify.
In summary, Alston's theory of justified belief devolves into unmitigated relativism and is ultimately self-defeating. (The Kindle version of this book is also the worst I have seen for typos and misprints.)
March 14, 2007
Boo. Direct realism seems like the philosophical equivalence of Intelligent Design.
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