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European Decolonization 1918–1981: An Introductory Survey
One of the most dramatically significant themes of the twentieth century has been the decline and final dismemberment of the European colonial empires. This book outlines the general features which influence this decline and, by concentrating on a series of case studies, emphasises the varieties of experience within this broad historical process.
While primarily concerned with events in the British Empire, the largest of the imperial systems, Dr Holland also considers developments in the French, Belgian, Dutch and Portuguese dependencies. The chronologically arranged sections focus on the sources of weakness in the European empires between 1918 and 1939; the impact of the Second World War; the upheavals of the post-war crisis; the move to decolonization in the later 1950's and early 1960's; and the subsequent realignment of relations between advanced and non-advanced nations.
The aim of this study is to provide an introductory text for sixth form and university students on a vital dimension of change within international relationships in twentieth century.
While primarily concerned with events in the British Empire, the largest of the imperial systems, Dr Holland also considers developments in the French, Belgian, Dutch and Portuguese dependencies. The chronologically arranged sections focus on the sources of weakness in the European empires between 1918 and 1939; the impact of the Second World War; the upheavals of the post-war crisis; the move to decolonization in the later 1950's and early 1960's; and the subsequent realignment of relations between advanced and non-advanced nations.
The aim of this study is to provide an introductory text for sixth form and university students on a vital dimension of change within international relationships in twentieth century.
- GenresHistory
344 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1985
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About the author
Robert Holland
18 books7 followersRobert Holland is one of the world’s leading historians of the Mediterranean. He is visiting professor at the Centre for Hellenic Studies at King’s College London.
a.k.a. R.F. Holland
a.k.a. R.F. Holland
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
August 10, 2024
Basically read this twice, as I've been taking so many notes. A short recap:
Robert Holland was to history what Bairoch was to economics. Liberals are wrong because they believe "the market" will solve everything and institutions don't exist, marxists are wrong because they stopped updating their priors in 1914. He prefers to remain an empiricist, whose gut directs him towards imperial apologetics, not out of any sense of superiority per se, but because a) he believes the first world needs the third, and should only abandon it at its own risk, and b) he believes some order will pervail internationally, desirable or not, and the postcolonial era sacrificed the stabilitu of its former colonies on the altar of the savage free market.
Most empires (the British, the French) began to ferment around the time of the first World War. Populations boomed, wartime impositions boosted economic growth while depressing wages and blocking indigenous careers, populations grew while agricultural disincentives stifled foodstuff plenitude. The formally educated elite was small, hence cheap to the imperialist budget, but this also meant the base of administration was narrow and brittle. The war bought these agricultural and urban tensions to a fever pitch and started the domino collapse of formal colonialism.
Holland emphasizes that it wasn't wholesale exploitation in itself that provoked the uprising, but rather the end of colonialism's relative benefits. Many luminous anticolonial struggles (the Viet Minh, the Algerian FLN, the Maltese Labour Party) were rearguard actions: decolonization was a given, but the position of the privileged negotiation partner was oftentimes left up for grabs. He is dismissive towards "neocolonialism" as an explanation of postcolonial submissiveness or poverty: local challenges could explain setbacks better than the spectre of continued worldwide economic dominance; Tshombé's Katanga was no less "authentic" than Boumedienne's Algeria or Sukarno's Indonesia. The global hierarchy is shaped by relative national economic power; colonialism formalizes this relation, and cannot arrest but cán accelerate economic and institutional development.
Despite writing in the 80s, Holland's hobbesianism proved prophetic. A nation's worst curse is institutional collapse. Vietnam, Algeria and Indonesia suffered massively in terms of human life, but maintained an upwards trajectory after decolonization. Neither Belgium, Portugal nor Rhodesia prepared for a postcolonial future, and hence Congo, Mozambique and Zimbabwe had to restart from scratch, their struggle being not national development but the development of an accepted and cohesisve ruling body. Vietnam came dangerously close to this scenario, but the solidity and deep roots of communist organizing managed to span the void.
Holland proclaims loudly he doesn't follow any ideology or school. As always with this kind of rhetoric, he does: colonial nostalgia, imperialist dismissiveness towards indigenous capabilities and a grudge towards liberals for abandoning the 'honest' face of open colonialism for the covert power politics and humanitarian neglect of the global market. This clouds his judgement — especially when it comes to Katanga, he is a little too happy to discount imperialist meddling, and the French OAS is likewise reduced to a sideshow. But the glee with which he brings down overarching and absolute narratives, in favor of the unintentional and contingent, is exactly the appeal of the Bairochian contrarian: providing inconvenient facts, for the policy-minded historian.
Robert Holland was to history what Bairoch was to economics. Liberals are wrong because they believe "the market" will solve everything and institutions don't exist, marxists are wrong because they stopped updating their priors in 1914. He prefers to remain an empiricist, whose gut directs him towards imperial apologetics, not out of any sense of superiority per se, but because a) he believes the first world needs the third, and should only abandon it at its own risk, and b) he believes some order will pervail internationally, desirable or not, and the postcolonial era sacrificed the stabilitu of its former colonies on the altar of the savage free market.
Most empires (the British, the French) began to ferment around the time of the first World War. Populations boomed, wartime impositions boosted economic growth while depressing wages and blocking indigenous careers, populations grew while agricultural disincentives stifled foodstuff plenitude. The formally educated elite was small, hence cheap to the imperialist budget, but this also meant the base of administration was narrow and brittle. The war bought these agricultural and urban tensions to a fever pitch and started the domino collapse of formal colonialism.
Holland emphasizes that it wasn't wholesale exploitation in itself that provoked the uprising, but rather the end of colonialism's relative benefits. Many luminous anticolonial struggles (the Viet Minh, the Algerian FLN, the Maltese Labour Party) were rearguard actions: decolonization was a given, but the position of the privileged negotiation partner was oftentimes left up for grabs. He is dismissive towards "neocolonialism" as an explanation of postcolonial submissiveness or poverty: local challenges could explain setbacks better than the spectre of continued worldwide economic dominance; Tshombé's Katanga was no less "authentic" than Boumedienne's Algeria or Sukarno's Indonesia. The global hierarchy is shaped by relative national economic power; colonialism formalizes this relation, and cannot arrest but cán accelerate economic and institutional development.
Despite writing in the 80s, Holland's hobbesianism proved prophetic. A nation's worst curse is institutional collapse. Vietnam, Algeria and Indonesia suffered massively in terms of human life, but maintained an upwards trajectory after decolonization. Neither Belgium, Portugal nor Rhodesia prepared for a postcolonial future, and hence Congo, Mozambique and Zimbabwe had to restart from scratch, their struggle being not national development but the development of an accepted and cohesisve ruling body. Vietnam came dangerously close to this scenario, but the solidity and deep roots of communist organizing managed to span the void.
Holland proclaims loudly he doesn't follow any ideology or school. As always with this kind of rhetoric, he does: colonial nostalgia, imperialist dismissiveness towards indigenous capabilities and a grudge towards liberals for abandoning the 'honest' face of open colonialism for the covert power politics and humanitarian neglect of the global market. This clouds his judgement — especially when it comes to Katanga, he is a little too happy to discount imperialist meddling, and the French OAS is likewise reduced to a sideshow. But the glee with which he brings down overarching and absolute narratives, in favor of the unintentional and contingent, is exactly the appeal of the Bairochian contrarian: providing inconvenient facts, for the policy-minded historian.
to-keep-reference
October 18, 2016Sobre la historia general del proceso de descolonización.
Imperio Pág.185
Imperio Pág.185
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