What do you think?
Rate this book
The Co-Vans: U.S. Marine Advisors in Vietnam
Foreword by Edwin Howard Simmons
Depending upon where and when they served, Americans had vastly different experiences in the Vietnam War. Among the more unique experiences were those of the advisors who worked closely with their Vietnamese counterparts, sharing the dangers, privations, local politics, tactical victories, and ultimate defeat as part of the long saga of the Vietnam War. U.S. Marines worked more closely than other advisors with the Vietnamese and were often on their own to deal with the vastly different culture and difficult cause. Despite these obstacles and arduous circumstances, the advisors, called co-vans in Vietnamese, did a credible job amidst a war far from home, upholding the honor of the Corps and infusing their allies with an esprit de corps that made the Vietnamese Marines a potent fighting force.
John Miller, a co-van himself, has captured their experiences in this very readable, often humorous, sometimes poignant book. With the same writing style that earned him writing awards and thousands of readers in his earlier book on John Ripley's heroism at a bridge in Vietnam, Miller captures the grit of life in the field, the no-nonsense view of men at arms no matter what the nationality, and the smell of cordite in the air. But more than a combat memoir, this is an introspective and thought-provoking look at an unusual mission in a war in an inscrutable culture at a time when Americans and their values were under fire.
Depending upon where and when they served, Americans had vastly different experiences in the Vietnam War. Among the more unique experiences were those of the advisors who worked closely with their Vietnamese counterparts, sharing the dangers, privations, local politics, tactical victories, and ultimate defeat as part of the long saga of the Vietnam War. U.S. Marines worked more closely than other advisors with the Vietnamese and were often on their own to deal with the vastly different culture and difficult cause. Despite these obstacles and arduous circumstances, the advisors, called co-vans in Vietnamese, did a credible job amidst a war far from home, upholding the honor of the Corps and infusing their allies with an esprit de corps that made the Vietnamese Marines a potent fighting force.
John Miller, a co-van himself, has captured their experiences in this very readable, often humorous, sometimes poignant book. With the same writing style that earned him writing awards and thousands of readers in his earlier book on John Ripley's heroism at a bridge in Vietnam, Miller captures the grit of life in the field, the no-nonsense view of men at arms no matter what the nationality, and the smell of cordite in the air. But more than a combat memoir, this is an introspective and thought-provoking look at an unusual mission in a war in an inscrutable culture at a time when Americans and their values were under fire.
- GenresWar
195 pages, Hardcover
First published October 1, 2000
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
December 8, 2016
Really good; actually one of the better memoirs I've read by a U.S. military officer about the wars in Indo-China. This author is better known for his earlier book The Bridge At Dong Ha, an award-winning account of events during the 1972 Easter Offensive which is considered to be a classic work of military history, and which I have not yet read. I'm going to have to remedy that sooner rather than later- luckily, I think I know where I can get a nice First Edition copy relatively inexpensively... In any case, I would certainly recommend this current work to anyone with an interest in the later years of U.S. involvement in Viet Nam, or specifically the advisory effort vis-a-vis the armed forces of the RVN.
November 21, 2015
I'm a little disappointed in The Co-Vans. This book was sold to me as the real story of the advisory war, and the more factual companion to Bing West's The Village, but it's basically an average memoir with only a little bit of insight in the bigger picture.
In 1970, Miller returned to Vietnam as a USMC Major, adviser to a VNMC Battalion. His previous combat tour as company commander and 3-month Vietnamese immersion course only partially prepared him for his new job. Unlike Army advisers, who deployed with a small team for backup, Marine advisers served alone, living on Vietnamese rations, with only the radio net and occasional trips back home as connection with the world. It's these experiences that Miller focuses on, and they're a lot like any rifleman's except a little more adult. Meals are sketchy chicken cooked by an enlisted VNMC "cowboy" servant rather than C-rations. Officers get drunk and get in trouble in Saigon, if a little less frequently than privates. There's the same political games with idiotic superiors, except that they have flag rank here.
Miller's tour overlapped a key period in Nixon's 'Vietnamization' draw-down, when the Vietnamese would have to take over fighting the war themselves. By and large, by this point the Vietnamese were experienced veterans, and Miller's duties apparently consisted mostly of coordinating logistics and air strikes, which were still American run. Most tellingly, Miller took a week off for R&R in the middle of Operation Lam Son 719; the critical test invasion of Laos by RVN forces in 1971. Only one adviser was allowed over Laos at a time, so there was little that Miller and his comrades could do aside from shelter from NVA artillery at Khe Sanh and listen to the radio, but even a professional and committed adviser like Miller seemed fairly checked out at this stage in the war.
I was really hoping for some sort of insight into the advising relationship across cultural barriers, but aside from some awkward moments of "He speaks our language?" from both Vietnamese and Americans, the details of the advisory relationship remain opaque. I was also hoping that Miller would rebut, confirm, or at least expand upon the common charges that RVN forces were cowardly, corrupt, and incompetent, but his assessment of the Vietnamese military is confined to about 10 pages at the end of the book, where he notes that Vietnamese officers tended to run their units out of their hip-pockets as personal fiefdoms, so for example a battalion was more of an over-sized company. This worked on light-duty counter-insurgency missions, but the absence of a command structure made it impossible to coordinate combined arms missions across multiple units in battle, making the VNMC less than the sum of it's parts. Commanders' personal charisma mattered a lot, the phrase 'mandate of heaven' is invoked, but units tended to fall apart if their commanders broke or became incapacitated. The worst criticism is reserved for ARVN General "Old Bloody Hands" Lam, who ordered the VNMC to act as a rear-guard for Lam Son 719 without a plan for their extraction except 'die to a man', apparently as the end-stage of some decade-long political feud in the RVN armed forces.
Anybody with a passing interest in the Vietnam War knows that the advisory system never really worked, and that in the end ARVN was defeated by the NVA. But this is not the book to provide much context for why that happened, except that by 1970 it was probably too late for everybody concerned.
In 1970, Miller returned to Vietnam as a USMC Major, adviser to a VNMC Battalion. His previous combat tour as company commander and 3-month Vietnamese immersion course only partially prepared him for his new job. Unlike Army advisers, who deployed with a small team for backup, Marine advisers served alone, living on Vietnamese rations, with only the radio net and occasional trips back home as connection with the world. It's these experiences that Miller focuses on, and they're a lot like any rifleman's except a little more adult. Meals are sketchy chicken cooked by an enlisted VNMC "cowboy" servant rather than C-rations. Officers get drunk and get in trouble in Saigon, if a little less frequently than privates. There's the same political games with idiotic superiors, except that they have flag rank here.
Miller's tour overlapped a key period in Nixon's 'Vietnamization' draw-down, when the Vietnamese would have to take over fighting the war themselves. By and large, by this point the Vietnamese were experienced veterans, and Miller's duties apparently consisted mostly of coordinating logistics and air strikes, which were still American run. Most tellingly, Miller took a week off for R&R in the middle of Operation Lam Son 719; the critical test invasion of Laos by RVN forces in 1971. Only one adviser was allowed over Laos at a time, so there was little that Miller and his comrades could do aside from shelter from NVA artillery at Khe Sanh and listen to the radio, but even a professional and committed adviser like Miller seemed fairly checked out at this stage in the war.
I was really hoping for some sort of insight into the advising relationship across cultural barriers, but aside from some awkward moments of "He speaks our language?" from both Vietnamese and Americans, the details of the advisory relationship remain opaque. I was also hoping that Miller would rebut, confirm, or at least expand upon the common charges that RVN forces were cowardly, corrupt, and incompetent, but his assessment of the Vietnamese military is confined to about 10 pages at the end of the book, where he notes that Vietnamese officers tended to run their units out of their hip-pockets as personal fiefdoms, so for example a battalion was more of an over-sized company. This worked on light-duty counter-insurgency missions, but the absence of a command structure made it impossible to coordinate combined arms missions across multiple units in battle, making the VNMC less than the sum of it's parts. Commanders' personal charisma mattered a lot, the phrase 'mandate of heaven' is invoked, but units tended to fall apart if their commanders broke or became incapacitated. The worst criticism is reserved for ARVN General "Old Bloody Hands" Lam, who ordered the VNMC to act as a rear-guard for Lam Son 719 without a plan for their extraction except 'die to a man', apparently as the end-stage of some decade-long political feud in the RVN armed forces.
Anybody with a passing interest in the Vietnam War knows that the advisory system never really worked, and that in the end ARVN was defeated by the NVA. But this is not the book to provide much context for why that happened, except that by 1970 it was probably too late for everybody concerned.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews