Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization

The Wilder House Series in Politics, History and Culture

by Karen Barkey

Why did the main challenge to the Ottoman state come not in peasant or elite rebellions, but in endemic banditry? Karen Barkey shows how Turkish strategies of incorporating peasants and rotating elites kept both groups dependent on the state, unable and unwilling to rebel. Bandits, formerly mercenary soldiers, were not interested in rebellion but concentrated on trying to gain state resources, more as rogue clients than as primitive rebels. The state's ability to control and manipulate bandits--through deals, bargains and patronage--suggests imperial strength rather than weakness, she maintains.

Bandits and Bureaucrats details, in a rich, archivally based analysis, state-society relations in the Ottoman empire during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Exploring current eurocentric theories of state building, the author illuminates a period often mischaracterized as one in which the state declined in power.

Outlining the processes of imperial rule, Barkey relates the state political and military institutions to their socal foundations. She compares the Ottoman route with state centralization in the Chinese and Russian empires, and contrasts experiences of rebellion in France during the same period. Bandits and Bureaucrats thus develops a theoretical interpretation of imperial state centralization through incorporation and bargaining with social groups, and at the same time enriches our understanding of the dynamics of Ottoman history.

Genres: History

304 pages, Hardcover

First published November 1, 1994

Reviews

[Bob Newman · Rating 3 out of 5]

Robin Hood Cuts a Deal with Sultan, Takes Office

OK, I'm going to start out by stating that I didn't like this book very much. However, I will immediately follow that by saying that it's obviously well-researched, the author covers a lot of ground methodically, and you'd have to be pretty obtuse not to follow her line of argument---it's repeated a LOT of times. Ottoman Turkey did not follow the same pattern of state centralization as various European societies, but many Western scholars insist on trying to force its history into a European mold. They see Western history as a kind of model which other societies must follow willy-nilly. Such assumptions are found in anthropology, psychology, and probably economics as well. If peasant rebellions and elite revolts marked European history in answer to the process of state centralization, they did not, in Barkey's view do so in the Ottoman Empire. I must confess to being a stranger to the topic and though I may know more of Turkish history than the average American, I am no expert. So, I was hoping to learn a lot from BANDITS AND BUREAUCRATS and I did. It seems that Ottoman society, particularly in Anatolia, on which Barkey did her research, did not produce peasant revolts or elite revolts. She shows why in great detail, perhaps much more detail than a non-specialist reader can absorb, but that is not a fault. Both peasants and elites were divided; there was no hereditary nobility as understood in Europe so peasants did not form close ties with members of the elite. Secondly, due to the very process of state centralization, large number of former soldiers or mercenaries, sometimes originally peasants, were cast adrift. A considerable part of these eventually became bandits, or if that word summons up Hollywood, at least we can say that they lived by looting and plundering hapless peasant populations. While European governments suppressed such elements, the Ottomans often negotiated deals with them. Bandit chiefs became military or political leaders, their men absorbed into the ranks. It didn't always work out; sometimes the Ottoman government wound up cutting off a lot of heads. In short, there was resistance to centralization, but as the author says, "a resistance that demanded to be incorporated", not one which advocated overthrow of the system. The seventeenth century has often been labelled a period of Ottoman decline. The author thinks otherwise. You will see if you agree. I don't think a review should necessarily summarize every aspect of the work under review.

If my comments stimulate your interest, you may get hold of the book. The reasons I didn't like the book and am giving it only three stars (though as a piece of research it deserves five) are three. 1) There are very few specific examples given in the first part. The part about bandits is better. When I read history, I like to find plenty of specific examples, not go on trust that the author knows what she is talking about. She spoke, towards the end, of "using theory to elucidate history". I would prefer using examples to elucidate history. THEN, you make reference to theory. 2) I felt right from the start a rather aggressive tone. The word "I" occurs an amazing number of times along with such words as "argue", "contend", "clearly provide" and even a reference to somebody "launching an attack on". It may just be my personal preference, but I think such things could be left out of books likely to be read by people like me who are unaware of academic battles (and not very interested either). 3) Related to the second point....I sensed throughout that the author disagrees with a section of the Ottoman History community and is conducting a battle with some unseen interlocutors. It is a way of establishing oneself in academia---attracting attention as the young, up-and-coming scholar who battles with the older members in order to be considered a rising star. I think it worked in the case of Dr. Barkey. I would have liked to be left out of it, however. Finding yourself in the middle of an unknown person's career moves is not a pleasant experience. I cannot say if the arguments hold water. They are extremely interesting however, and if you are serious about Ottoman history I doubt if you can ignore this book.

[Resul · Rating 5 out of 5]

İmparatorlukların güçlerini değişimden aldıklarını söyleyerek başlayan kitapta, merkeziyetçi devlet oluşum sürecinin tüm devletlerde Avrupa devletleri gibi gerçekleşmediğini, bilhassa Fransa üzerinden karşılaştırmalı olarak köylü ve elit ittifakıyla oluşan köylü isyanlarının neden Osmanlı’da gerçekleşmediğini elitlerin arasında kazanan ve kaybeden yaratılarak gerçekleştirildiğini uzunca izah edilmiş.
XVI. ve XVII. Yüzyıllarındaki Celali isyanları ve genel eşkıyalık faaliyetlerinin ve devletin eşkıya reisleriyle giriştiği pazarlıkların Osmanlı’nın zayıflığının göstergesi olmadığının, Osmanlı’nın hem eşkıyaların yıkıcı faaliyetlerini önleyebilmesiyle hem de bu faaliyetleri kendi yararına kullanabilmesiyle de gücünün göstergesi olduğunu söylüyor. Eşkıyaları devletle bütünleştirerek Avrupa muadillerine göre farklı şekilde merkezileşen Osmanlı’nın XVI. Yüzyılda padişahın kendisi olmaktan çıkıp kurum olmaya başladığının altını çizilmiş. Sekbanların ve köylü milislerin oluşum sürecinde Çin’le karşılaştırarak Barkey yine çok yararlı örnekler vermiş.
Ödüllü bir kitap olarak rüştünü ispatlamış olan kitap Osmanlı tarihi için en faydalı kaynaklardan biri.

[Özgür Akyol · Rating 2 out of 5]

Akademik çalışmalarda klasik hale gelmiş olan yeni bir şey diyim hastalığı bulaşan çalışmalardan biri. Osmanli gerileme söylemini yıkacağız diye büyük saçmalamış kitap. Yarım yüzyıl Anadoluda idare kalmamış, yazarın kendisi dahi devlet görevlisi olan ile olmayan arasındaki fark bulanıklaşmış diyor ama aynı yazar bunun eşkıyaların başarılı bir şekilde devlet merkezine eklemlenmesi diyor. Merkezileşmek için standardize gerekir. Senin bahsettiğin ise yamalar bütünü.
Hani neredeyse Osmanlı nasıl yıkılır ona inanmayacak hale geleceğim okurken.

[Ana Krijpen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting story about political development with rich archival evidence.

[J.M. Hushour · Rating 4 out of 5]

Was the 17th century really a period of decline for the Ottomans? Were the celali rebellions a symptom or symbol of imperial weakness? No, says Barkey, rather it was a adaptive imperial strategy of inclusion rather than exclusion, or, incorporation of and negotiation with dissidence. Unlike European states of the time, who experienced peasant, class-based rebellions, the Ottomans experienced nothing like this. Instead, Barkey shows how state patronage and negotiation allowed bandits to be creatively integrated into the polity.

[Revolutionarywtgrrl · Rating 2 out of 5]

Not good; doesn't differentiate between state formation in and empire vs. nation-state; questionable theoretical assumptions; little in the way of source material