Review of G. A. Cohen, If You are an Egalitarian, How Come You are so Rich? Harvard, 2000
This set of lectures can be difficult going when Cohen is parsing words and phrases, giving definitions, and displaying his logical rigor. But mostly it has the elegance and clarity I also appreciated in his Karl Marx’s Theory of History (KMTH). The two books often overlap. But I found the repetition worthwhile.
I skipped the two opening autobiographical chapters as I had read a version of those elsewhere. I also skimmed the last three chapters devoted mostly to dismantling Rawls. In the 2000 version of KMTH, Cohen shows why Marx avoided speaking of values, ethics, and justice. Marx was committed to a scientific analysis of capitalism, says Cohen. The Marxist tradition, he things, doubles down on this mistake. He announces that Marxism must turn to liberal theorists of justice and learn from them. So, it was no surprise that Cohen moves to a critique of Rawls (and Dworkin and Nozick). However, I don’t have it in me to open up to the Rawlsian world because its announcing move is to defend inequality – even if Cohen gives a sizzling critique. My uneducated and uncultured position is that functional inequality arguments cannot but be wrong since they measure value and goodness in terms of utility and not in terms of more meaningful ethical principles.
That leaves the middle of the book – ch 3. Utopian and Scientific Socialism, ch 4. Hegel in Marx; ch 5: Opium of the People; and, ch 6: Equality. These I found superb and clear enough to use for undergraduate students.
Here Cohen both clarifies and critiques Marx.
Examples of Cohen’s clarifications: why Marx critiqued French and utopian socialism; how Hegel’s influence remains in Marx; Hegel’s understanding of what I would call “objective idealism”; Marx’s upturning of Feuerbach’s critique of religion because it lacks a sociological grounding; a much more dialectical (my word use, not Cohen’s) understanding of Marx’s 11th thesis on Feuerbach which calls for both action and interpretation; Marx’s defense of reformism when coupled with structural understanding of capitalism and of history; Marx’s sympathy for those who rely on religion and his understanding of why people create religion and God, and, therefore, how and why people dupe themselves.
Examples of Cohen’s critique: Marx false belief that activists cannot be engineers and can only be the midwives of history; Marx’s unwarranted belief that solutions to problems can only be immanent to the problems themselves; and Marx’s optimism about a post-capitalist future.
I remain amazed at Cohen’s ability to simultaneously be generous and take apart Hegel, Marx, and anybody. My apprenticeship with him does not mean that I think he gets it all correct. His understanding of dialectics is, I think, inferior to that of Zizek’s. Zizek (in Tarrying with the Negative, believes that dialectic dynamism carries (my word) all negations (or to use a Freudian/Lacan word) all “wounds” with it. Nothing is smoothed over; all scars, wounds, negations remain as the dialectic unfolds. I think it is a smoothed over understanding of dialectics that allows Cohen to link Hegelian “totality” to “totalitarianism” (90).
I was immediately suspicious of Cohen’s incorporation of “scarcity” -- one of the two pillars of neo-classical economics and of contractarian social theory (e.g., Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau). The two pillars are: needs are infinite, means are scarce. Result: a tragic world. Cohen believes Marx’s vision of an abundant future is impossible due to natural “scarcity.” This means that Western standards of living will have to be reduced. More crucial, Third World people will never attain those standards. In effect, Cohen is ready to dismiss most of the world’s population aspirations as impossible.
One of Cohen’s most important lines is about the deepest root meaning of injustice: injustice is when results derive from luck and circumstance (130). Cohen consistently rejects, as Marx does, all distributive schemes that do not follow from what Cohen calls the need principle, namely the famous “from those according to their abilities, to those their needs.” I have been won over by Cohen’s claim that Marx’s deepest ethical commitment is to the need principle. This commitment speaks to one of my most basic concerns, one I have held even as a child. At the end of the day, the power of Marx’s vision results from his embrace of the need principle AND his rejection of luck and circumstance as determining of one’s life chances. The scarcity assumption undoes that aspiration. It also goes against the central assumption of both Hegelianism and Marxism – that humans re-create nature to for their own purposes.
The twin pillars of scarcity of means and infinity of wants are, ideologically, an embrace of hierarchy and a rejection of equality. Their opposite is a wealthy equality, namely an abundance of means (due to technology, due to human creativity) and finite needs (that meaningful consumption can be satisfied, that therefore that the circuit M-C-M’ serves the circuit C1-M-C2).
The politics of scarcity necessarily abandons either the relative abundance that technology (the human manipulation of nature) creates, or, it abandons a commitment to equality. Part of Marx’s greatness – despite his many problems – is that he refuses to forsake either abundance or equality. Cohen, in contrast, gives up on abundance and therefore also on equality. So falls analytical Marxism’s visionary appeal – if it ever had one. Precision is always a laudable goal but it must serve some purpose. What greater purpose it serves analytical Marxists, I still do not know.