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The Road to Hell
A stunning personal narrative of best intentions gone awry, Michael Maren, at one time an aid worker and journalist in Somalia, writes of the failure of international charities, such as CARE and Save the Children, who he claims does anything but. Maren also attacks the United Nation's "humanitarian" missions are controlled by agribusinesses and infighting bureaucrats.
320 pages, Paperback
First published January 14, 1997
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July 3, 2008
Michael Maren's book is simply brilliant in its exhaustive research and compassion and perspective. When the book was written in 1997, the author had already spent nineteen years in Africa – in Kenya, Somalia, Burkina faso, Rwanda and Ethiopia – reporting on the famine, civil war and military conflicts in the region. So, he is eminently qualified to take a critical look at international charity organizations and overseas aid projects in Africa and also the United Nations organizations like UNHRC. What emerges is a scathing revelation of foreign aid and international charity as an end in itself and a self-serving system where these organizations care less about the victims of famine and civil war and more about their own organizational interests and the perpetuation of their organizations' interests.
Maren investigates extensively the major organizations like CARE, Save the Children and UNHCR in the long civil strife of Somalia and shows how they all treat every famine, civil war and displacement of people as a 'business opportunity' and descend in large numbers to do 'famine relief'. Actually, there is vast money in famine relief and managing small scale conflicts in places like Africa after the end of the Cold war. These NGOs as well as the UN bureaucracy chase these billions of dollars and set up shop in places of strife where the aid workers lead comfortable lives in their protected enclaves, ride around in Landrovers and end up basically destroying the self-sufficient fabric of the societies into which they descend.
The other key players in this sorry saga are of course, the local warlords and dictators who have a vested interest in the continuation of the famine and dependency on foreign aid to advance their own clan or sectarian interests. Maren shows how even the military establishments like the Pentagon and NATO get involved in these places like Somalia, Bosnia, Ethiopia etc to test out their 'capabilities' in the post-Cols War scenarios. The author shows how the western media also plays a role in aiding and abetting this nexus of 'NGO-UN-military and local warlords by exaggerating the crisis in target countries like Somalia by beaming the faces of emaciated children and dead cattle and disease and poverty.
Maren makes two important observations. One is about the deception of the charity organizations using pie charts to convey an impression that something like 85% of the donor's money being used for 'program services'. Often this term 'program services' tends to be just a play on semantics. Investigations show that only 10% actually goes in the service of ultimate beneficiaries. The other point is about charities destroying the traditional inter-dependence of nomads and settled people in Somalia and Ethiopia. Aid organizations forced nomads to settle down to farming without providing a way for them to survive when drought conditions make farming impossible.
Maren shows in 1997 how the crisis in Rwanda had all the facets of new 'business opportunities' for the NGOs just as Somalia was receding from the front pages of the western media. To me, the book was a revelation of how sordid this whole gamut of aid organizations and NGOs which have proliferated in the past decades.
In Michael Maren's own words, the point is made as follows:
“The NGOs are seeking ever newer tasks to tackle. Where they once spoke of basic human needs, women in development and sustainable development, they now address issues of land mines, conflict avoidance, and now the latest and trendiest of issues - 'civil society'. The same aid workers who once tried (and largely failed) to teach farmers to grow things are now fanning out and sowing the seeds of 'civil society' across the world. Generally speaking, a civil society is one that is held together by rule of law, not one of loyalties to clan. It is the essence of the cultural struggles taking place in Somalia, Bosnia and even New York city. In many ways, it is a constant struggle , and one that seems bizarrely juxtaposed with the traditional notion and capacities of an NGO. Yet it is a growth opportunity. Along with land-mine clearance and conflict avoidance/resolution, it is where the money is. Few NGOs have seen a contract they didn't like or a problem they didn't believe they could solve. The first priority of any NGO, like any bureaucracy, is its own survival.”
It is one of the best books I have read in recent years and I strongly recommend it to anyone interested in international charity and foreign aid institutions as well as what happened really in the Somali crisis of the 1980s and 90s.
Maren investigates extensively the major organizations like CARE, Save the Children and UNHCR in the long civil strife of Somalia and shows how they all treat every famine, civil war and displacement of people as a 'business opportunity' and descend in large numbers to do 'famine relief'. Actually, there is vast money in famine relief and managing small scale conflicts in places like Africa after the end of the Cold war. These NGOs as well as the UN bureaucracy chase these billions of dollars and set up shop in places of strife where the aid workers lead comfortable lives in their protected enclaves, ride around in Landrovers and end up basically destroying the self-sufficient fabric of the societies into which they descend.
The other key players in this sorry saga are of course, the local warlords and dictators who have a vested interest in the continuation of the famine and dependency on foreign aid to advance their own clan or sectarian interests. Maren shows how even the military establishments like the Pentagon and NATO get involved in these places like Somalia, Bosnia, Ethiopia etc to test out their 'capabilities' in the post-Cols War scenarios. The author shows how the western media also plays a role in aiding and abetting this nexus of 'NGO-UN-military and local warlords by exaggerating the crisis in target countries like Somalia by beaming the faces of emaciated children and dead cattle and disease and poverty.
Maren makes two important observations. One is about the deception of the charity organizations using pie charts to convey an impression that something like 85% of the donor's money being used for 'program services'. Often this term 'program services' tends to be just a play on semantics. Investigations show that only 10% actually goes in the service of ultimate beneficiaries. The other point is about charities destroying the traditional inter-dependence of nomads and settled people in Somalia and Ethiopia. Aid organizations forced nomads to settle down to farming without providing a way for them to survive when drought conditions make farming impossible.
Maren shows in 1997 how the crisis in Rwanda had all the facets of new 'business opportunities' for the NGOs just as Somalia was receding from the front pages of the western media. To me, the book was a revelation of how sordid this whole gamut of aid organizations and NGOs which have proliferated in the past decades.
In Michael Maren's own words, the point is made as follows:
“The NGOs are seeking ever newer tasks to tackle. Where they once spoke of basic human needs, women in development and sustainable development, they now address issues of land mines, conflict avoidance, and now the latest and trendiest of issues - 'civil society'. The same aid workers who once tried (and largely failed) to teach farmers to grow things are now fanning out and sowing the seeds of 'civil society' across the world. Generally speaking, a civil society is one that is held together by rule of law, not one of loyalties to clan. It is the essence of the cultural struggles taking place in Somalia, Bosnia and even New York city. In many ways, it is a constant struggle , and one that seems bizarrely juxtaposed with the traditional notion and capacities of an NGO. Yet it is a growth opportunity. Along with land-mine clearance and conflict avoidance/resolution, it is where the money is. Few NGOs have seen a contract they didn't like or a problem they didn't believe they could solve. The first priority of any NGO, like any bureaucracy, is its own survival.”
It is one of the best books I have read in recent years and I strongly recommend it to anyone interested in international charity and foreign aid institutions as well as what happened really in the Somali crisis of the 1980s and 90s.
April 2, 2011
Muckraking the emergency relief industry. Very targeted exposé of humanitarian aid "non-governmental" organizations and their funding ties to government grants and therefore government foreign and domestic policy. The case is Somalia 1977-1992 and the US government's use of famine and wars in that country as a valve for agricultural surplus and a means to prop up an anti-Communist dictator by maintaining a refugee crisis over decades. The refugees kept aid agencies in country, kept aid money flowing in with no expectations for anything else to come out. The aid was knowingly stolen and sold by political elites and soldiers, refugees prevented from resettling as a means to fund power and war. Maren carefully documents how well known and accepted this practice was, how charities (naming names!) get rich off aid money, encourage instability to stay in business, and the ways they undermine workers, national & expat, who focus on doing the work instead of keeping their job.
Two problems with this book. First, it's outdated. It was published in the mid-90s. Its publication was part of a movement to redefine globalization, to focus attention on the neocolonial manifestation of missionaries in humanitarian aid projects. This critique was, I think, rather successful in some aspects and dismissed in other. Throughout, I was kind of dying to know what parts of this book are still relevant and how the others changed. Specifically, his biting critique of Save the Children came as a surprise to me; working in food relief, Save comes up often as one of the better organizations doing useful, solid work now, with unclear references to a dirty past. Has the past changed much since Maren's time?
Second, this book was written in a rage and from deep within a specific context. And therefore, it lacks context: 15 years old and scattered, it needed brief explanations of the characters and events that may have seemed self-evident from the author's perspective. It needed to be better organized, held together tighter for the many specific examples to better fit into a clearly damning whole.
Aside from those issues, The Road to Hell is a useful critique of the aid business in a nutshell. It's all there, he lays out a large overall critique of the entire value chain from high-flying expat aid worker to self-interested US policy. He does this with care to distinguish what good work looks like. The problem is not critical kindness. The problem is the manipulations of kind acts by power for its maintencance.
Some longish quotes:
p.192
[I wanted to quote Maren's 2-page breakdown of how the US agricultural Food for Peace Act, which was originally titled the Agricultural Trade Development Assistance Act, works as a front for US domestic and foreign policy. Domestically, the government buys surplus grains to maintain high prices for US farmers-- when their is excess supply, rather than allow the prices to drop, the government buys up the oversupply and sends it overseas (as free aid sometimes, but often simply sold as "aid" for a lower price). Where the food goes is then a matter of foreign policy, food as a source of power and leverage for US diplomats. Time was limited and I returned the book to the library tho.]
p. 88
Like Chris and hundreds of others, he had realized that charity and development work are political, that doing relief and development work in the context of oppression is counterproductive. Any real commitment to development requires political action, speaking out against the powers that keep people from developing themselves. In the Somali context, doing *real* development work was a truly subversive activity. During the late 1980s, at least a dozen aid workers were killed in Somalia. In 1988 alone, there were 200 acts of violence *reported* against aid workers. Some of it was robbery and general harassment, much of it was directed against activities that the government viewed as against its best interests. Aid groups were left in peace so long as they didn't cross the government. Most kept working through the violence, though their activities were kept to a minimum. In essence, they were allowed to stay and work as long as they really didn't do their jobs.
p. 259
In industrialized countries, even the lowest paid worker can occasionally spring for a good bottle of whiskey or a decent pair of shoes. Rich and poor exist on opposite ends of a broad economic continuum. In Africa there are few places where the two economies meet. Of the money that Western organizations, businesses, and charities spend in Africa, a small part goes into the African tier economy. This is the money paid to servants and workers, the pennies passed out to beggars and street children for watching their cars at night. The vast bulk of the money that Westerners spend is in the upper tier of the economy. Rents are paid at European rates, often in foreign exchange. Planes are chartered and trucking companies are engaged to move aid and relief supplies. The landlords and car dealers are the government officials who live sin this upper tier with the expatriates, who show up at the restaurants and clubs. NGOs generally pay their local staff well, by local standards. But even the lowliest foreign-born volunteer aid worker exists in the expatriate economy; these unskilled Westerners earn multiples of what highly qualified nationals get paid.
The disaster in Somalia was a windfall for Kenya. The Kenyans charged landing feeds for airplanes at Wilson AIrport, where most charter and civilian planes are based. NGOs moved in thousands of personnel and the United Nations operated most of their relief effort from Nairobi. In addition, hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees flocked into Kenyam where they were met by an army of aid workers t
take care of their needs. Relief organizations purchased water, food, blankets, and other materials in Kenya. They rented houses. All of this was going money going to Kenya's politician-businessman class.
With Kenya's crucial tourism industry, aid workers became a permanent tourist presence, filling hotels and restaurants as tourists once did. And just as the Somalia operation was ending, Rwanda came int o fill
the gap.
p. 268
"You need a license to drive a taxi in New York City, but anyone can form a charity and start working oversees." The United States government has passed laws that govern the behvaior of US businesses abroad, but there are no such rules for chairities. There is no accountability. The UN can attempt to run a refugee camp but has no authority to tell an organization they can't pitch a tent and start working. There's nothing to prevent a group of Westerners withmoney from setting up shop and perofmring surgery on refugees. No one is going to ask for their medical diplomas or evidence of liability insurance. When I wa sa Peace Corps volunteer in Kenya, I remember meeting a doctor in a bush hospital who elatedly told me, ''I'd have to wait another five years before they'd let me do the things I'm doing here.''
[Read while in Ethiopia.]
Two problems with this book. First, it's outdated. It was published in the mid-90s. Its publication was part of a movement to redefine globalization, to focus attention on the neocolonial manifestation of missionaries in humanitarian aid projects. This critique was, I think, rather successful in some aspects and dismissed in other. Throughout, I was kind of dying to know what parts of this book are still relevant and how the others changed. Specifically, his biting critique of Save the Children came as a surprise to me; working in food relief, Save comes up often as one of the better organizations doing useful, solid work now, with unclear references to a dirty past. Has the past changed much since Maren's time?
Second, this book was written in a rage and from deep within a specific context. And therefore, it lacks context: 15 years old and scattered, it needed brief explanations of the characters and events that may have seemed self-evident from the author's perspective. It needed to be better organized, held together tighter for the many specific examples to better fit into a clearly damning whole.
Aside from those issues, The Road to Hell is a useful critique of the aid business in a nutshell. It's all there, he lays out a large overall critique of the entire value chain from high-flying expat aid worker to self-interested US policy. He does this with care to distinguish what good work looks like. The problem is not critical kindness. The problem is the manipulations of kind acts by power for its maintencance.
Some longish quotes:
p.192
[I wanted to quote Maren's 2-page breakdown of how the US agricultural Food for Peace Act, which was originally titled the Agricultural Trade Development Assistance Act, works as a front for US domestic and foreign policy. Domestically, the government buys surplus grains to maintain high prices for US farmers-- when their is excess supply, rather than allow the prices to drop, the government buys up the oversupply and sends it overseas (as free aid sometimes, but often simply sold as "aid" for a lower price). Where the food goes is then a matter of foreign policy, food as a source of power and leverage for US diplomats. Time was limited and I returned the book to the library tho.]
p. 88
Like Chris and hundreds of others, he had realized that charity and development work are political, that doing relief and development work in the context of oppression is counterproductive. Any real commitment to development requires political action, speaking out against the powers that keep people from developing themselves. In the Somali context, doing *real* development work was a truly subversive activity. During the late 1980s, at least a dozen aid workers were killed in Somalia. In 1988 alone, there were 200 acts of violence *reported* against aid workers. Some of it was robbery and general harassment, much of it was directed against activities that the government viewed as against its best interests. Aid groups were left in peace so long as they didn't cross the government. Most kept working through the violence, though their activities were kept to a minimum. In essence, they were allowed to stay and work as long as they really didn't do their jobs.
p. 259
In industrialized countries, even the lowest paid worker can occasionally spring for a good bottle of whiskey or a decent pair of shoes. Rich and poor exist on opposite ends of a broad economic continuum. In Africa there are few places where the two economies meet. Of the money that Western organizations, businesses, and charities spend in Africa, a small part goes into the African tier economy. This is the money paid to servants and workers, the pennies passed out to beggars and street children for watching their cars at night. The vast bulk of the money that Westerners spend is in the upper tier of the economy. Rents are paid at European rates, often in foreign exchange. Planes are chartered and trucking companies are engaged to move aid and relief supplies. The landlords and car dealers are the government officials who live sin this upper tier with the expatriates, who show up at the restaurants and clubs. NGOs generally pay their local staff well, by local standards. But even the lowliest foreign-born volunteer aid worker exists in the expatriate economy; these unskilled Westerners earn multiples of what highly qualified nationals get paid.
The disaster in Somalia was a windfall for Kenya. The Kenyans charged landing feeds for airplanes at Wilson AIrport, where most charter and civilian planes are based. NGOs moved in thousands of personnel and the United Nations operated most of their relief effort from Nairobi. In addition, hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees flocked into Kenyam where they were met by an army of aid workers t
take care of their needs. Relief organizations purchased water, food, blankets, and other materials in Kenya. They rented houses. All of this was going money going to Kenya's politician-businessman class.
With Kenya's crucial tourism industry, aid workers became a permanent tourist presence, filling hotels and restaurants as tourists once did. And just as the Somalia operation was ending, Rwanda came int o fill
the gap.
p. 268
"You need a license to drive a taxi in New York City, but anyone can form a charity and start working oversees." The United States government has passed laws that govern the behvaior of US businesses abroad, but there are no such rules for chairities. There is no accountability. The UN can attempt to run a refugee camp but has no authority to tell an organization they can't pitch a tent and start working. There's nothing to prevent a group of Westerners withmoney from setting up shop and perofmring surgery on refugees. No one is going to ask for their medical diplomas or evidence of liability insurance. When I wa sa Peace Corps volunteer in Kenya, I remember meeting a doctor in a bush hospital who elatedly told me, ''I'd have to wait another five years before they'd let me do the things I'm doing here.''
[Read while in Ethiopia.]
July 5, 2009
The book raised some interesting and valid points. However, the author lost a lot of credibility by exaggerating certain facts and dwelling on other issues almost obsessively that appeared to be mainly personal gripes - such as aid workers driving Land Rovers. He also was obviously a disgruntled Save the Children employee. Further, Somalia was an extreme example of a disastrous aid - particularly food aid. There are actually aid programs and projects that did some good around the world.
November 26, 2010
Good to get a critical perspective on foreign aid and international charity work. I wasn't expecting the heavy focus/historical background on Somalia, but understand how that served as an illustration of the author's point. I certainly learned a lot!
Notes and quotes from the book:
Personal Notes:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_...
PVO = private voluntary organization
NGO = non-governmental organization
A non-governmental organization (NGO) is a legally constituted organization created by natural or legal persons that operates independently from any government and a term usually used by governments to refer to entities that have no government status. In the cases in which NGOs are funded totally or partially by governments, the NGO maintains its non-governmental status by excluding government representatives from membership in the organization.
The starving African exists as a point in space from which we measure our own wealth, success, and prosperity, a darkness against which we can view our own cultural triumphs. And he serves as a handy object of our charity. He is evidence that we have been blessed, and we have an obligation to spread that blessing. The belief that we can help is an affirmation of our own worth in the grand scheme of things. The starving African transcends the dull reality of whether or not anyone is actually starving in Africa. Starvation clearly delineates us from them.
Sometimes it appears that the only time Africans are portrayed with dignity is when they’re helpless and brave at the same time. A person about to starve to death develops a stoic strength. Journalists write about the quiet dignity of the hopelessly dying. If the Africans were merely hungry and poor, begging or conning coins on the streets of Nairobi or Addis Ababa, we might have become annoyed and brush them aside—and most aid workers have done that at one time. When they steal tape decks from our Land Cruisers we feel anger and disgust. It is on ly in their weakness, when their death is inevitable, that we are touched. And it is their helplessness that they become a marketable commodity.
(page 3)
When I slowed down for a moment to consider what was happening, it became clear: Aid distribution is just another big, private business that relies on government contracts. Groups like CRS are paid by the U.S. government to give away surplus food produced by subsidized U.S. farmers. The more food CRS gave away, the more money they received from the government to administer the handouts. Since the securing of grant money is the primary goal, aid organizations rarely meet a development project they don’t like.
(page 8)
… It becomes increasingly difficult for aid workers to ignore the compelling correlation between massive international food aid and increasing vulnerability to famine. “Our charity does not overcome famine, and may help to prolong it,” someone will always lament. Those who spend the time to study the local economies see that the people have now geared their own activities not to returning to their old lives but to getting their hands on aid.
(pages 21-22)
… In essence, the West’s surplus grains were subsidizing the production of bananas and other crops that did not compete with Western agricultural interests. And Somalia’s elite were making millions of dollars at both ends of the system. All this was made possible by food aid—and as more farmers were forced off their land, food aid became more necessary. The cycle of food-aid dependence was self-sustaining.
And what about the donors? Did they care what their aid was doing? A World Bank study charged that donors were concerned only with their own domestic agricultural situation. “[D]onors’ food aid budgets are primarily influenced by prospects for commercial exports of their food surpluses rather than being determined in accordance with the needs and objectives of recipient countries to reduce their food import dependency. Accordingly, donors usually reduce their food aid budgets when prospects for commercial exports of surpluses are good and increase than when those prospects are poor. As a result, significant price fluctuations are likely to occur in the domestic food market, particularly when the former decision of donors happens to coincide with a poor harvest in the recipient country and the latter with a good one.”
(page 170)
…USAID doles out close to 80 percent of its contracts and grants to U.S. firms—which in turn provide food, supplies, or assistance to recipient nations overseas.
Organizations that lobby on behalf of aid understand that. They know the way to sell aid in Congress is to emphasize what we get from it. Yet these organizations, NGOs mostly, are put in a position to lobby on behalf of multibillion-dollar corporations so they can do their little piece of work and get their relatively tiny slice of the pie.
The grain-trading companies dominate the world of food, and in this scheme of things, the NGOs and charities serve two very important functions. First, they are the primary lobbyists for sending food to the Third World. … Second, they are the agents, the contractors who move the food.
Yet even the NGOs know that they have to pitch food aid for its domestic benefits. Ken Hackett, director of Catholic Relief Services, selling the idea of food aid to Congress said, “Each food aid dollar has at least a double impact. First, the funds are spent primarily in the United States on U.S. commodities, processing, bagging, fortification, and transportation. This enhances economic activity and increases the tax receipts to the U.S. government. Second, the food is provided to people and countries which cannot afford to import adequate amounts of food on a commercial basis. Finally, when PVOs are involved, we leverage funds and services and gain broad public participation.
The modern role of the NGO developed in the years following the creation of the Food for Peace program, and much of that early activity took place in Vietnam. The U.S. government found PL-480 to be a handy way to get around agreements limiting the amount of aid funds that could be sent to Vietnam. NGOs were under tremendous pressure to cooperate. As Professor Vernon Ruttan noted, “While cooperating with the government, the PVOs voiced their dissatisfaction with the increasing politicization of their programs. IN spite of their reservations they allowed themselves to be used, because they were dependent on government money and supplies; most were willing to do whatever was necessary—including distributing food in situations that were at best questionable and at worst harmful to recipients.”
That was in the early 1960s, and little has changed. CARE, the largest American NGO, has a budget that approaches half a billion dollars annually. More than half of that is in the form of commodities and funds they receive to administer the distribution of commodities.
According to the General Accounting Office in fiscal year 1993, NGOs distributed almost 1.2 million metric tons of U.S.-donated food aid, not including emergency aid, to fifty-eight countries. PVOs sold about 13 percent of the Title II commodities in 1993 to conduct nonfood projects. The GAO has noted that NGOs tend to distribute food first, and examine the consequences later:
AID and PVOs have generally evaluated food aid projects based on commodity management and outputs, such as numbers of children fed or miles of road constructed, but have not assessed the impact of their projects on long-term food security. AID has stated that it and the PVOs are fully committed to doing a better job at evaluating the impact of food aid development projects on long-term food security and are making progress in developing and applying methodologies.
Humanitarian organizations have become comfortable in bed with the grain companies. Their survival and growth depend on it, but they must realize how the humanitarian instinct has become perverted by its partnership with domestic special interests. Humanitarians speak eloquently about the need for relief of hunger in the Third World. Yet most of the food aid they hand out—about 90 percent—is not emergency aid for starving people. (In fact, by law at least 76 percent of the commodities provided under Title II must be used for nonemergency development activities.) When food aid is criticized, their response is, “Do you suggest we let people starve?” It seems they’ve learned much from their partners in agribusiness, who see starving people as little more than another market for their products.
(pages 201-202)
The episode reflected a prevalent Western attitude that anything we send, anything we can do, is needed and useful. It is the same attitude that hammers home the message that for the price of a cup of coffee, we can alter the lives of poor children in the Third World. It is bargain-basement charity.
(page 264)
Hilsum and I were at a conference in Geneva in December of 1995 where someone remarked, “You need a license to drive a taxi in New York City, but anyone can form a charity and start working overseas.” The United States government has passed laws that govern the behavior of U.S. businesses abroad, but there are no such rules for charities. There is no accountability. The UN can attempt to run a refugee camp but has no authority to tell an organization they can’t pitch a tent and start working. There’s nothing to prevent a group of Westerners with money from setting up shop and performing surgery on refugees. No one is going to ask for their medical diplomas or evidence of liability insurance. When I was a Peace Corps volunteer in Kenya, I remember meeting a doctor working in a bush hospital who elatedly told me, “I’d have to wait another five years before they’d let me do the things I’m doing here at home.”
On top of this, much of what these organizations do, they do with public money. In 1993, American NGOs received more than $1.7 billion from USAID, including $414 million in food commodities and freight. Other federal agencies, such as the Department of State and the Department of Agriculture, handed over an additional $439 million. A decade earlier NGOs received just over $1 billion from the federal government. More than 60 percent of American NGOs receive some kind of federal funding. And this doesn’t include taxpayer monies channeled through UN agencies.
Organizations like the National Charities Information Bureau do a decent job monitoring expenditures and the proportion of funds NGOs devote to overhead and fund-raising, yet they’re in no position to make any judgments about the work these groups do. By NCIB’s standards, AmeriCares is among the best charities. Because most of what they get are contributions in kind, 100 percent of which they are able to pass along to recipients; AmeriCares is able to make the amazing claim that 99.1 percent of donations go to the needy. No one asks if the needy want those donations or need those donations. Most organizations follow suit and do their best, as Save the Children does, to make that pie chart look good because that’s the only thing critics and watchdogs tend to look at.
Journalists are currently in the best position to judge NGOs, but those who are too critical of the organizations aren’t allowed access to their projects, and NGOs are under no obligation to open their books or reveal their activities to the press. At any rate, few journalists are equipped to do a detailed and accurate analysis of development activities. It takes more time than journalists generally have. You can walk into a village, see happy children and a Save the Children logo on the local school, and judge that everything is fine. Recipients of aid aren’t stupid enough to complain to journalists about projects especially if someone from the NGO is within earshot.
In a place like Somalia and Rwanda, it was particularly difficult to criticize NGOs. They had all the money and all the airplanes. The only rides to Goma, for journalists who weren’t back by big new organizations with money to charter planes, was with aid organizations. They were more than happy to help. The return on investment makes it all worthwhile because NGOs need nothing more than publicity. Their prime interest is in reaching their customers, the donating public. These are the people who must be convinced that the organizations are doing what they say they’re doing, and NGOs look after their customers at all times.
What is really required is a truly independent agency—not one like InterAction, which is composed of NGOs—to look after the interests of the targets of development and relief, a.k.a., the needy. The organization should be staffed by professionals who have the time and resources to produce detailed analyses of what these organizations are doing for the poor of the Third World. Those that do effective aid work should be singled out so “customers” know where to spend their money. IN the short run, that will stop the wildfire proliferation of NGOs, and eventually reduce them to a manageable number so that relief circuses like Rwanda don’t ever happen again.
(pages 268-269)
Notes and quotes from the book:
Personal Notes:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_...
PVO = private voluntary organization
NGO = non-governmental organization
A non-governmental organization (NGO) is a legally constituted organization created by natural or legal persons that operates independently from any government and a term usually used by governments to refer to entities that have no government status. In the cases in which NGOs are funded totally or partially by governments, the NGO maintains its non-governmental status by excluding government representatives from membership in the organization.
The starving African exists as a point in space from which we measure our own wealth, success, and prosperity, a darkness against which we can view our own cultural triumphs. And he serves as a handy object of our charity. He is evidence that we have been blessed, and we have an obligation to spread that blessing. The belief that we can help is an affirmation of our own worth in the grand scheme of things. The starving African transcends the dull reality of whether or not anyone is actually starving in Africa. Starvation clearly delineates us from them.
Sometimes it appears that the only time Africans are portrayed with dignity is when they’re helpless and brave at the same time. A person about to starve to death develops a stoic strength. Journalists write about the quiet dignity of the hopelessly dying. If the Africans were merely hungry and poor, begging or conning coins on the streets of Nairobi or Addis Ababa, we might have become annoyed and brush them aside—and most aid workers have done that at one time. When they steal tape decks from our Land Cruisers we feel anger and disgust. It is on ly in their weakness, when their death is inevitable, that we are touched. And it is their helplessness that they become a marketable commodity.
(page 3)
When I slowed down for a moment to consider what was happening, it became clear: Aid distribution is just another big, private business that relies on government contracts. Groups like CRS are paid by the U.S. government to give away surplus food produced by subsidized U.S. farmers. The more food CRS gave away, the more money they received from the government to administer the handouts. Since the securing of grant money is the primary goal, aid organizations rarely meet a development project they don’t like.
(page 8)
… It becomes increasingly difficult for aid workers to ignore the compelling correlation between massive international food aid and increasing vulnerability to famine. “Our charity does not overcome famine, and may help to prolong it,” someone will always lament. Those who spend the time to study the local economies see that the people have now geared their own activities not to returning to their old lives but to getting their hands on aid.
(pages 21-22)
… In essence, the West’s surplus grains were subsidizing the production of bananas and other crops that did not compete with Western agricultural interests. And Somalia’s elite were making millions of dollars at both ends of the system. All this was made possible by food aid—and as more farmers were forced off their land, food aid became more necessary. The cycle of food-aid dependence was self-sustaining.
And what about the donors? Did they care what their aid was doing? A World Bank study charged that donors were concerned only with their own domestic agricultural situation. “[D]onors’ food aid budgets are primarily influenced by prospects for commercial exports of their food surpluses rather than being determined in accordance with the needs and objectives of recipient countries to reduce their food import dependency. Accordingly, donors usually reduce their food aid budgets when prospects for commercial exports of surpluses are good and increase than when those prospects are poor. As a result, significant price fluctuations are likely to occur in the domestic food market, particularly when the former decision of donors happens to coincide with a poor harvest in the recipient country and the latter with a good one.”
(page 170)
…USAID doles out close to 80 percent of its contracts and grants to U.S. firms—which in turn provide food, supplies, or assistance to recipient nations overseas.
Organizations that lobby on behalf of aid understand that. They know the way to sell aid in Congress is to emphasize what we get from it. Yet these organizations, NGOs mostly, are put in a position to lobby on behalf of multibillion-dollar corporations so they can do their little piece of work and get their relatively tiny slice of the pie.
The grain-trading companies dominate the world of food, and in this scheme of things, the NGOs and charities serve two very important functions. First, they are the primary lobbyists for sending food to the Third World. … Second, they are the agents, the contractors who move the food.
Yet even the NGOs know that they have to pitch food aid for its domestic benefits. Ken Hackett, director of Catholic Relief Services, selling the idea of food aid to Congress said, “Each food aid dollar has at least a double impact. First, the funds are spent primarily in the United States on U.S. commodities, processing, bagging, fortification, and transportation. This enhances economic activity and increases the tax receipts to the U.S. government. Second, the food is provided to people and countries which cannot afford to import adequate amounts of food on a commercial basis. Finally, when PVOs are involved, we leverage funds and services and gain broad public participation.
The modern role of the NGO developed in the years following the creation of the Food for Peace program, and much of that early activity took place in Vietnam. The U.S. government found PL-480 to be a handy way to get around agreements limiting the amount of aid funds that could be sent to Vietnam. NGOs were under tremendous pressure to cooperate. As Professor Vernon Ruttan noted, “While cooperating with the government, the PVOs voiced their dissatisfaction with the increasing politicization of their programs. IN spite of their reservations they allowed themselves to be used, because they were dependent on government money and supplies; most were willing to do whatever was necessary—including distributing food in situations that were at best questionable and at worst harmful to recipients.”
That was in the early 1960s, and little has changed. CARE, the largest American NGO, has a budget that approaches half a billion dollars annually. More than half of that is in the form of commodities and funds they receive to administer the distribution of commodities.
According to the General Accounting Office in fiscal year 1993, NGOs distributed almost 1.2 million metric tons of U.S.-donated food aid, not including emergency aid, to fifty-eight countries. PVOs sold about 13 percent of the Title II commodities in 1993 to conduct nonfood projects. The GAO has noted that NGOs tend to distribute food first, and examine the consequences later:
AID and PVOs have generally evaluated food aid projects based on commodity management and outputs, such as numbers of children fed or miles of road constructed, but have not assessed the impact of their projects on long-term food security. AID has stated that it and the PVOs are fully committed to doing a better job at evaluating the impact of food aid development projects on long-term food security and are making progress in developing and applying methodologies.
Humanitarian organizations have become comfortable in bed with the grain companies. Their survival and growth depend on it, but they must realize how the humanitarian instinct has become perverted by its partnership with domestic special interests. Humanitarians speak eloquently about the need for relief of hunger in the Third World. Yet most of the food aid they hand out—about 90 percent—is not emergency aid for starving people. (In fact, by law at least 76 percent of the commodities provided under Title II must be used for nonemergency development activities.) When food aid is criticized, their response is, “Do you suggest we let people starve?” It seems they’ve learned much from their partners in agribusiness, who see starving people as little more than another market for their products.
(pages 201-202)
The episode reflected a prevalent Western attitude that anything we send, anything we can do, is needed and useful. It is the same attitude that hammers home the message that for the price of a cup of coffee, we can alter the lives of poor children in the Third World. It is bargain-basement charity.
(page 264)
Hilsum and I were at a conference in Geneva in December of 1995 where someone remarked, “You need a license to drive a taxi in New York City, but anyone can form a charity and start working overseas.” The United States government has passed laws that govern the behavior of U.S. businesses abroad, but there are no such rules for charities. There is no accountability. The UN can attempt to run a refugee camp but has no authority to tell an organization they can’t pitch a tent and start working. There’s nothing to prevent a group of Westerners with money from setting up shop and performing surgery on refugees. No one is going to ask for their medical diplomas or evidence of liability insurance. When I was a Peace Corps volunteer in Kenya, I remember meeting a doctor working in a bush hospital who elatedly told me, “I’d have to wait another five years before they’d let me do the things I’m doing here at home.”
On top of this, much of what these organizations do, they do with public money. In 1993, American NGOs received more than $1.7 billion from USAID, including $414 million in food commodities and freight. Other federal agencies, such as the Department of State and the Department of Agriculture, handed over an additional $439 million. A decade earlier NGOs received just over $1 billion from the federal government. More than 60 percent of American NGOs receive some kind of federal funding. And this doesn’t include taxpayer monies channeled through UN agencies.
Organizations like the National Charities Information Bureau do a decent job monitoring expenditures and the proportion of funds NGOs devote to overhead and fund-raising, yet they’re in no position to make any judgments about the work these groups do. By NCIB’s standards, AmeriCares is among the best charities. Because most of what they get are contributions in kind, 100 percent of which they are able to pass along to recipients; AmeriCares is able to make the amazing claim that 99.1 percent of donations go to the needy. No one asks if the needy want those donations or need those donations. Most organizations follow suit and do their best, as Save the Children does, to make that pie chart look good because that’s the only thing critics and watchdogs tend to look at.
Journalists are currently in the best position to judge NGOs, but those who are too critical of the organizations aren’t allowed access to their projects, and NGOs are under no obligation to open their books or reveal their activities to the press. At any rate, few journalists are equipped to do a detailed and accurate analysis of development activities. It takes more time than journalists generally have. You can walk into a village, see happy children and a Save the Children logo on the local school, and judge that everything is fine. Recipients of aid aren’t stupid enough to complain to journalists about projects especially if someone from the NGO is within earshot.
In a place like Somalia and Rwanda, it was particularly difficult to criticize NGOs. They had all the money and all the airplanes. The only rides to Goma, for journalists who weren’t back by big new organizations with money to charter planes, was with aid organizations. They were more than happy to help. The return on investment makes it all worthwhile because NGOs need nothing more than publicity. Their prime interest is in reaching their customers, the donating public. These are the people who must be convinced that the organizations are doing what they say they’re doing, and NGOs look after their customers at all times.
What is really required is a truly independent agency—not one like InterAction, which is composed of NGOs—to look after the interests of the targets of development and relief, a.k.a., the needy. The organization should be staffed by professionals who have the time and resources to produce detailed analyses of what these organizations are doing for the poor of the Third World. Those that do effective aid work should be singled out so “customers” know where to spend their money. IN the short run, that will stop the wildfire proliferation of NGOs, and eventually reduce them to a manageable number so that relief circuses like Rwanda don’t ever happen again.
(pages 268-269)
November 6, 2009
i hate to love this book, but i do love it.
it begs the question though: is writing the only safe thing left to do in terms of taking on the topic of 'development'?
this book was initially deeply depressing and devastating.
but there is beauty in its honesty.
it begs the question though: is writing the only safe thing left to do in terms of taking on the topic of 'development'?
this book was initially deeply depressing and devastating.
but there is beauty in its honesty.
December 1, 2009
This really opened my eyes to so many things that I suspected, but no one had really confirmed. I think that our society is afraid of facing the consequences of our actions, because deep down we know that we are harming the world more than we are helping. I now am even more skeptical than I used to be, and I can only hope that when I actually am in a position where I can do some good, I don't forget the ideals that this book helped me see. The corruption and lying and deceiving and blindness astounded me.
The book did get tedious at times, but it was completely worth my time. It did make me angry like the back cover said, but I think that finding out the truth about NGOs, the UN, governments, etc, that we glorify is worth this anger.
The book did get tedious at times, but it was completely worth my time. It did make me angry like the back cover said, but I think that finding out the truth about NGOs, the UN, governments, etc, that we glorify is worth this anger.
February 24, 2008
Read this book when I was just beginning to become disillusioned with the world of aid and development. Wow..this book crystallized everything for me. I thought it might be over-dramatic judging by the title..but it was a very well-written, knowledgeable, and easy to read story of the crazy crap that goes on while us people try to help.
November 23, 2023
A stunning indictment of the international charity movement - that raises question about what is really helpful to do in the way we care for one another.
September 29, 2016
Wow, this is such a depressing, but important book. It's an expose on foreign aid and military humanitarianism in Somalia in the 80's and 90's. If you're old enough, you'll remember those ads on TV during the 80's, by Save the Children, with Sally Struthers showing pictures of starving children, and reassuring the audience that you can save their lives, for the price of a cup of coffee. As this book calls it, "bargain-basement charity."
This book shows what a huge mistake that whole mission was, and exposes the corruption and mismanagement in Save the Children, the UN, the U.S. military, and others. Everyone fucked it up, and at the end of it all Somalia was worse off than ever before, while the U.S. aid workers, corporations, Somalian dictators, and corrupt Somalian contractors were able to make off with an enormous amount of the money that flowed into it. It was awful, downright horrifying to read. It was a pathetic example of American hubris, that we rich Americans who know jack shit about Africa think we can send in the price of a cup of coffee and all will be well in the world.
Maybe the biggest problem is this idea that food will solve famine. It's an intuitive but simplistic assumption. Famine runs much deeper than that. Invariably, it has to do with a corrupt local government. Relief money and food aid just become yet another way to control the people. By mucking around in a complex situation we know nothing about, we just make a bad problem worse. This book goes into the complexities at great length. By the time I was done with it, my head was spinning. It's SO much more complicated that just sending money and food.
I once volunteered for the Red Cross, and saw some of what this book talks about first hand. The first thing I did was sit at a booth, where I was to represent the Red Cross, but tell people that we were unable to help them because there wasn't enough funding (and yet there was enough funding to fly me in, feed me, and put me in a hotel, so that Red Cross could "show they have a presence.") I'll never forget the woman that came to my booth feeling so hopeful and then collapsed in tears when I said we couldn't help her.
The whole time I was there, I was told not to ask questions. They had us canvas houses, and I kept wondering why we were keeping no records. I didn't ask because I was told not to ask questions. Later, when they found they had no way of knowing which homes were canvased and which weren't, they had us do the entire 3-day operation over again from scratch. I ended up leaving after my supervisor verbally assaulted me, twice. And yet, the situation in Somalia described in this book was hundreds, or thousands of times worse than this.
I do think the book is too long, and poorly organized. It was hard to follow, and sometimes he got so bogged down in foreign relations reporting that I started feeling like I was missing the point he was making. It also doesn't flow very smoothly. Also, I'd have liked to seen some ideas for how Somalia could have been helped, if at all, by well-intentioned people in developed nations. I saw so many organizations that were corrupt and mismanaged, so naturally, I wonder if there are any exceptions, and if so, which ones.
But overall, this book is well worth reading. Even if it feels like a chore sometimes, it's worth it. It will blow your mind.
This book shows what a huge mistake that whole mission was, and exposes the corruption and mismanagement in Save the Children, the UN, the U.S. military, and others. Everyone fucked it up, and at the end of it all Somalia was worse off than ever before, while the U.S. aid workers, corporations, Somalian dictators, and corrupt Somalian contractors were able to make off with an enormous amount of the money that flowed into it. It was awful, downright horrifying to read. It was a pathetic example of American hubris, that we rich Americans who know jack shit about Africa think we can send in the price of a cup of coffee and all will be well in the world.
Maybe the biggest problem is this idea that food will solve famine. It's an intuitive but simplistic assumption. Famine runs much deeper than that. Invariably, it has to do with a corrupt local government. Relief money and food aid just become yet another way to control the people. By mucking around in a complex situation we know nothing about, we just make a bad problem worse. This book goes into the complexities at great length. By the time I was done with it, my head was spinning. It's SO much more complicated that just sending money and food.
I once volunteered for the Red Cross, and saw some of what this book talks about first hand. The first thing I did was sit at a booth, where I was to represent the Red Cross, but tell people that we were unable to help them because there wasn't enough funding (and yet there was enough funding to fly me in, feed me, and put me in a hotel, so that Red Cross could "show they have a presence.") I'll never forget the woman that came to my booth feeling so hopeful and then collapsed in tears when I said we couldn't help her.
The whole time I was there, I was told not to ask questions. They had us canvas houses, and I kept wondering why we were keeping no records. I didn't ask because I was told not to ask questions. Later, when they found they had no way of knowing which homes were canvased and which weren't, they had us do the entire 3-day operation over again from scratch. I ended up leaving after my supervisor verbally assaulted me, twice. And yet, the situation in Somalia described in this book was hundreds, or thousands of times worse than this.
I do think the book is too long, and poorly organized. It was hard to follow, and sometimes he got so bogged down in foreign relations reporting that I started feeling like I was missing the point he was making. It also doesn't flow very smoothly. Also, I'd have liked to seen some ideas for how Somalia could have been helped, if at all, by well-intentioned people in developed nations. I saw so many organizations that were corrupt and mismanaged, so naturally, I wonder if there are any exceptions, and if so, which ones.
But overall, this book is well worth reading. Even if it feels like a chore sometimes, it's worth it. It will blow your mind.
December 5, 2014
Michael Maren explores how foriegn aid destroys the Somali economy. He interviews a few differnet people from Somalians to aid workers to NGO officials to Somalian officials exploring the different ways that corruption is apparent. He goes into details about the background of the conflict in Somalia but honestly the book is very disjointed and hard to follow in terms of timeline. He also skips around in terms of subjects and what not. I found it quite difficult to follow. The basic premise is extremely interesting, how when there is famine/conflict in a third world country, NGOs flood in to provide "aid", however much of the aid they provide doesn't end up in the hand of refugees but instead of the hands of corrupt politicians who use the aid to help fund their army or whatever they want. They buy up land and then rent it to NGOs often charging exhorbant amounts of money. The food they steal they later sell and keep the profits. The politicians WANT more refugees because they want the aid to keep flowing in so they do their best to keep people there. They don't actually try to develop any sustainable way to improve the lives of the refugees because then the aid would stop. For the NGOs, many of them do not care that their aid is going to the wrong purposes. As long as their numbers look good, they can say they donated x% of the money towards their cause to get more donations. Many times they don't even seem to care whether what they give is even needed. They simply wish to have nice looking pie charts and portfolios to show donors while throwing themselves extravagent parties. Some charities where someone sponsors a child, the child isn't even in need, the money doesn't actually go to the child and the charity simply just takes the money to use for their own purposes. Maren interviews the sponsored children and they barely have anything to show for it. Worse, having all this aid flood into the economy ruins the lives of people who do not get the aid. Farmers cannot compete with the free food that flows in and people who are not refugees become jealous of the people who are refugees who get the immense amount of food. Even with a lot of stealing and corruption some food does end up with the refugees, many of whom sell it because the refugee numbers are so inflated that that much food isn't needed.
Anyways, the topic is so incredibly fascinating but the book really jumbles the timeline. At the end they even have a timeline of events which is most definitely needed. But I mean by that time it's way too late, put it in the beginning so I know it's there so I can refer to it. Whats the point of putting it at the end???? I'm not going to reread the book to try to understand it I have more books to read damn you Maren.
Anyways, the topic is so incredibly fascinating but the book really jumbles the timeline. At the end they even have a timeline of events which is most definitely needed. But I mean by that time it's way too late, put it in the beginning so I know it's there so I can refer to it. Whats the point of putting it at the end???? I'm not going to reread the book to try to understand it I have more books to read damn you Maren.
February 22, 2018
yeah, it's 20 years old and pre-9/11. doesn't matter. an expose of international aid, NGO involvement in developing countries and general white savior complex that will make you angry. focuses on Somalia and to a lesser extent Rwanda.
March 7, 2008
I searched and searched and searched for this book for a couple of years before finally getting my hands on it. Some people who also worked in international development had told me that I had to read it.
Once I started, I felt like it was overdone and the style was a bit too ranting for my taste.
Once I started, I felt like it was overdone and the style was a bit too ranting for my taste.
June 1, 2020
Eye-opening and tragic. Even though this was published in 1997, I think that these issues are as relevant as ever, unfortunately.
March 18, 2023
The fourth star is for honesty but overall this is a dense book of sad facts about how foreign aid, from almost any organization, is counterproductive to the lives of almost everyone in Somalia and many other African countries.
Start with the skim for the onshore admistration of aid industry organizations with generous salaries for CEOS etc and then proceed to graft in target countries where donated food, that should be free, is very profitably sold instead. The food is often being donated because the US helped engineer a situation of continued and growing demand for the crops of American farmers who were growing more food than was required or could be sold. So government subsidies and charitable donations generated by carefully scripted ads leads to lots of food grown elsewhere to be made available free to countries like Somalia sometimes in exchange for strategic footholds or other benefits to donor countries. This generates great wealth for a few local insiders (who seem to care less for their people than you would hope) but essentially undercuts the country's farmers who can't compete with free and are unable to sell the food they are able to grow in good years. Farming disappears as donated food sold at low prices replaces crops creating ongoing dependency and corruption as people fight for control of that donated food. With the farming extinction, people lose local schools and family supports as hungry people congregate in large cities and refugee camps and become totally dependent on aid.
Yes, there are droughts but, while people had strategies to weather these in the past, now farming, that should enable them to sustain themselves, has been obliterated by aid along with confidence in the future. Even as droughts are more common, the solution might be to stop interfering and let those who live there determine how to adapt and ask for what they need to keep farming viable enough to sustain the population which has grown from 3 million to 16 million in the last 60 years.
Start with the skim for the onshore admistration of aid industry organizations with generous salaries for CEOS etc and then proceed to graft in target countries where donated food, that should be free, is very profitably sold instead. The food is often being donated because the US helped engineer a situation of continued and growing demand for the crops of American farmers who were growing more food than was required or could be sold. So government subsidies and charitable donations generated by carefully scripted ads leads to lots of food grown elsewhere to be made available free to countries like Somalia sometimes in exchange for strategic footholds or other benefits to donor countries. This generates great wealth for a few local insiders (who seem to care less for their people than you would hope) but essentially undercuts the country's farmers who can't compete with free and are unable to sell the food they are able to grow in good years. Farming disappears as donated food sold at low prices replaces crops creating ongoing dependency and corruption as people fight for control of that donated food. With the farming extinction, people lose local schools and family supports as hungry people congregate in large cities and refugee camps and become totally dependent on aid.
Yes, there are droughts but, while people had strategies to weather these in the past, now farming, that should enable them to sustain themselves, has been obliterated by aid along with confidence in the future. Even as droughts are more common, the solution might be to stop interfering and let those who live there determine how to adapt and ask for what they need to keep farming viable enough to sustain the population which has grown from 3 million to 16 million in the last 60 years.
December 2, 2020
A devastating, stomach churning read that will shred any last remaining beliefs that international charitable organizations and NGOs seek to do anything but cause more strife and destruction in the third world.
With Somalia as an example, Maren details a decades long case study in how NGOs act as a new form of colonialism. The history of food aid in particular, is all about economics and disposing of surplus. Aid is never meant as aid, and the organizations do not care about the long term impacts of their efforts. They never develop infrastructure, never do research or interact with the people they live beside. NGO settlements create miniature apartheid states that follow on the tails of the military and leave when the press and money leaves. The destruction is their purpose and their point, the problems they claim to solve the ones they create.
This sort of devastation is invisible to the vast majority of Westerners, who have been spoon fed images of the third world as a chaotic, pitiful place full of starving children and constant violence, removed from all context. Charity offers you peace of mind, while your donations are nothing but money laundering schemes for big businesses.
This is a must read book.
With Somalia as an example, Maren details a decades long case study in how NGOs act as a new form of colonialism. The history of food aid in particular, is all about economics and disposing of surplus. Aid is never meant as aid, and the organizations do not care about the long term impacts of their efforts. They never develop infrastructure, never do research or interact with the people they live beside. NGO settlements create miniature apartheid states that follow on the tails of the military and leave when the press and money leaves. The destruction is their purpose and their point, the problems they claim to solve the ones they create.
This sort of devastation is invisible to the vast majority of Westerners, who have been spoon fed images of the third world as a chaotic, pitiful place full of starving children and constant violence, removed from all context. Charity offers you peace of mind, while your donations are nothing but money laundering schemes for big businesses.
This is a must read book.
November 14, 2023
Before reading this book I knew that all charity and aid organizations do more damage than good, because they promote helplessness and "save" people (or animals) who are visible instead of saving future people who are invisible. Targeting the cause will soon make the ice cream vanish. Targeting the needy in front of the cameras will not.
This book, however, explains more than you might think. This book explains how free food promotes inequality and wars and how this very food creates more desire than life. Sometimes I was shocked at discovering to what extremes the promoters and the press will go in order to construct "images" that will sell the organization and promote the news.
This book is still applicable today and we can still learn a lot about today by reading about things that happened a while ago.
"Few NGOs have ever seen a contract they didn't like, or a problem they didn't believe they could solve. The first priority of an NGO, like any bureaucracy, it its own survival."
This book, however, explains more than you might think. This book explains how free food promotes inequality and wars and how this very food creates more desire than life. Sometimes I was shocked at discovering to what extremes the promoters and the press will go in order to construct "images" that will sell the organization and promote the news.
This book is still applicable today and we can still learn a lot about today by reading about things that happened a while ago.
"Few NGOs have ever seen a contract they didn't like, or a problem they didn't believe they could solve. The first priority of an NGO, like any bureaucracy, it its own survival."
April 7, 2025
While I have heard bits and pieces about how humanitarian actions fail, this book was truly eye-opening. Centering on just one humanitarian intervention - Somalia - the author creates a compelling image of how it well went to hell. Profit-driven corporations, warlords, professionals trying to climb the ladder, as well as starry-eyed volunteers and hapless refugees, all come together in a toxic mixture, in which aid becomes currency and actually perpetuates, if not downright starts armed conflicts. The book is quite infuriating at times. It also shows how NGOs with great PR grab out money and do little with it. If I learned one thing, that is to check more in depth where my money goes. There are people who do good out there, but it is rarely those whit millions to spend on Youtube ads with Oscar-winning actors.
January 13, 2026
Interesting explanation of why foreign food aid started (government surpluses) and how they flood the markets of the places they are donated with food that is so cheap they turn countries that are easily capable of producing food to famine ridden countries when farmers give up work because of the influx of aid food. Dives into the corruption of companies a lot which is less interesting and some of the stories are a little long. Good read though
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
April 7, 2024
Great book people should read.
Also, Dead Aid by Dambisa Moyo,
The White Man's Burden by William Easterly.
I became interested after watching a YouTube video about the 1.4 Trillion in Foreign Aid to Africa in the past 70 years (In Spanish)
Also, Dead Aid by Dambisa Moyo,
The White Man's Burden by William Easterly.
I became interested after watching a YouTube video about the 1.4 Trillion in Foreign Aid to Africa in the past 70 years (In Spanish)
August 21, 2024
I had to read this book for class and it was great material. I am sure the consequences in recipient nations can vary in practice, but it exposes the selfish nature of the aid complex
June 28, 2025
It’s old. Not sure if it was one of the first books to raise questions about foreign aid such as: does it promote dependency, does it prop up disreputable powers that be - good questions, but I know people doing this work ask themselves that all the time. Point well taken that NGOs necessarily have to perpetuate themselves so have to take care not to end up as pawns to donors agencies.
March 21, 2022
At times I like to challenge/stretch myself to read opinion pieces like this to understand opposing views. I approached this book as a glimpse into development in the 80s, when much of this took place, to compare with the current situation. Frankly, I was astonished that the library still had this 25 yr old book in its collection (published in '97).
As expected, much has changed in development in those 25 years and many of the faults that Maren points out have been rectified with biometrics for counting refugee populations, livelihoods programs, evaluation and efficacy assessments done on development projects, etc. therefore many/most of his chief grievances are obsolete.
I should've expected with a cuss word in the title that many more would follow on the pages. The first half of the book was mostly a rant and I almost quit after the "I'm not into this cultural sensitivity shit" line, lacking any apparent introspection into hubris and naivety as possible culprits of development's failings.
While the latter half of the book was redemptive in its more balanced analysis of America's manipulation of food as a weapon of foreign policy and the failures in Somalia, one really can't fixate on one example for blanket conclusions that all aid is a disaster. It's no secret that aid is political, NGOs exist on donations, and media skews our perceptions of crises. This book is extremely one-sided bound at both ends with interviews of only people who supported his thesis with zero solutions provided. And I'm still suffering from whiplash from the manic jumping around of time frames.
For a more contemporary look at Somalia and a much more balanced (cuss-free, rant-free) view of the intertangled web of conflict, forced migration and refugee camps, I highly recommend City of Thorns: Nine Lives in the World's Largest Refugee Camp
As expected, much has changed in development in those 25 years and many of the faults that Maren points out have been rectified with biometrics for counting refugee populations, livelihoods programs, evaluation and efficacy assessments done on development projects, etc. therefore many/most of his chief grievances are obsolete.
I should've expected with a cuss word in the title that many more would follow on the pages. The first half of the book was mostly a rant and I almost quit after the "I'm not into this cultural sensitivity shit" line, lacking any apparent introspection into hubris and naivety as possible culprits of development's failings.
While the latter half of the book was redemptive in its more balanced analysis of America's manipulation of food as a weapon of foreign policy and the failures in Somalia, one really can't fixate on one example for blanket conclusions that all aid is a disaster. It's no secret that aid is political, NGOs exist on donations, and media skews our perceptions of crises. This book is extremely one-sided bound at both ends with interviews of only people who supported his thesis with zero solutions provided. And I'm still suffering from whiplash from the manic jumping around of time frames.
For a more contemporary look at Somalia and a much more balanced (cuss-free, rant-free) view of the intertangled web of conflict, forced migration and refugee camps, I highly recommend City of Thorns: Nine Lives in the World's Largest Refugee Camp
August 16, 2007
This book rocked the foundations of my world. If I could make the entire country read one book, this would be the one.
Maren is angry, justifiably so, about the corruption and misdirection of food and money intended to help the people of Somalia and Rwanda. He saw it first hand as a US AID worker and again as a journalist. Instead of alleviating suffering, the massive quantities of foreign aid and international charity lead to the collapse of the Somali state, the rise of ethnic and tribal divisions, the reappropriation of wealth and weapons into the hands of warlords, corporations, and charities, millions of refugees, and the genocide in Rwanda.
Maren is angry, justifiably so, about the corruption and misdirection of food and money intended to help the people of Somalia and Rwanda. He saw it first hand as a US AID worker and again as a journalist. Instead of alleviating suffering, the massive quantities of foreign aid and international charity lead to the collapse of the Somali state, the rise of ethnic and tribal divisions, the reappropriation of wealth and weapons into the hands of warlords, corporations, and charities, millions of refugees, and the genocide in Rwanda.
October 26, 2007
The Road to Hell focuses primarily on the disingenuous efforts by Save The Children in Somalia in the early 1990s. While interesting and by no means flattering to Save, it must be understood that much of the information comes from a disillusioned employee. (As a side note I know many people who currently work for Save and am impressed by their skill, commitment, and professionalism. Save itself has greatly reformed since the time covered in this book).
The Road to Hell also focuses on the overall negative effects of US food aid and how it cripples foreign markets, destroys efforts at local agriculture, and primarily supports US markets.
Overall insightful and worth a read.
The Road to Hell also focuses on the overall negative effects of US food aid and how it cripples foreign markets, destroys efforts at local agriculture, and primarily supports US markets.
Overall insightful and worth a read.
July 21, 2015
This is an eye opening look at the humanitarian aid industry. The author uses Somalia as a case study, examining different aspects of foreign aid. He doesn't leave any group out and discusses the role of the U.S. Government, military, aid organizations, media outlets, foreign governments and even the UN. The story isn't a heart wrenching, feel good tale of how things have gotten better abroad, but rather the corruption that occurs. It is thought provoking and even somewhat disheartening. However, I would recommend it to anyone interested in foreign aid, international affairs, or just humanitarianism.
May 5, 2025
I come back to this book every few year and it never gets less true. This time in 2025 amid shrinkage of ODA and budget and staffing cuts globally.
Another book I had to re-visit. Seeing an increasing number of warnings of humanitarian catastrophe, I wanted to re-check against Maren's levels, which still ring true. Of course with more years in the field behind me than the first time I read this, it's a far less shocking book that it was the first go around. That said, fifteen years later, the most shocking thing is how little the humanitarian system has learned, how poorly it still treats people, and how perfect those on the outside expect it to be.
Another book I had to re-visit. Seeing an increasing number of warnings of humanitarian catastrophe, I wanted to re-check against Maren's levels, which still ring true. Of course with more years in the field behind me than the first time I read this, it's a far less shocking book that it was the first go around. That said, fifteen years later, the most shocking thing is how little the humanitarian system has learned, how poorly it still treats people, and how perfect those on the outside expect it to be.
May 18, 2007
I learned that food aid is a tricky business and there is a lot of unnecessary suffering in the aid business due t greed and incompetence...and don't go swimming of the coast of Mogadishu (not a vacation hot spot I know) because some genius put a meat processing plant there, pumped the refuse (chum) into the water...and you can guess the outcome. For some reason, this little bit of incompetence struck me more than the inevitable US incompetence in Somalia due to the Berg's Communist takeover of Ethiopia and the inevitable (we must love a geographically close nutjob response)
March 21, 2016
This book is an anecdotal account of the problems with Somalia and Save the Children. In that light, it's pretty good. I really disliked this book because it tries to sell itself as an account of "the ravaging effects of foreign aid and international charity." Yet, it has almost now statistical evidence for anything, especially outside the lens of Somalia and Save the Children. You can't infer that international development is a "Road to Hell" on the cover of your book and then only point to two cases between the pages.
September 3, 2007
I liked this book and agreed with a lot of the things Maren has to say. The first part of the book was great. I liked what he had to say about his own experiences in Africa and his focus on Somalia. When he got to talking specifically about Save the Children, I lost a little interest. I don't think Save the Children has the best reputation to start with. It might be a little dated, but very good book.
February 10, 2008
This book changed the way I looked at humanitarian aid. We are taught as a people to be generous and to give to those in need. However, it is important to remember that the act of giving alone isn't enough. In fact, many well-intentioned people have done more harm than good. This book is a call to more responsible giving...giving that will change the lives of its recipients for the better, and not just giving so we will feel better.
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