The Army, James Ii, and the Glorious Revolution

by John Childs

Shipped from UK, please allow 10 to 21 business days for arrival. Good, First Edition, 1980: Manchester University Press. A good, clean and sound copy in red cloth boards, slight forward lean, gold gilt title on spine with a good dust jacket - very lightly faded on spine with some wear to upper/lower edges.

Genres: History, 17th Century

226 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1980

About the author

John Charles Roger Childs FRHS is Emeritus Professor of Military History at the University of Leeds.

Reviews

[Joseph Ficklen · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent book. King James II, enjoying a brief surge of loyalty and popularity after the disposal of Monmouth’s rebellion, chose to keep the forces raised for that conflict as a standing army. This was unpalatable for most Englishmen, who still remembered the impositions of Cromwell’s military rule. James also chose to purge his army of amateurs and those who were deemed “politically unreliable,” and to stock his new army with career officers who had no other means except what they earned from the army. Many of these new career soldiers were Catholics, deprived by the Test Acts of other avenues of public service. James did indeed use his army to achieve political aims, installing loyal officers as governors and aldermen of towns, arranging for many army officers to enter Parliament, quartering his troops on towns suspected of disloyalty. For Europe in the 17th Century, this was considered modernity, an effective means of rulers to use their standing armies as an instrument of the centralized state. In the English context, this was considered a great imposition, almost tyranny. Taking this with the King’s seeming preference for Roman Catholics, rumors swirled that the new army was going to be the instrument of restoring the Roman faith in England. Rumor bred conspiracy. Conspiracy coincided with the aims of William, the Prince of Orange, who hoped to harness the English army as an ally in the brewing conflict with the France of Louis XIV. The actual conspiracy within James’ army was small and badly coordinated. But in the event, it didn’t need to be to entirely shake King James’ confidence. The desertion of key officers, such as Churchill, Grafton, Kirke, Trelawney, etc., the very men who had led the Royal Army to victory over Monmouth at Sedgemoor, gave James the impression that he was leaning on a broken staff. He chose flight rather than resistance. When James ordered his army to retreat from its strong position at Salisbury, this broke the confidence of the army and thus broke the backbone of James’ rule in England. His abdication and flight were the inevitable results.