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Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind
Psychosemantics explores the relation between commonsense psychological theories and problems that are central to semantics and the philosophy of language. Building on and extending Fodor's earlier work it puts folk psychology on firm theoretical ground and rebuts externalist, holist, and naturalist threats to its position.
This book is included in the series Explorations in Cognitive Science, edited by Margaret A. Boden.
A Bradford Book.
This book is included in the series Explorations in Cognitive Science, edited by Margaret A. Boden.
A Bradford Book.
189 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1987
About the author
Jerry A. Fodor
28 books89 followersJerry Alan Fodor is an American philosopher and cognitive scientist. He is the State of New Jersey Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and is also the author of many works in the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive science, in which he has laid the groundwork for the modularity of mind and the language of thought hypotheses, among other ideas. Fodor is of Jewish descent.
Fodor argues that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are relations between individuals and mental representations. He maintains that these representations can only be correctly explained in terms of a language of thought (LOT) in the mind. Further, this language of thought itself is an actually existing thing that is codified in the brain and not just a useful explanatory tool. Fodor adheres to a species of functionalism, maintaining that thinking and other mental processes consist primarily of computations operating on the syntax of the representations that make up the language of thought.
For Fodor, significant parts of the mind, such as perceptual and linguistic processes, are structured in terms of modules, or "organs", which are defined by their causal and functional roles. These modules are relatively independent of each other and of the "central processing" part of the mind, which has a more global and less "domain specific" character. Fodor suggests that the character of these modules permits the possibility of causal relations with external objects. This, in turn, makes it possible for mental states to have contents that are about things in the world. The central processing part, on the other hand, takes care of the logical relations between the various contents and inputs and outputs.
Although Fodor originally rejected the idea that mental states must have a causal, externally determined aspect, he has in recent years devoted much of his writing and study to the philosophy of language because of this problem of the meaning and reference of mental contents. His contributions in this area include the so-called asymmetric causal theory of reference and his many arguments against semantic holism. Fodor strongly opposes reductive accounts of the mind. He argues that mental states are multiply realizable and that there is a hierarchy of explanatory levels in science such that the generalizations and laws of a higher-level theory of psychology or linguistics, for example, cannot be captured by the low-level explanations of the behavior of neurons and synapses.
Fodor argues that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are relations between individuals and mental representations. He maintains that these representations can only be correctly explained in terms of a language of thought (LOT) in the mind. Further, this language of thought itself is an actually existing thing that is codified in the brain and not just a useful explanatory tool. Fodor adheres to a species of functionalism, maintaining that thinking and other mental processes consist primarily of computations operating on the syntax of the representations that make up the language of thought.
For Fodor, significant parts of the mind, such as perceptual and linguistic processes, are structured in terms of modules, or "organs", which are defined by their causal and functional roles. These modules are relatively independent of each other and of the "central processing" part of the mind, which has a more global and less "domain specific" character. Fodor suggests that the character of these modules permits the possibility of causal relations with external objects. This, in turn, makes it possible for mental states to have contents that are about things in the world. The central processing part, on the other hand, takes care of the logical relations between the various contents and inputs and outputs.
Although Fodor originally rejected the idea that mental states must have a causal, externally determined aspect, he has in recent years devoted much of his writing and study to the philosophy of language because of this problem of the meaning and reference of mental contents. His contributions in this area include the so-called asymmetric causal theory of reference and his many arguments against semantic holism. Fodor strongly opposes reductive accounts of the mind. He argues that mental states are multiply realizable and that there is a hierarchy of explanatory levels in science such that the generalizations and laws of a higher-level theory of psychology or linguistics, for example, cannot be captured by the low-level explanations of the behavior of neurons and synapses.
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
June 9, 2014
Jerry Fodor's "Psychosemantics" is undeniably well written; he writes in a relatively casual tone with a moderate dose of humor, so one feels comfortable reading his book. However, one shouldn't quickly judge the book to be easy on the basis of his light demeanor. Reading his book requires a fair amount of technical knowledge in philosophy of mind and language. Moreover, the appendix section is for those who are relatively familiar with Fodor's Language of Thought hypothesis (though Fodor explains it very well without using too much jargon). This book is very important for anyone who is interested in the project of naturalizing intentionality.
While Fodor does spend a couple of chapters arguing for folk-psychology, narrow content, and against meaning holism (including Functional Role Semantics), it's really his chapter "Meaning and the World Order" that is very important. In this chapter, Fodor motivates an account of (crude) causal theory of mental content, which roughly states that all instantiations cause one to token a concept. So, an instantiation of red (i.e. red apple) causes me to token the concept RED. However, he presents a philosophical problem of naturalizing mental content known as the "disjunction problem", which is that an instantiation of cow OR horse can cause one to token the concept HORSE (In a certain condition, a cow can look like a horse). In other words, one needs a theory of mental representation that includes the phenomenon of misrepresentation. However, if one thinks that the semantic content of mental representation amounts to one event is sufficient for causing someone to token a concept, then counterfactually there is another event that likewise is sufficient for causing someone to token a same concept. In that case, event A OR event B causes a tokening of the concept 'A', so 'A' means A or B. What someone like Fodor wants is a theory that can explain how 'A' can represent A, but misrepresent B, rather than representing A or B as if both cause a correct representation 'A'. Fodor tries to present a solution known as the "asymmetric dependence" in which a causal relation between B and tokening of 'A' can only happen if there is already a causal relation between A and 'A', but not the other way around. So, a cow can cause me to see it as a 'horse' if and only if my tokening of 'horse' is already caused by a horse. If a horse had not cause me to token the concept HORSE, then a cow cannot cause me to token the concept HORSE.
Of course, there is more to Fodor's solution than I described, but for the purpose of this light review I think it's enough that the readers see one of the main purpose of Fodor's "Psychosemantics". I personally think Fodor's asymmetric dependence is a clever solution to the disjunction problem, but of course its not without problems (but then again, what philosophical solution is without blemish?). One can easily google objections against Fodor's Assymetric Dependence account to see what I mean. Nonetheless, Fodor's Psychosemantics is a must read for anyone who is interested in the philosophical project of naturalizing intentionality.
While Fodor does spend a couple of chapters arguing for folk-psychology, narrow content, and against meaning holism (including Functional Role Semantics), it's really his chapter "Meaning and the World Order" that is very important. In this chapter, Fodor motivates an account of (crude) causal theory of mental content, which roughly states that all instantiations cause one to token a concept. So, an instantiation of red (i.e. red apple) causes me to token the concept RED. However, he presents a philosophical problem of naturalizing mental content known as the "disjunction problem", which is that an instantiation of cow OR horse can cause one to token the concept HORSE (In a certain condition, a cow can look like a horse). In other words, one needs a theory of mental representation that includes the phenomenon of misrepresentation. However, if one thinks that the semantic content of mental representation amounts to one event is sufficient for causing someone to token a concept, then counterfactually there is another event that likewise is sufficient for causing someone to token a same concept. In that case, event A OR event B causes a tokening of the concept 'A', so 'A' means A or B. What someone like Fodor wants is a theory that can explain how 'A' can represent A, but misrepresent B, rather than representing A or B as if both cause a correct representation 'A'. Fodor tries to present a solution known as the "asymmetric dependence" in which a causal relation between B and tokening of 'A' can only happen if there is already a causal relation between A and 'A', but not the other way around. So, a cow can cause me to see it as a 'horse' if and only if my tokening of 'horse' is already caused by a horse. If a horse had not cause me to token the concept HORSE, then a cow cannot cause me to token the concept HORSE.
Of course, there is more to Fodor's solution than I described, but for the purpose of this light review I think it's enough that the readers see one of the main purpose of Fodor's "Psychosemantics". I personally think Fodor's asymmetric dependence is a clever solution to the disjunction problem, but of course its not without problems (but then again, what philosophical solution is without blemish?). One can easily google objections against Fodor's Assymetric Dependence account to see what I mean. Nonetheless, Fodor's Psychosemantics is a must read for anyone who is interested in the philosophical project of naturalizing intentionality.
June 27, 2014
Fodor's Psychosemantics is a book that I've wanted to read for a very long time. I've read some pieces of his work, and he always writes entertainingly, humorously, with a highly engaging style. In that respect, at least, this book couldn't possibly disappoint. His philosophical rival, (or 'Auntie', as she is affectionately known), is not entirely consistent with her views, since she represents anyone that Fodor should disagree with - from content externalists such as Tyler Burge, behaviourists such as Ryle and Wittgenstein, to eliminativists like philosophical 'bad boy' Paul Churchland.
Be warned. Fodor's excellent writing style requires a certain level of familiarity with philosophical terms from epistemology, mind, science, and metaphysics. Although he does write clearly, this work, in general, wouldn't be recommended for those not fluent in such speak.
The strategy in this book is fairly straightforward - put up a straw man as your opponent, and knock him down. For myself, the clearest indication of this is in his discussion of holism. Whilst Fodor elucidates some useful distinctions that need to be borne in mind concerning holism (such as confirmation holism v. content holism), he ends the chapter by suggesting that holism about content has gained plausibility from the popularity of conceptual role semantics, which he doesn't subscribe to. (Or so he says). The chapter ends with him sneaking the bathwater in the back door, and leaving the baby outside, although I should probably leave the reader to decide the issue for themselves.
This chapter was really a turning point in the book for me. Up to this point, the first two chapters (on propositional attitude psychology, and individualism, supervenience and methodological solipsism), left me thinking - 'Here he goes!' And feeling thoroughly entertained as he espoused his dual content theory whilst tearing apart his straw men with great wit. Although I wondered if Ryle's ghost had acquired the description 'narrow content', I considered this a very interesting, relatively sophisticated idea. I admired the construction of his theory, despite lacking sympathy. But by the time we get to his third chapter, the reader is left feeling a little philosophically 'ripped off'. Wittily annihilating a caricature of a view is humorous, but ultimately unpersuasive.
All this said, I have still acquired a fascination with Fodor's work. There is no doubt that I will engage with him again in the near future, although I won't expect high quality argumentation. I will expect more humorous horse-play (and counterfactual tinkering with his own theory), more claiming to distrust modal intuitions, (despite invoking them heavily), but above all, more fun.
Be warned. Fodor's excellent writing style requires a certain level of familiarity with philosophical terms from epistemology, mind, science, and metaphysics. Although he does write clearly, this work, in general, wouldn't be recommended for those not fluent in such speak.
The strategy in this book is fairly straightforward - put up a straw man as your opponent, and knock him down. For myself, the clearest indication of this is in his discussion of holism. Whilst Fodor elucidates some useful distinctions that need to be borne in mind concerning holism (such as confirmation holism v. content holism), he ends the chapter by suggesting that holism about content has gained plausibility from the popularity of conceptual role semantics, which he doesn't subscribe to. (Or so he says). The chapter ends with him sneaking the bathwater in the back door, and leaving the baby outside, although I should probably leave the reader to decide the issue for themselves.
This chapter was really a turning point in the book for me. Up to this point, the first two chapters (on propositional attitude psychology, and individualism, supervenience and methodological solipsism), left me thinking - 'Here he goes!' And feeling thoroughly entertained as he espoused his dual content theory whilst tearing apart his straw men with great wit. Although I wondered if Ryle's ghost had acquired the description 'narrow content', I considered this a very interesting, relatively sophisticated idea. I admired the construction of his theory, despite lacking sympathy. But by the time we get to his third chapter, the reader is left feeling a little philosophically 'ripped off'. Wittily annihilating a caricature of a view is humorous, but ultimately unpersuasive.
All this said, I have still acquired a fascination with Fodor's work. There is no doubt that I will engage with him again in the near future, although I won't expect high quality argumentation. I will expect more humorous horse-play (and counterfactual tinkering with his own theory), more claiming to distrust modal intuitions, (despite invoking them heavily), but above all, more fun.
August 27, 2024
Semantics is for mental representations before it is for natural language. Why didn't I read that earlier.
May 20, 2026
The introduction involves Fodor observing his cat and introducing intentionality with a similar representational ability as language. Then, chapter 1 begins with defending commonsense psychology against objections relating to ceterus paribus clauses, explanations at more basic levels, resemblance to disposable proverbs, etc. He additionally argues that we cannot even make sense of words without commonsense psychology. He gives commonsense psychology three components: (i) semantically evaluable states, (ii) with certain causal relations, (iii) subsumable under folk-psychological laws. He then introduces RTM which posits “For any organism 0, and any attitude A toward the proposition P, there is a ('computational' 'functional ') relation R and a mental representation MP such that MP means that P I and 0 has A iff 0 bears R to MP.” An important part of RTM is that “You connect the causal properties of a symbol with its semantic properties via its syntax” because syntax can be reduced to shapes which physically has a clear causal role. Then he responds to a few possible counterarguments, then distinguishing in reply personal/subpersonal processes, implicit and explicit representation–”no intentional causation without explicit representation.”
In chapter 2, he addresses Putnam’s and Burge’s arguments for externalism about content. The alleged challenge is this: common sense psychology individuates mental states relationally while psychology and brain sciences do not. In particular, even if the content of the states is different their causal powers are not. He then responds to objections that their causal powers are also different–in these cases, brain states would also be different and it would be mad to say linguistic affiliation has causal effects (“You can affect the relational properties of things in all sorts of ways- including by stipulation. But for one thing to affect the causal powers of another, there must be a mediating law or mechanism”). He then distinguishes between solipsism and individualism and addresses more arguments against the individuation and causal role of content–”Two thought contents are identical only if they effect the same mapping of thoughts and contexts onto truth conditions.” He then discusses narrow vs broad context.
In chapter 3, he addresses holism. If holism is true, no two beliefs are the same so there are no intentional generalizations to be made. Additionally, it makes trouble for functionalism because beliefs are supposedly individuated by their causal role. But he emphasizes that the causal role can define its belief role without fully determining its content. Otherwise, “one-factor functional-role semantics is out because of the Twin cases; and two-factor functional -role semantics is out because of the problem of coordinating the factors.” He then defends denotational semantics.
In chapter 4, he discusses naturalizing intentionality. He argues that is anything can be naturalized it is mental representation. He then defends a Slightly Less Crude Causal Theory. He first addresses the disjunction problem involving the incapability of misrepresentation: “we have a necessary condition for a B-caused 'A' token to be wild: B-caused ' A' tokenings are wild only if they are asymmetrically dependent upon non-B-caused 'A' tokenings.” Then he acknowledges the problem that not all A’s will token A’s. He thinks psychophysics can help here by discovering what physical properties can reliably cause tokenings, but they only work with a narrow range of concepts like color concepts. For harder concepts: “'Horse' means horse if 'horse' tokenings are reliably caused by tokenings of psychophysical concepts that are in turn caused by instantiations of psychophysical properties for which instantiations of horse are in fact causally responsible.”
In the Appendix, he argues that an Intentionalist Realist should believe in LOT. First, mental states and behavior both have constituent structure. Second, the best psychological theories of mental processes are computational, which requires a LOT. Lastly, he goes over the classic productivity and systemicity arguments.
In chapter 2, he addresses Putnam’s and Burge’s arguments for externalism about content. The alleged challenge is this: common sense psychology individuates mental states relationally while psychology and brain sciences do not. In particular, even if the content of the states is different their causal powers are not. He then responds to objections that their causal powers are also different–in these cases, brain states would also be different and it would be mad to say linguistic affiliation has causal effects (“You can affect the relational properties of things in all sorts of ways- including by stipulation. But for one thing to affect the causal powers of another, there must be a mediating law or mechanism”). He then distinguishes between solipsism and individualism and addresses more arguments against the individuation and causal role of content–”Two thought contents are identical only if they effect the same mapping of thoughts and contexts onto truth conditions.” He then discusses narrow vs broad context.
In chapter 3, he addresses holism. If holism is true, no two beliefs are the same so there are no intentional generalizations to be made. Additionally, it makes trouble for functionalism because beliefs are supposedly individuated by their causal role. But he emphasizes that the causal role can define its belief role without fully determining its content. Otherwise, “one-factor functional-role semantics is out because of the Twin cases; and two-factor functional -role semantics is out because of the problem of coordinating the factors.” He then defends denotational semantics.
In chapter 4, he discusses naturalizing intentionality. He argues that is anything can be naturalized it is mental representation. He then defends a Slightly Less Crude Causal Theory. He first addresses the disjunction problem involving the incapability of misrepresentation: “we have a necessary condition for a B-caused 'A' token to be wild: B-caused ' A' tokenings are wild only if they are asymmetrically dependent upon non-B-caused 'A' tokenings.” Then he acknowledges the problem that not all A’s will token A’s. He thinks psychophysics can help here by discovering what physical properties can reliably cause tokenings, but they only work with a narrow range of concepts like color concepts. For harder concepts: “'Horse' means horse if 'horse' tokenings are reliably caused by tokenings of psychophysical concepts that are in turn caused by instantiations of psychophysical properties for which instantiations of horse are in fact causally responsible.”
In the Appendix, he argues that an Intentionalist Realist should believe in LOT. First, mental states and behavior both have constituent structure. Second, the best psychological theories of mental processes are computational, which requires a LOT. Lastly, he goes over the classic productivity and systemicity arguments.
January 21, 2026
Reading Fodor was a traumatic experience as student in cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind (it is so awful to read my god, pleas teachers stop treating it as an introductory book to philosophy of mind), but I still give two star because I'm still happy that we bridged semantics and causality trough syntax even i dont know why i'm happy and that maybe Ishouldn't care
July 31, 2022
Typical Fodor — great writing, full of wit, and he's anticipated and pulverized most posssible objections. New characters like his cat, granny, and Aunty pop up.
September 13, 2025
Pretty harsh on meaning holism, but the positive account of mental state token contents as what causes they asymmetrically depend on is pretty clever. Plus Fodor is funny sometimes.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews