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The First Cold War: The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson in U.S. - Soviet Relations
In The First Cold War , Donald E. Davis and Eugene P. Trani review the Wilson administration’s attitudes toward Russia before, during, and after the Bolshevik seizure of power. They argue that before the Russian Revolution, Woodrow Wilson had little understanding of Russia and made poor appointments that cost the United States Russian goodwill. Wilson later reversed those negative impressions by being the first to recognize Russia’s Provisional Government, resulting in positive U.S.–Russian relations until Lenin gained power in 1917.
Wilson at first seemed unsure whether to recognize or repudiate Lenin and the Bolsheviks. His vacillation finally ended in a firm repudiation when he opted for a diplomatic quarantine having almost all of the ingredients of the later Cold War. Davis and Trani argue that Wilson deserves mild criticism for his early indecision and inability to form a coherent policy toward what would become the Soviet Union. But they believe Wilson rightly came to the conclusion that until the regime became more moderate, it was useless for America to engage it diplomatically.
The authors see in Wilson’s approach the foundations for the “first Cold War”—meaning not simply a refusal to recognize the Soviet Union, but a strong belief that its influence was harmful and would spread if not contained or quarantined. Wilson’s Soviet policy in essence lasted until Roosevelt extended diplomatic recognition in the 1930s. But The First Cold War suggests that Wilson’s impact extended beyond Roosevelt to Truman, showing that the policies of Wilson and Truman closely resemble each other with the exception of an arms race. Wilson’s intellectual reputation lent credibility to U.S. Cold War policy from Truman to Reagan, and the reader can draw a direct connection from Wilson to the collapse of the USSR. Wilsonians were the first Cold War warriors, and in the era of President Woodrow Wilson, the first Cold War began.
Wilson at first seemed unsure whether to recognize or repudiate Lenin and the Bolsheviks. His vacillation finally ended in a firm repudiation when he opted for a diplomatic quarantine having almost all of the ingredients of the later Cold War. Davis and Trani argue that Wilson deserves mild criticism for his early indecision and inability to form a coherent policy toward what would become the Soviet Union. But they believe Wilson rightly came to the conclusion that until the regime became more moderate, it was useless for America to engage it diplomatically.
The authors see in Wilson’s approach the foundations for the “first Cold War”—meaning not simply a refusal to recognize the Soviet Union, but a strong belief that its influence was harmful and would spread if not contained or quarantined. Wilson’s Soviet policy in essence lasted until Roosevelt extended diplomatic recognition in the 1930s. But The First Cold War suggests that Wilson’s impact extended beyond Roosevelt to Truman, showing that the policies of Wilson and Truman closely resemble each other with the exception of an arms race. Wilson’s intellectual reputation lent credibility to U.S. Cold War policy from Truman to Reagan, and the reader can draw a direct connection from Wilson to the collapse of the USSR. Wilsonians were the first Cold War warriors, and in the era of President Woodrow Wilson, the first Cold War began.
- GenresHistory
360 pages, Hardcover
First published July 1, 2002
20 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
October 13, 2022
good histiography
February 1, 2023
Reasoning Behind the Rating:
First, and most importantly, the authors state, not once but twice, that their premise for the entire book was that a "cold war" lasted from 1917 to 1933. The authors completely fail to support their thesis. It does not help that the authors in chapter 8 - the last chapter before their conclusions (more than three quarters of the way through the book) - state that America conducted a cold war with Soviet Russia from August 1920 to 1933. Apparently the authors are not sure themselves.
Second, Even if the authors settled on a time frame, the two historians then contend that a "first cold war" began during Woodrow Wilson's administration and that Wilson's policy set a precedent for the Cold War of 1946 to 1991. The problem here is that Wilson's policy from 1917 to 1920 was one of "wait and see" and this was hardly the path that Truman and others took beginning in 1946. Based on what Davis and Trani have put together, Wilson actually had no policy until August 1920 and even then his so-called policy was the idea of Robert Lansing and others.
Third, In relation to the second problem mentioned above, the author only spend NINE pages at the end of their work connecting Wilson to post-World War II, and then to only Truman. Given that numerous presidents followed Truman and each had his own way of conducting the 1946-1991 Cold War, the authors would have really needed to expand on the connections they were wanting to make to even come close to supporting their thesis. Most of the book is a waste in trying to demonstrate that Wilson had no knowledge of Russia and no policy whatsoever aside from "wait and see". This could have been accomplished more succinctly than in the presented material. Also, if one begins reading the book by starting with the Preface, then for nearly two hundred pages one wonders if the authors forgot their thesis as nothing they write supports their premise. The thesis states that the "first cold war" began in 1917, but the authors do not provide any details to support Wilson initiating a policy. The closest the two come is in chapter 4 when discussing Lansing's views on communism and why the United States cannot recognize the Soviet government. At least when the authors identify Lansing's views they establish that the concept of containment came around long before George Kennan wrote his long telegram in 1946. However, Davis and Trani leave this point behind and do not look back, essentially, until their few concluding pages.
Fourth, The book is mostly told from the American or West's perspective. There are relatively few points and quotes made from the Russian point of view. This book was published in 2002, theoretically after 20 years of research, so the authors should have had a chance to examine the Russian archives in depth. There is a section at the end of the book entitled an "Essay on Notes and Sources" that contains comments on the Russian Archives but the authors fail to make good use of this research when trying to prove their point. Overall, information on a Soviet policy, aside from "down with capitalism" and "we want recognition", is lacking. It does take two to make a "cold war" and the authors do not expand on what Lenin, Trotsky, et al actually do for their part of this supposed "first cold war".
Fifth, while the authors might be considered researchers they are certainly not writers. Davis and Trani leave out details, specifically dates, that would help their narrative. The two demonstrate the inability to transition from one topic to the next and often have topic sentences in paragraphs that are completely unrelated to the information that follows. All one has to do is read the first few paragraphs of the introduction to see that the authors need to work on their writing style.
The First Cold War does make an interesting argument in that a "cold war" might have existed beginning with the end of World War I, but Davis and Trani fail to execute support for their idea. This book has far more problems than identified above. A few other issues begin immediately with the second Forward to the book where V. Nikonov, a Russian, states that the authors convincingly prove a "Cold War" began long before Kennan but then spends the last portion of his forward disagreeing with the authors (mostly on the point of democracy in Russia - another failure of the authors to actually prove that democracy existed, even for a brief moment). It also does not help that the authors demonstrate their lack of knowledge in American history when they claim that Wilson was the president who restored the power of the executive branch over the legislative, something that had been lost at the end of the Civil War. Apparently Davis and Trani have forgotten about Theodore Roosevelt's influence, though only Taft separated Teddy and Woodrow.
Davis and Trani were correct to research their thesis, but it will be up to other historians to provide legitimate support.
First, and most importantly, the authors state, not once but twice, that their premise for the entire book was that a "cold war" lasted from 1917 to 1933. The authors completely fail to support their thesis. It does not help that the authors in chapter 8 - the last chapter before their conclusions (more than three quarters of the way through the book) - state that America conducted a cold war with Soviet Russia from August 1920 to 1933. Apparently the authors are not sure themselves.
Second, Even if the authors settled on a time frame, the two historians then contend that a "first cold war" began during Woodrow Wilson's administration and that Wilson's policy set a precedent for the Cold War of 1946 to 1991. The problem here is that Wilson's policy from 1917 to 1920 was one of "wait and see" and this was hardly the path that Truman and others took beginning in 1946. Based on what Davis and Trani have put together, Wilson actually had no policy until August 1920 and even then his so-called policy was the idea of Robert Lansing and others.
Third, In relation to the second problem mentioned above, the author only spend NINE pages at the end of their work connecting Wilson to post-World War II, and then to only Truman. Given that numerous presidents followed Truman and each had his own way of conducting the 1946-1991 Cold War, the authors would have really needed to expand on the connections they were wanting to make to even come close to supporting their thesis. Most of the book is a waste in trying to demonstrate that Wilson had no knowledge of Russia and no policy whatsoever aside from "wait and see". This could have been accomplished more succinctly than in the presented material. Also, if one begins reading the book by starting with the Preface, then for nearly two hundred pages one wonders if the authors forgot their thesis as nothing they write supports their premise. The thesis states that the "first cold war" began in 1917, but the authors do not provide any details to support Wilson initiating a policy. The closest the two come is in chapter 4 when discussing Lansing's views on communism and why the United States cannot recognize the Soviet government. At least when the authors identify Lansing's views they establish that the concept of containment came around long before George Kennan wrote his long telegram in 1946. However, Davis and Trani leave this point behind and do not look back, essentially, until their few concluding pages.
Fourth, The book is mostly told from the American or West's perspective. There are relatively few points and quotes made from the Russian point of view. This book was published in 2002, theoretically after 20 years of research, so the authors should have had a chance to examine the Russian archives in depth. There is a section at the end of the book entitled an "Essay on Notes and Sources" that contains comments on the Russian Archives but the authors fail to make good use of this research when trying to prove their point. Overall, information on a Soviet policy, aside from "down with capitalism" and "we want recognition", is lacking. It does take two to make a "cold war" and the authors do not expand on what Lenin, Trotsky, et al actually do for their part of this supposed "first cold war".
Fifth, while the authors might be considered researchers they are certainly not writers. Davis and Trani leave out details, specifically dates, that would help their narrative. The two demonstrate the inability to transition from one topic to the next and often have topic sentences in paragraphs that are completely unrelated to the information that follows. All one has to do is read the first few paragraphs of the introduction to see that the authors need to work on their writing style.
The First Cold War does make an interesting argument in that a "cold war" might have existed beginning with the end of World War I, but Davis and Trani fail to execute support for their idea. This book has far more problems than identified above. A few other issues begin immediately with the second Forward to the book where V. Nikonov, a Russian, states that the authors convincingly prove a "Cold War" began long before Kennan but then spends the last portion of his forward disagreeing with the authors (mostly on the point of democracy in Russia - another failure of the authors to actually prove that democracy existed, even for a brief moment). It also does not help that the authors demonstrate their lack of knowledge in American history when they claim that Wilson was the president who restored the power of the executive branch over the legislative, something that had been lost at the end of the Civil War. Apparently Davis and Trani have forgotten about Theodore Roosevelt's influence, though only Taft separated Teddy and Woodrow.
Davis and Trani were correct to research their thesis, but it will be up to other historians to provide legitimate support.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews