Vietnam's Communist Revolution: The Power and Limits of Ideology

Cambridge Studies in US Foreign Relations

by Tuong Vu

By tracing the evolving worldview of Vietnamese communists over 80 years as they led Vietnam through wars, social revolution, and peaceful development, this book shows the depth and resilience of their commitment to the communist utopia in their foreign policy. Unearthing new material from Vietnamese archives and publications, this book challenges the conventional scholarship and the popular image of the Vietnamese revolution and the Vietnam War as being driven solely by patriotic inspirations. The revolution not only saw successes in defeating foreign intervention, but also failures in bringing peace and development to Vietnam. This was, and is, the real tragedy of Vietnam. Spanning the entire history of the Vietnamese revolution and its aftermath, this book examines its leaders' early rise to power, the tumult of three decades of war with France, the US, and China, and the stubborn legacies left behind which remain in Vietnam today.

Genres: History

320 pages, Hardcover

First published January 6, 2017

Reviews

[Jason Friedlander · Rating 4 out of 5]

Tuong Vu argues here that the role of communist/Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology in the decision making of the North Vietnamese leadership has been significantly understated in our common understandings, as well as the historical/academic records. He argues that their commitment to ideology was not only central in their internal debates over national and international strategy, but that it was also directly responsible for the country’s inability to adapt to the new global conditions after the fall of communism (dissolution of the Soviet Union and China’s economic liberalization) in the late 1980s. He depicts a Vietnam that felt itself as a leader of world communism and in some ways, its most dedicated ideologist. Even after the two giants of communism decided to open up their societies, Vietnam is depicted as being stubbornly adamant in staying true to their communist ideologies to the point that it inhibited their ability to take care of their citizens. The story here almost seems like Vietnam saw itself as playing a central role in keeping it alive, despite everything else going on around them showing that it was perhaps necessary to adapt to the changing global situation in order to let their societies thrive.

So it sometimes reads as a study on the dedication of the Vietnamese to communism over the past century, but also a criticism for this same thing. Tuong Vu’s presentation of history here is very different from other history books I’ve read, in a way that sometimes makes it feel like he had decided on his theses and conclusions first, then used the data available to him to prove those points. So it feels quite polemic in that sense. But when read in dialogue with other history books about the past century of Vietnam, or the Indochina wars in general, the book does provide a useful counterbalance to the more common interpretations of the war. The truth is likely somewhere in between. I also just found it strange that he argues towards the end of the book that it’s the North Vietnamese’s fault that the Americans decided to send ground troops to Vietnam. Absolutely wild take to have, especially from someone who is Vietnamese. That conclusion especially stuck out to me. I wasn’t convinced by it, but it’s a provocative take.

Both North and South Vietnam in general have been caricaturized as pawns in a broader war between the greater powers (Soviet Union, U.S.A., and China), so there’s been a couple of important academic books that have aimed to return agency to the Vietnamese people during their catastrophic wars in the second half of the 20th century. I think what we can all now agree, both from this book, as well as “Hanoi’s International War for Peace” by Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, that they were absolutely not pawns. They were very active participants in how the wars started, were maneuvered, and eventually ended. That’s indisputable now from their research. So all in all, if you’re interested in how the North Vietnamese interpreted communist ideology to justify their policies over the past hundred years, this is definitely worth reading. It’s generally easy to read, although I would suggest not to take all of his conclusions at face value. Make your own opinions based on the research of the field’s many scholars, both abroad and in Vietnam itself.

[TimEs · Rating 4 out of 5]

Pretty good. Beginning was really good and insightful. Later on, it got a little dull. This book is as the title says, expressly concerned with the power and limits of ideology. Do not expect to find very much specific information about the strategies, wars, and economy of Vietnam. The author is also University of Oregon which is a plus.

[Viet Phuong · Rating 2 out of 5]

The book has a very promising opening as the author seems to supplement the often American-centric scholarship of the Vietnam War and the Communist Party of Vietnam with a more balanced perspective aided by original sources from the Vietnamese side. However, the book quickly devolves into a forceful analysis of the CPV doctrine trying to prove that ALL political decisions made throughout the 70-plus years of history of the Party are based on the rigid communist ideology. The worst thing about this book probably is its standard of references with many unreliable sources (e.g. online and self-published documents that are not even up to Wikipedia criteria of referencing, let alone academic standard), the heavy reliance on a small number of sources (CPV's recent compilation of documents, or Huy Đức's "Bên thắng cuộc" - which was almost translated and briefed in pages, despite its being not really an academic book), and poor translation in some parts (not sure unintentionally or intentionally). Moreover, the author somehow did not differentiate CPV's internal (and often secret) documents discussing actual policies and strategies and its public documents, which mainly serve as Party's propaganda with negligible academic values, while disregarding the security and socio-political conditions of Vietnam that heavily influenced the decisions made by the CPV leadership (the personalities of these leaders, which have been considered extremely important to the decision-making process, were also often disregarded). The conclusions of the book are also pretty disappointing, which are in line with present consensus of the Western academia about the Vietnam War and the CPV and do not provide anything new, given the meticulous analysis of the author for each important event of the history of the CPV. The most important utility of this book to me might probably be its description of the changing policy by the CPV regarding the role of nuclear weapon in global politics, but that is of course not enough for an academic work to be a valuable and respectful one.