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The First Domino: Eisenhower, the Military, and America's Intervention in Vietnam
Discusses how State Department officials obtained U.S. backing for France's efforts to reclaim its colonies in Indochina
- GenresHistory
444 pages, Hardcover
First published November 1, 1991
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November 5, 2021
As James R. Arnold's book tells us, in his first State of Union Message Dwight D. Eisenhower mentioned four principles that would guide his administration. He told the American public he wanted to apply "America's influence in world affairs with such fortitude and such foresight that it will deter aggression." By aggression he meant international Communism. He believed that the free world should built a united defense against the Communist offense, and this belief shaped all his decisions in regard to Vietnam.
Ike Eisenhower's influential Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was also convinced that America's role in international affairs was decisive. He had believed his whole adult life that what was happening around the world affected American interests, and now, after he had joined the Eisenhower administration, he could finally practice what he preached. The General charged him with "the responsibility of developing the specific policy, including the decision where the administration would stand and what course of action would be followed in each international crisis," for he considered John Foster to be more experienced and knowledgeable in diplomacy than any other living American.
Here we come to the first of the two major problems I have with this book.
James R. Arnold quotes Dwight D. Eisenhower's words: "Foster has been in training for this job all his life." So far so good. That was the General's opinion, and it is quite reasonable if we consider he could not look at John Foster Dulles's policy from a historic perspective. However, what spoiled what seemed to be an insightful study for me was the fact that the author readily agrees with him. John Foster Dulles – the perfect Secretary of State? I can hardly conceive of a State Department official who caused more trouble abroad.
Arnold claims John Foster's background prepared him for the job. In fact, after graduating from Princeton University John Foster was accepted as a clerk to Sullivan & Cromwell, the country's most eminent corporate law firm (thanks to his influential grandfather, former Secretary of State, whose singular accomplishment was the overthrow of Queen Liliuokalani of Hawai'i and the subsequent landing of American troops at Honolulu.)
According to the Dulles brothers' biographer Stephen Kinzer, by the time John Foster joined Sullivan & Cromwell, it had already become a unique repository of power and influence. Enormous fortunes were accumulated in the United States during the last decades of the nineteenth century, and many of the men who accumulated them used Sullivan & Cromwell as their link to Washington and the world. The firm thrived at the point where Washington politics intersected with global business. John Foster Dulles worked at this intersection for nearly forty years, rising from a clerk to a partner. Aside from his upbringing, nothing shaped his character as much as this job. It reinforced his conviction that the unrestricted operation of large American corporations in the world is beneficial for everyone. This conviction guided his foreign policy during the Eisenhower administration.
He possessed a rigorously organized mind, but he was not a deep thinker. His ideology was the defense of the two principles that he believed best served global commerce: free enterprise and American-centered internationalism. "He was driven to find and confront enemies, quick to make moral judgments, and not given to subtlety or doubt," writes Kinzer.
Furthermore, John Foster's inability to understand the Third World was remarkable. He was too quick to see Moscow’s hand behind cries for social reform in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. The three continents were to him little more than a vast Cold War battleground. He never sought to engage creatively with the aspirations of the millions of people who were emerging from colonialism and looking for their place in a turbulent world, but rather planned destructive campaigns against their leaders to exterminate what he perceived to be Communist aggression. He was attracted to order and predictability, so he strived to make up patterns in an ever-changing world. All of those are hardly qualities a great Secretary of State should be known for.
The second major problem is Arnold's conclusions about the foreign policy of John F. Kennedy. If we believe Arnold, Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower could not have wished for a more obedient successor – and a Democratic successor at that. John Kennedy allegedly recognized his own inexperience in comparison to the General and hung on his every word. He followed the advice and example his predecessor gave him when making foreign policy decisions.
Nothing can be further from the truth. In fact, President John F. Kennedy was deeply skeptical about Ike Eisenhower's advice. When he was given a transitional briefing by the General on January 19, 1961, he asked an unexpected question in regard to the rising conflict with Communist forces in Laos. Which option would he prefer, John Kennedy asked, a "coalition with the Communists to form a government in Laos or intervening [militarily] through SEATO [the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, to which the U.S. belonged]?" The General answered without hesitation that it would be "far better" to intervene militarily because any coalition with the Communists would end up with them in control. Even unilateral intervention by American troops was preferable to that. It would be "a last desperate effort to save Laos."
Arnold asserts that John F. Kennedy followed Dwight D. Eisenhower's recommendations, but in fact John Kennedy thought he was hearing a recipe for disaster, from a man who in a few hours would not be responsible for it. "There he sat," he told friends later, "telling me to get ready to put ground forces into Asia, the thing he himself had been carefully avoiding for the last eight years." He did not pursue the course of military intervention Ike Eisenhower had been recommending. He chose to neutralize Laos without shedding American blood.
Because of the aforementioned details, which I, having studied the Dulles brothers and the Kennedy administration with great interest, have committed to memory, I disagree with some of the book's basic assumptions. This leads me to believe that James R. Arnold's other conclusions might also be misleading, so I do not recommend THE FIRST DOMINO.
Books I highly recommend:
The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles & Their Secret World War
JFK and the Unspeakable: Why He Died and Why It Matters
Vietnam If Kennedy Had Lived: Virtual JFK
Decision Against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954
Ike Eisenhower's influential Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was also convinced that America's role in international affairs was decisive. He had believed his whole adult life that what was happening around the world affected American interests, and now, after he had joined the Eisenhower administration, he could finally practice what he preached. The General charged him with "the responsibility of developing the specific policy, including the decision where the administration would stand and what course of action would be followed in each international crisis," for he considered John Foster to be more experienced and knowledgeable in diplomacy than any other living American.
Here we come to the first of the two major problems I have with this book.
James R. Arnold quotes Dwight D. Eisenhower's words: "Foster has been in training for this job all his life." So far so good. That was the General's opinion, and it is quite reasonable if we consider he could not look at John Foster Dulles's policy from a historic perspective. However, what spoiled what seemed to be an insightful study for me was the fact that the author readily agrees with him. John Foster Dulles – the perfect Secretary of State? I can hardly conceive of a State Department official who caused more trouble abroad.
Arnold claims John Foster's background prepared him for the job. In fact, after graduating from Princeton University John Foster was accepted as a clerk to Sullivan & Cromwell, the country's most eminent corporate law firm (thanks to his influential grandfather, former Secretary of State, whose singular accomplishment was the overthrow of Queen Liliuokalani of Hawai'i and the subsequent landing of American troops at Honolulu.)
According to the Dulles brothers' biographer Stephen Kinzer, by the time John Foster joined Sullivan & Cromwell, it had already become a unique repository of power and influence. Enormous fortunes were accumulated in the United States during the last decades of the nineteenth century, and many of the men who accumulated them used Sullivan & Cromwell as their link to Washington and the world. The firm thrived at the point where Washington politics intersected with global business. John Foster Dulles worked at this intersection for nearly forty years, rising from a clerk to a partner. Aside from his upbringing, nothing shaped his character as much as this job. It reinforced his conviction that the unrestricted operation of large American corporations in the world is beneficial for everyone. This conviction guided his foreign policy during the Eisenhower administration.
He possessed a rigorously organized mind, but he was not a deep thinker. His ideology was the defense of the two principles that he believed best served global commerce: free enterprise and American-centered internationalism. "He was driven to find and confront enemies, quick to make moral judgments, and not given to subtlety or doubt," writes Kinzer.
Furthermore, John Foster's inability to understand the Third World was remarkable. He was too quick to see Moscow’s hand behind cries for social reform in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. The three continents were to him little more than a vast Cold War battleground. He never sought to engage creatively with the aspirations of the millions of people who were emerging from colonialism and looking for their place in a turbulent world, but rather planned destructive campaigns against their leaders to exterminate what he perceived to be Communist aggression. He was attracted to order and predictability, so he strived to make up patterns in an ever-changing world. All of those are hardly qualities a great Secretary of State should be known for.
The second major problem is Arnold's conclusions about the foreign policy of John F. Kennedy. If we believe Arnold, Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower could not have wished for a more obedient successor – and a Democratic successor at that. John Kennedy allegedly recognized his own inexperience in comparison to the General and hung on his every word. He followed the advice and example his predecessor gave him when making foreign policy decisions.
Nothing can be further from the truth. In fact, President John F. Kennedy was deeply skeptical about Ike Eisenhower's advice. When he was given a transitional briefing by the General on January 19, 1961, he asked an unexpected question in regard to the rising conflict with Communist forces in Laos. Which option would he prefer, John Kennedy asked, a "coalition with the Communists to form a government in Laos or intervening [militarily] through SEATO [the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, to which the U.S. belonged]?" The General answered without hesitation that it would be "far better" to intervene militarily because any coalition with the Communists would end up with them in control. Even unilateral intervention by American troops was preferable to that. It would be "a last desperate effort to save Laos."
Arnold asserts that John F. Kennedy followed Dwight D. Eisenhower's recommendations, but in fact John Kennedy thought he was hearing a recipe for disaster, from a man who in a few hours would not be responsible for it. "There he sat," he told friends later, "telling me to get ready to put ground forces into Asia, the thing he himself had been carefully avoiding for the last eight years." He did not pursue the course of military intervention Ike Eisenhower had been recommending. He chose to neutralize Laos without shedding American blood.
Because of the aforementioned details, which I, having studied the Dulles brothers and the Kennedy administration with great interest, have committed to memory, I disagree with some of the book's basic assumptions. This leads me to believe that James R. Arnold's other conclusions might also be misleading, so I do not recommend THE FIRST DOMINO.
Books I highly recommend:
The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles & Their Secret World War
JFK and the Unspeakable: Why He Died and Why It Matters
Vietnam If Kennedy Had Lived: Virtual JFK
Decision Against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954
Displaying 1 of 1 review