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Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays
By the time of his death in 2006, Sir Peter Strawson was regarded as one of the world's most distinguished philosophers. First published thirty years ago but long since unavailable, Freedom and Resentment collects some of Strawson's most important work and is an ideal introduction to his thinking on such topics as the philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology and aesthetics. Beginning with the title essay Freedom and Resentment , this invaluable collection is testament to the astonishing range of Strawson's thought as he discusses free will, ethics and morality, logic, the mind-body problem and aesthetics. The book is perhaps best-known for its three interrelated chapters on perception and the imagination, subjects now at the very forefront of philosophical research. This reissue includes a substantial new foreword by Paul Snowdon and a fascinating intellectual autobiography by Strawson.
246 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1974
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About the author
Peter Frederick Strawson
25 books34 followersSir Peter Frederick Strawson FBA was an English philosopher. He was the Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at the University of Oxford (Magdalen College) from 1968 to 1987. Before that he was appointed as a college lecturer at University College, Oxford in 1947 and became a tutorial fellow the following year until 1968. On his retirement in 1987, he returned to the college and continued working there until shortly before his passing.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
December 6, 2015
I sludged through the titular essay. Strawson is a pretty dull writer.
The essay pretty much tries to see what would happen if we operationalize the term determinism. What would determinism, or the lack of it, even look like? In the end whether the doctrine is real or not, it makes no real impact on our psychological feelings (moral sentiments). Strawson argues that in real life we do change our opinion of resentment based on the agent's responsibility. The example he gives, among many, is this: a guy steps on your hand. The first thing you think is, "what an asshole!!!". This initial response will change if you find out A) the guy purposely stomped on your foot or B) it was a complete accident (i.e. the guy was pushed).
Ultimately resentment and gratitude is a form of life and is ingrained in our social practices. It doesn't matter if actions are in fact pre-determined, our actions create our selves (we are our actions) or, as Strawson puts it: "Our practices do not merely exploit our natures, they express them". I think John Dewey puts it more clearly in his essay on ethics, "We are responsible for out conduct because that conduct is ourselves objectified in actions." The statement that claims that we are not responsible for our actions is an absurd one.
On the flip side, to suggest that if determinism were true it would undermine moral responsibility is absurd because you couldn't alter our psychological makeup, our propensity to feel resentment, with a change in philosophical perspective.
The essay pretty much tries to see what would happen if we operationalize the term determinism. What would determinism, or the lack of it, even look like? In the end whether the doctrine is real or not, it makes no real impact on our psychological feelings (moral sentiments). Strawson argues that in real life we do change our opinion of resentment based on the agent's responsibility. The example he gives, among many, is this: a guy steps on your hand. The first thing you think is, "what an asshole!!!". This initial response will change if you find out A) the guy purposely stomped on your foot or B) it was a complete accident (i.e. the guy was pushed).
Ultimately resentment and gratitude is a form of life and is ingrained in our social practices. It doesn't matter if actions are in fact pre-determined, our actions create our selves (we are our actions) or, as Strawson puts it: "Our practices do not merely exploit our natures, they express them". I think John Dewey puts it more clearly in his essay on ethics, "We are responsible for out conduct because that conduct is ourselves objectified in actions." The statement that claims that we are not responsible for our actions is an absurd one.
On the flip side, to suggest that if determinism were true it would undermine moral responsibility is absurd because you couldn't alter our psychological makeup, our propensity to feel resentment, with a change in philosophical perspective.
August 27, 2020
Just read the titular essay. Strawson's writing is a bit of a slog, but his point that our reactive attitudes towards others (Resentment, gratitude, praise, blame, etc.) are constitutive parts or facts about human existence and are the reason corrective measures are effective (in discussions of determinism) is quite good and certainly influential.
June 30, 2025
If every occurrence happens to have a reason why it is occurring and every occurrence being the reason for the latter occurrence also has an occurrence being the reason for occurring itself, one might put into question, whether there happens anything at all not having a reason for its happening. Therefore, if nothing happens out of mere coincidence one might suggest that all occurrences are determined in a sense that it is certain that they will happen.
Among those accepting that premise, on the one hand, and being concerned with moral philosophy, on the other hand, there have been two different positions regarding free will. There are those (optimists in Strawson‘s paper) who assume a compatibility of determinism and freedom. Moreover, there are those (pessimists) claiming there can‘t be determinism and freedom and since determinism is, it follows that freedom is not.
However, the possibility of free will not being existent raises serous issues on the justness of moral punishment, if one doesn‘t intend to justify it merely in terms of efficiency.
This paper is about this problem. At first, Strawson tries to reconstruct the different arguments of the optimists and the pessimists. The pessimist might argue that there needs to be freedom in order to hold people accountable for what they do. As a reply the optimist may say that this is certainly true and freedom also exists in a sense that just means the absence of certain reasons which would justify the behavior of the agent. Nevertheless, the pessimist might not be content with that answer and claims that this is not the kind of freedom he meant. He is searching for a positive freedom which would necessarily imply the negation of determinism.
In the following, leaving the optimist and the pessimist aside Strawson focuses on an examination of personal reactive attitudes, on what their nature is and in what situations they seem appropriate. He concludes that there may be two different categories in which resentment might be mollified. One holds the agent for responsible just not for a specific act, if one knows that the agent has been in a bad mood lately for some valid reasons, for instance. If the agent, however, happens to be a child or a schizophrenic one doesn‘t hold them accountable since they aren‘t seen as a fully responsible agent.
Furthermore, this has serious implications for the interpersonal relation between one and that person, since one doesn‘t see them anymore as an adequate candidate.
Strawson goes on by addressing not only personal reactive attitudes but also those which are more general or vicarious. However, the argument in general stays the same.
The question, if such personal reactive attitudes are even just is completely senseless. It would not be possible to put them down while maintaining a view of a given person as a candidate for interpersonal relation and if one puts down one‘s usual personal reactive attitudes that‘s certainly not true because of the truth of determinism but because of certain circumstances which make as assume that given person his not fully conscious of his misbehavior.
Among those accepting that premise, on the one hand, and being concerned with moral philosophy, on the other hand, there have been two different positions regarding free will. There are those (optimists in Strawson‘s paper) who assume a compatibility of determinism and freedom. Moreover, there are those (pessimists) claiming there can‘t be determinism and freedom and since determinism is, it follows that freedom is not.
However, the possibility of free will not being existent raises serous issues on the justness of moral punishment, if one doesn‘t intend to justify it merely in terms of efficiency.
This paper is about this problem. At first, Strawson tries to reconstruct the different arguments of the optimists and the pessimists. The pessimist might argue that there needs to be freedom in order to hold people accountable for what they do. As a reply the optimist may say that this is certainly true and freedom also exists in a sense that just means the absence of certain reasons which would justify the behavior of the agent. Nevertheless, the pessimist might not be content with that answer and claims that this is not the kind of freedom he meant. He is searching for a positive freedom which would necessarily imply the negation of determinism.
In the following, leaving the optimist and the pessimist aside Strawson focuses on an examination of personal reactive attitudes, on what their nature is and in what situations they seem appropriate. He concludes that there may be two different categories in which resentment might be mollified. One holds the agent for responsible just not for a specific act, if one knows that the agent has been in a bad mood lately for some valid reasons, for instance. If the agent, however, happens to be a child or a schizophrenic one doesn‘t hold them accountable since they aren‘t seen as a fully responsible agent.
Furthermore, this has serious implications for the interpersonal relation between one and that person, since one doesn‘t see them anymore as an adequate candidate.
Strawson goes on by addressing not only personal reactive attitudes but also those which are more general or vicarious. However, the argument in general stays the same.
The question, if such personal reactive attitudes are even just is completely senseless. It would not be possible to put them down while maintaining a view of a given person as a candidate for interpersonal relation and if one puts down one‘s usual personal reactive attitudes that‘s certainly not true because of the truth of determinism but because of certain circumstances which make as assume that given person his not fully conscious of his misbehavior.
March 14, 2025
【Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays / Frederic Strawson】
Strawson, certainly, was a great logician whose ability was mainly in improving the methodology of analytics, and I should say the famous "Freedom and Resentment" might disappoint you with his verbose but scattered logic.
However, for example, the fourth essay, Causation in Perception (PP73-94) is a great one which deserves more care as a precursor to ethics in technology. It both disentangles the hallucinations of people (for example, Macbeth) and technological visual aids (like X-ray) without contradicting the positivist discourse. The fifth, Perception and Identification (PP95-118) is even harder to read than "Freedom and Resentment," but worth reading when you consider the difference between "aesthetic perception" and "identification" (despite not showing a solid conclusion).
The seventh, "Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigation'" lets us take a glimpse at why he wrote these papers in an almost illegible way. This monograph is enough to show us he did not expect to find his own conclusions from the beginning - he may get something about Wittgenstein, Ryle or philosophy in general, but it wasn't even necessary for him. He spends words ten times more than other analytics - like Ayer, for example, but that would be what a positivist has to do after the studies of Popper and Wittgenstein (from opposite angles).
--One of the marks, though not a necessary mark, of a really great philosopher is to make a really great mistake (P186). I don't think he really made one, but I think that he was highly eligible.
Strawson, certainly, was a great logician whose ability was mainly in improving the methodology of analytics, and I should say the famous "Freedom and Resentment" might disappoint you with his verbose but scattered logic.
However, for example, the fourth essay, Causation in Perception (PP73-94) is a great one which deserves more care as a precursor to ethics in technology. It both disentangles the hallucinations of people (for example, Macbeth) and technological visual aids (like X-ray) without contradicting the positivist discourse. The fifth, Perception and Identification (PP95-118) is even harder to read than "Freedom and Resentment," but worth reading when you consider the difference between "aesthetic perception" and "identification" (despite not showing a solid conclusion).
The seventh, "Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigation'" lets us take a glimpse at why he wrote these papers in an almost illegible way. This monograph is enough to show us he did not expect to find his own conclusions from the beginning - he may get something about Wittgenstein, Ryle or philosophy in general, but it wasn't even necessary for him. He spends words ten times more than other analytics - like Ayer, for example, but that would be what a positivist has to do after the studies of Popper and Wittgenstein (from opposite angles).
--One of the marks, though not a necessary mark, of a really great philosopher is to make a really great mistake (P186). I don't think he really made one, but I think that he was highly eligible.
August 3, 2024
freedom and resentment was great! social morality and the individual ideal was ok. the rest of the essays were just so slow and niche. PF strawson likes to stake out speculative ground that ends up both being flimsily supported and not particularly well demarcated. this works fine for a concrete subject like whether we might feel resentment in response to injustice. but for topics like social morality, or perception, or language, his style comes off kinda wishy-washy and dispassionate. nevertheless, a good exercise in patience and careful reading.
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October 6, 2014Just read the titular essay.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews