Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs: Are Animals Conscious?

by Michael Tye

A consideration of some of the most common questions about animal minds.

Do birds have feelings? Can fish feel pain? Could a honeybee be anxious? For centuries, the question of whether or not animals are conscious like humans has prompted debates among philosophers and scientists. While most people gladly accept that complex mammals - such as dogs - share emotions and experiences with us, the matter of simpler creatures is much less clear. Meanwhile, the advent of the digital age and artificial intelligence has created an added dimension to questions about non-human consciousness.

In Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs , Michael Tye offers answers to some of today's most pressing questions about nonhuman consciousness. Blending the latest research about animal sensation with theories about the nature of consciousness, Tye develops a methodology for addressing the mysteries of the animal mind. Without endorsing any specific theory on the nature of consciousness, Tye tackles issues such as the animal experience of pain and fear, and the role of brain anatomy in determining consciousness. He then turns his attention to the artificial realm, considering whether complex robots could ever be considered conscious. Tye concludes with a discussion of how, if we consider animals conscious, this might impact our ethical obligations to them.

From insects to crabs, fish to birds, Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs offers an insightful exploration of the ways in which animals relate to the world. Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs will appeal to students and scholars of philosophy and neuroscience, as well as general readers with an interest in animal and environmental ethics.

Genres: Animals, Philosophy, Nonfiction, Biology, Vegan, Ecology, Nature

256 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2016

Reviews

[Daniel · Rating 3 out of 5]

Fascinating information about the emotional capabilities of non-human animals but the logic of the seemed to go off the rails a bit. Which is surprising coming from an actual philosopher, but seriously, labeling certain things as being preferable to others without giving a reason? What's up with that?

[Emma · Rating 4 out of 5]

I need to re-read this when I'm smarter. A lot of it went over my head at this time (mainly philosophical ideas of consciousness, which I found hard to parse). Noting as read-but-not-entirely-grasped.

[Lana · Rating 3 out of 5]

-interesting but highly repetitive
-some questionable arguments

[Christian Emilsson · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting concepts throguhout, although the last chapter seem to desperately try to justify a dominant view on the basis on intuition rather than rationale.

[Dayton Martindale · Rating 4 out of 5]

Most of it was very interesting! Hadn't read anything this academic in a while, it was fun. Basically the central question to Tye is not whether we can *prove* nonhuman consciousness, but whether based on similar behavior and underlying neural structures we can decide whether it's *preferable to believe* animals are conscious (i.e., undergo subjective experiences) to the view that they aren't. I'd say he's a little to reliant on assumptions about what consciousness is for, and occasionally appears to give undue agency to Mother Nature (I think he means it metaphorically, but it's odd), but overall his arguments are convincing (and fascinating--I learned some stuff about animal nervous systems).

He defends consciousness in all vertebrates, most fish and at least some invertebrates, including the eponymous bees and crabs. (Or at least, defends that it is preferable to believe that they are conscious than they are not, though with declining confidence further along the phylogentic tree.) He also briefly explores the ethical implications of animal consciousness, but relies way too much on what I'd call speciesist intuitions—a lot of frustrating holes in the last section.