On Genetic Interests: Family, Ethnicity and Humanity in an Age of Mass Migration

by Frank K. Salter

From an evolutionary perspective, individuals have a vital interest in the reproduction of their genes. Yet this interest is overlooked by social and political theory at a time when we need to steer an adaptive course through the unnatural modern world of uneven population growth and decline, global mobility, and loss of family and communal ties. In modern Darwinian theory, bearing children is only one way to reproduce. Since we share genes with our families, ethnic groups, and the species as a whole, ethnocentrism and humanism can be adaptive. They can also be hazardous when taken to extremes. On Genetic Interests canvasses strategies and ethics for conserving our genetic interests in an environmentally sustainable manner sensitive to the interests of others.

Genres: Science, Biology, Politics, Nonfiction, Genetics, Evolution, Race

388 pages, Paperback

First published December 3, 2003

About the author

Frank Kemp Salter is an Australian academic and researcher at the former Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Physiology, Andechs, Germany, best known for his writings on ethnicity and ethnic interests. He is a political ethologist, studying political phenomena using the methods and theories of behavioral biology in addition to conventional methods. Those phenomena include hierarchy (Emotions in Command, 1995), indoctrination (Ethnic Conflict and Indoctrination, 1998, edited with I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt), ethnic altruism and conflict (Welfare, Ethnicity and Altruism, 2002, Risky Transactions: Trust, Kinship and Ethnicity, 2004 ), and genetic interests (On Genetic Interests: Family, Ethnicity, and Humanity in an Age of Mass Migration, 2003).

Reviews

[A · Rating 5 out of 5]

A game changer for any sort of evolution-informed morality. Has completely flipped my perspective on family life, having children, the pursuit of "knowledge" (vs. spending time raising a family), etc. Christians are smarter than the media says they are (they have not been brainwashed into destroying their genetic interests).

[Vagabond of Letters, DLitt · Rating 5 out of 5]

10/10. One of the most important books for all people to read of the American era. Conclusively defeats multiculturalism in all forms.

[David · Rating 5 out of 5]

“Is the reduction of an individual’s or group’s genes necessarily a moral issue?” (p. 313)

This book is dry, long, and often obtuse, but something about this question fascinated me enough to read the book from cover to cover. Each human has a unique, irreplaceable genetic fingerprint that defines who they are in ways that we do not yet fully grasp. We instinctively revolt against the loss of human life partly because of this unique and irreplaceable nature. Thus, the extinction of an individual is certainly a moral issue. But if groups of individuals are also identifiable by an irreplaceable genetic fingerprint, does the extinction of such a group also become a moral issue?

One might argue that in the absence of a motivation to aggress, as is the case in all those animal and plant species that lack consciousness, genetic replacement presents no moral problem. And since humans generally are not aware of genetic interests, perhaps there is nothing immoral about one person or group’s genes replacing others’. Morality would only become involved if the process of gene replacement entailed aggressive motives or fear or perceived loss on the part of the losers, and it would be these motives and fears that would raise moral issues, not the genetic effects. This argument leaves considerable room for ethical considerations since gene replacement is often achieved by aggressive acts motivated by intention to harm or callousness towards victims, including violent conquest, territorial displacement, and deception. Even if genetic conquest is unaccompanied by aggressive intent, an ethical issue still arises if the conquered suffer physically or emotionally in the process. Also, it is not true that humans are completely unaware of genetic interests. As noted in Chapter 6, all societies have cultural substitutes, often kin metaphors that serve emotionally to tag family, clan, and ethny. As knowledge of genetic interest spreads there will be fewer excuses for aggressing against those interests and perhaps greater resistance by victims, making the process of genetic replacement ever more ethically problematic. Furthermore, it is not absolutely clear that morality resides only in motives, since ethics can involve evaluating situations as well as apportioning blame. An observer might not blame a winning group for replacing another group’s genes, but still consider the fact of replacement morally objectionable and thus something to prevent or reverse if possible. (p. 313)

Consider the extinction of the Neanderthal. They lived and moved and had their being at some point in the distant past, but they are extinct now. They were assimilated into the modern human population, leaving small traces of their genetic signature in most of the world's non-African populations. The Denisovans met a similar fate, leaving their genetic remains principally in the bloodlines of East Asian populations. Was the assimilation of these archaic humans into the modern population “immoral”? Was it even “sad”?

The rapid advance of global trade, communication, and travel have accelerated the homogenization of humanity by assimilating minority groups into larger populations at an unprecedented rate.

If the non-white minority continues to grow at the high end of its 2-4 percent annual growth rate reported since 1950, whites will be in the minority in the British Isles by 2100. On current trends, whites will be in the minority in London by 2010. The Dutch port city of Rotterdam has a population of 540,000 people, 45 percent not of Dutch descent. If present trends continue the Hague will be minority Dutch by 2020 and Israelis of Jewish descent will become a minority in Israel by about 2030 due to higher Arab fertility and immigration in the family reunion category. ("Immigration and Ethnic Genetic Interests", p. 61)

The accelerated assimilation of minorities can be compared to the accelerated rate of extinction among non-human species. We can all intuitively appreciate the value of preserving diversity among animals and plants. Salter makes the argument that preserving the diversity of humans is also important, and he does so principally on the basis of the "family analogy":

The family analogy again helps clarify the issue. Recall from Chapters 2, 3, and 5 that an ethny is usually a large store of genetic interest homologous to that residing in families, though often at a lower concentration. Both groups are large stores of genetic interest for their members. Genetically, directing members’ loyalty away from their ethnies is equivalent to directing parents’ loyalties away from their children. … Sentimental interests are also damaged since such acts tend to break or prevent the formation of meaningful prosocial relationships. The contemporary intellectual emphasis on the evils produced by ethnic sentiment should not blind us to the positive role of ethnicity in providing a sense of belonging, social cohesion, and continuity. Whether ultimate or proximate interests are considered, turning individuals away from their ethnies is aggressive in effect, and if done with knowledge of genetic or sentimental interests, also in intent. It would seem to be immoral on that basis. (p. 305)

The foundational principle of this book is that if we feel there is something immoral about dissolving the bonds of loyalty and love between a parent and child, then we ought also to feel there is something immoral about dissolving these bonds between members of an ethnic group. This principle is based on something Salter calls, “genetic interest”:

The number of copies of an individual’s distinctive genes. These are most concentrated in the individual, then in first degree relatives, thence in decreasing concentration to clan, tribe or ethny, geographic race, and species. In terms of population genetics, genetic interest can be quantified as aggregate kinship, as an equivalent number of children or other close kin. (p. 339 - 340)

The term "distinctive genes" means "distinctive gene frequencies" or "distinctive allele frequencies." (p. 13). Genetic interest gives rise to the related ideas of “ethny”, “population”, and last, but not least, “race”.

Ethny
"The term ‘ethny’ used in this book usually means, ‘a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of common culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity among at least some of its members’. [Ethnicity by Hutchinson and Smith, 1996, Oxford University Press, p. 6] However, it sometimes has a more general meaning, and thus corresponds most closely to the biological concept of the population." (p. 338)

Population
"A set of organisms of the same species living in or recently migrated from a defined territory, for example one bounded by natural features of rivers, mountains and seas and, in the case of humans, by cultural and political boundaries. Interbreeding is or has been freer within a population than between it and adjacent populations. While all ethnies are or were recently populations, not all populations are ethnies." (p. 343 - 344)

Race
"Two populations constitute different races when they are sufficiently genetically distinct from one another that they are physically distinct - especially on inspection of external characteristics such as colour, hair form, and physiognomy. Since such differences are most visible in populations resident for millennia on different continents, the race concept is usually tied to a continental name, such as ‘African’, ‘East Asian’, ‘Australian’, etc." (p. 344)

These terms are basically different ways to describe "relatedness". All humans are, of course, "related" to some degree, just as we are "related" to mammals, multi-cellular organisms, carbon-based life-forms, and anything composed of matter and energy. You would probably think it odd, however, if I sacrificed my life for the sake of my front doormat, even if it were woven from the fabric of a fellow carbon-based life-form. By contrast, it would be plainly heroic of me to make a similar sacrifice on behalf of a small child. Why? In part, because the child is more closely related to me than the doormat. This is why quantifying "relatedness" is crucial to understanding whether or not human relatedness “matters”. With this in mind, Salter devotes considerable space to precisely quantifying the degrees of human “relatedness”.

The small groups that left Africa to colonize the world were almost certainly bands comprised of closely related individuals, and thus genetically differentiated to some degree from the remainder of the species. According to theory expounded by Cavalli-Sforza himself, genetic drift within these small bands would have rapidly increased the genetic difference between and the kinship within them. That is without factoring in selective force of changed environment. Consistent with this time scale, E. O. Wilson has argued that microevolution of human populations can occur within 1000 years, major adaptations taking perhaps 2000 years, and speciation 40,000 years. ("Concentrations of Kinship", p. 48)

It is uncontroversial that individuals' distinctive genes are concentrated within their families. The proportion of shared genes, denoted by r (for relatedness) in Hamilton's original formulation, declines by 50% for each generational step. An individual shares half his or her genes with each offspring, a quarter with each grandchild, an eighth with first cousins, and so on. The formula for calculating r between two individuals is simply half raised to the power of the number of generational steps n separating them. ("Concentrations of Kinship", p. 38).

Hamilton developed inclusive fitness theory using the coefficient of relatedness r, being the proportion of genes identical by descent shared by two individuals. [The genetic evolution of social behavior, parts 1 and 2. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7, 1-51] Subsequently quantitative genetic theorists replaced r with the coefficient of kinship f because of the latter’s greater precision. (p. 344)

The coefficient of kinship between two diploid organisms describes their overall genetic similarity to each other relative to some base population. For example, kinship between parent and offspring of 1/4 describes gene sharing in excess of random sharing in a random mating population. In a subdivided population the statistic Fst describes gene sharing within subdivisions in the same way. Since Fst among human populations on a world scale is reliably 10 to 15 percent, kinship between two individuals of the same human population is equivalent to kinships between grandparent and grandchild or between half siblings. (p. 327)

Here is the definition of kinship between person x and person y: pick a random gene at a locus from x and let the population frequency of this gene by p. Now pick a gene from the same focus from y. The probability that the gene in y is the same as the gene picked from x, Py is Py = Fxy + (1 - Fxy)p … For example, pick a gene from me, then pick another gene from the same locus from me. With probability 1/2 we picked the same gene, while with probability 1/2 we picked the other gene at that locus. Therefore the probability that the second gene is the same as the first is just 1/2 + p/2, and substitution of this conditional frequency in the formula for kinship shows that my kinship with myself is just 1/2. The same reasoning leads to the well known values of 1/4 with my child, 1/8 with my grandchild, my half-sib, or my nephew, and so on. (p. 328)

Many studies agree that Fst in world samples of human populations is between ten and fifteen percent. If small long-isolated populations are included, the figure is usually somewhat higher. A conservative general figure for our species is Fst ~ 0.125 = 1/8. This number was given by Cavalli-Sforza in 1966, and a widely cited paper by Lewontin (1972) argued at length that this is a small number, implying that human population differences are trivial. An alternative perspective is that kinship between grandparent and grandchild, equivalent to kinship within human populations, is not so trivial. (p. 330)

Now we can restate the original question in a more precise way: is the 10 to 15 percent of kinship shared within the geographically-defined human populations of the world “trivial” or not? For answer, Salter returns to the family analogy: “…kinship found within ethnies is homologous with that found within families. Are we to believe that parents do not have a vital, fundamental, or ultimate interest in their children?” (p. 13).

The plausibility of the analogy between duty to family and tribe is greatly strengthened by the fact that tribal duty has been the norm throughout human history and prehistory. Only those who accept a secular doctrine of original sin could contemplate the notion that humans have been evil for all of their existence and have only become pure in the last decades in a few benighted countries. It is more rational to assume that the absence of ethnic duty is a bold experiment, possibly an immoral one. (p. 303)

Perhaps the family analogy can be taken further. It is parents’ duty to care for their children. Do we have a similar duty to nurture our ethnies? Such a duty would imply that it is morally right to defend one’s ethny. It would also mean that fellow ethnics could be held accountable for their actions towards the ethnic family, similarly to family members being considered to have acted improperly when they failed to aid kin. The logic for asserting both family and ethnic duties is the same, and derives from the nature of genetic interests. An individual who fails to help a family member in time of need or who directs scarce resources towards nonkin harms the jointly-held genetic interests of the whole family. The same is true with ethnies. (p. 302)

While utopian socialists such as the early Bolsheviks and the Israeli kibbutz movement have tried to abolish the nuclear family and the parental favoritism it involves, attempts to redirect parental investment to nonkin have usually given way to popular demand; parental favoritism remains almost universally accepted. This inevitably contributes to inequality among children but nevertheless the parental bond is so strong that this primary form of discrimination is considered morally unexceptional. (p. 301)

The foregoing shows, if nothing else, that Salter provides a cogent, quantifiable, and research-based argument in defense of ethnic loyalty and cohesion during an era of genetic replacement and assimilation on a global scale.

[Emil O. W. Kirkegaard · Rating 5 out of 5]

Based and redpilled.

[E. E. E. · Rating 5 out of 5]

The logic of biology.

[Илья Дескулин · Rating 2 out of 5]

The book is worth reading because it provides an original theory and political program. What makes Salter's academic effort a failure, however, is that his premises are either incorrect, or at least dubious. At times Salter admits these facts but fails to pit them against his general theory. Here are some of them:

1. People are not rational calculators of genetic interests based on relatedness to and size of their co-ethnics. The kind of Salter's ethnic communism has to be ORGANIZED.
2. Extreme altruism towards your co-ethnics will pay off only in case of TOTAL war between two distinct populations. Multicultural competition for resources and status in a liberal state is a conflict of much less intensity, so it might still be more adaptive to invest in your closer kin.
3. While nation states are somewhat similar to tribes, a conflict over territory and resources is not so intensive because we are post-Malthusian now. So, the negative ethnocentric traits of tribal societies might have not been selected for.
4. Immigration of distant foreigners makes you comparatively more related to your co-ethnics. However, at the same time it makes your close kin EVEN MORE RELATED to you. Hence, extreme altruism for your ethnic group resisting immigration becomes much less adaptive than Salter claims.

Also, I doubt that mixed-race kids are SIGNIFICANTLY less related to their parents due to exogamy. Do we have any evidence that these kids are treated worse than, for example, Black kids?

I might revise this review again. I feel that Salter also simplifies and at time misunderstands the mechanism of selection for altruism. It might have been done on purpose in order to promote his political agenda. It's a pity that Salter's theory has not been properly challenged either from the HBD-dissidents, or liberal mainstream.