What do you think?
Rate this book
The Field Marshal's Revenge: The Breakdown of a Special Relationship
This is an incisive exploration of the "special relationship" between Britain and the United States told from the perspective of the volatile, often fraught, alliance during World War Two. The spotlight falls on Monty and Ike, then takes in the ordinary "squaddie" who becomes a pawn in the game, and finally Montgomery's unsuccessful attempt to assert Britain's superiority in the closing months of the war. Charles Whiting, author of the Spellmount Siegfried Line series, is one of the UK's most prolific military writers, and approaches his subject with his characteristic authority and insight.
- GenresHistoryWorld War II
200 pages, Hardcover
First published July 1, 2004
About the author
Charles Whiting
279 books56 followersCharles Whiting was a British writer and military historian and with some 350 books of fiction and non-fiction to his credit, under his own name and a variety of pseudonyms including Ian Harding, Duncan Harding, K.N. Kostov, John Kerrigan, Klaus Konrad, and Leo Kessler.
Born in the Bootham area of York, England, he was a pupil at the prestigious Nunthorpe Grammar School, leaving at the age of 16 to join the British Army by lying about his age. Keen to be in on the wartime action, Whiting was attached to the 52nd Reconnaissance Regiment and by the age of 18 saw duty as a sergeant in France, Holland, Belgium and Germany in the latter stages of World War II. While still a soldier, he observed conflicts between the highest-ranking British and American generals which he would write about extensively in later years.
After the war, he stayed on in Germany completing his A-levels via correspondence course and teaching English before being enrolled at Leeds University reading History and German Language. As an undergraduate he was afforded opportunities for study at several European universities and, after gaining his degree, would go on to become an assistant professor of history. Elsewhere, Whiting held a variety of jobs which included working as a translator for a German chemical factory and spells as a publicist, a correspondent for The Times and feature writer for such diverse magazines as International Review of Linguistics, Soldier and Playboy.
His first novel was written while still an undergraduate, was published in 1954 and by 1958 had been followed by three wartime thrillers. Between 1960 and 2007 Charles went on to write over 350 titles, including 70 non-fiction titles covering varied topics from the Nazi intelligence service to British Regiments during World War II.
One of his publishers, Easingwold-based Rupert Smith of GH Smith & Son said he was a quiet man and prolific writer.
"He's one of a band of forgotten authors because he sold millions of copies and still, up to his death was doing publishing deals.He was the kind of man who was very self-effacing, one of Britain's forgotten authors, still working at 80 years of age, with his nose down and kicking out books."
Charles Henry Whiting, author and military historian died on July 24 2007, leaving his wife and son.
Born in the Bootham area of York, England, he was a pupil at the prestigious Nunthorpe Grammar School, leaving at the age of 16 to join the British Army by lying about his age. Keen to be in on the wartime action, Whiting was attached to the 52nd Reconnaissance Regiment and by the age of 18 saw duty as a sergeant in France, Holland, Belgium and Germany in the latter stages of World War II. While still a soldier, he observed conflicts between the highest-ranking British and American generals which he would write about extensively in later years.
After the war, he stayed on in Germany completing his A-levels via correspondence course and teaching English before being enrolled at Leeds University reading History and German Language. As an undergraduate he was afforded opportunities for study at several European universities and, after gaining his degree, would go on to become an assistant professor of history. Elsewhere, Whiting held a variety of jobs which included working as a translator for a German chemical factory and spells as a publicist, a correspondent for The Times and feature writer for such diverse magazines as International Review of Linguistics, Soldier and Playboy.
His first novel was written while still an undergraduate, was published in 1954 and by 1958 had been followed by three wartime thrillers. Between 1960 and 2007 Charles went on to write over 350 titles, including 70 non-fiction titles covering varied topics from the Nazi intelligence service to British Regiments during World War II.
One of his publishers, Easingwold-based Rupert Smith of GH Smith & Son said he was a quiet man and prolific writer.
"He's one of a band of forgotten authors because he sold millions of copies and still, up to his death was doing publishing deals.He was the kind of man who was very self-effacing, one of Britain's forgotten authors, still working at 80 years of age, with his nose down and kicking out books."
Charles Henry Whiting, author and military historian died on July 24 2007, leaving his wife and son.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 1 of 1 review
February 15, 2015
Hmmm, where to start with this. By an large this book fails on so many different levels. It doesn't really deliver on the premise of Field Marshal Montgomery getting revenge, it has a tendency to fly off in a number of different directions seeming to try and prove that the Anti-British attitude that Bradley developed was one of the major causes of the loss of the 'Special Relationship' between the British and Americans. Although at other times he is laying that at the feet of Roosevelt.
With these different themes and the fact that the author has a tendency to write about small units in greater detail than is truly needed for what is put forward as the main point of the book, it seems to spin off in too many directions to keep what Monty is getting revenge for, or how he is achieving this revenge in any real sense. He main focus seems to be more about how the American's ruined the Special Relationship, by becoming anti-British, showing this through the prism that makes it almost entirely the fault of the American's. A development he seems to put into Bradley's responsibility, saying that Bradley developed this anti-British feeling while commanding II Corps in the Tunisian campaign. Which may have been a start to it, but that would lay the anti-British feeling that was developed in Bradley's HQ at the feet of Alexander who attempted to push the American's out of the final battles in Tunisia and it would also overlooks how livid Bradley was over Monty taking over a road that had been assigned to II Corps in Sicily, which the author does. He also shows the progression of this anti-British feelings that Bradley developed as going from II Corps, to 3rd Army and then to 12th US Army Group. An odd progression if Bradley was the root. Since Bradley went from II Corps, to 1st US Army and then 12th US Army Group.
The book is full of any number of ad hominim attacks directed at US officer, some of them with foundation and some less so. For example he points out Ike's relationship with Kay Summersby, although he makes it a sexual relationship without getting into the fact that it may or may not have been and it also seems to have made it so Ike could perform his duties better. The one that is on a less secure footing is when he points to Bradley as being a larger prima donna than Montgomery. I am not sure that anyone outside of Patton could have filled that bill in the ETO on the American side and maybe not even then.
Another way he tries to degenerate the US contribution to winning the battle of the Bulge is by comparing Monty and Patton moving troops to the field. He goes out of his way to point out that Monty moved the same number of divisions as Patton with no plan to the point of the Meuse river to protect the river crossings fast than Patton moved a Corps to Bastogne to help relieve the city. Of course his effort in this regards is somewhat defeated as he makes it clear that the units Monty was moving were in reserve, no real effort was made to supply them in the move and the only real direction they got was in regards to where to go and to stop the Germans. Compared to Patton, pulling troops out of the line, some actively engaged with the enemy and throwing them into another fight at the end of the move it doesn't quite have the same impact on the mind.
Lastly there is the 'Revenge' part of the book. Which seems to have been nothing more than Monty's speech at the Media get together where he explains how he won the Battle with the brave assistance of the poor US GI. But in covering the aftermath of that event it seems that if that was his revenge it was mostly revenge on himself. Since the aftermath was that he had finally pushed Ike to ignore him. It might be that it was meant to be revenge on the US Army for ignoring his demand for a full blooded narrow thrust into the heart of Germany under his command, but if so than he missed the mark by a full country mile. Whiting is a big proponent of the single thrust over the broad front, although he doesn't seem to realize that at the time Monty proposed the single thrust that would have left about seven Allied Divisions to cover the entire front that Monty was thrusting down. It also overlooks the object lesson of the two narrow thrust campaigns that are mentioned in the book. A narrow thrust runs the risk of being cut off and destroyed in detail by a foe that is allowed to have an operational reserve. Market-Garden was a good example of this, even if it didn't have the numbers that Monty wanted, he could have done more to put larger numbers into play or stress the need for following up and moving faster, neither seemed to be a high priority during the battle. The Battle of the Bulge, the Germans did have the numbers that Monty wanted for his Single Thrust Campaign and was seen early on the holding of the shoulders both North and South, the frustration of the inability to quickly seize either Bastogne or St. Vith, neither action of which had much to do with Monty in the early stages, caused everything on the German side to be thrown off track. To expect the Germans who had developed into the Masters of Ad Hoc defensive actions to have been able to do less is, in short, criminally optimistic.
As a book, it lacks from the lack of cohesion in telling the main thrust of the authors chosen subject and in not backing up some of his more declarative statements with supporting facts. A major disappointment in a learning sense although somewhat amusing in other regards.
With these different themes and the fact that the author has a tendency to write about small units in greater detail than is truly needed for what is put forward as the main point of the book, it seems to spin off in too many directions to keep what Monty is getting revenge for, or how he is achieving this revenge in any real sense. He main focus seems to be more about how the American's ruined the Special Relationship, by becoming anti-British, showing this through the prism that makes it almost entirely the fault of the American's. A development he seems to put into Bradley's responsibility, saying that Bradley developed this anti-British feeling while commanding II Corps in the Tunisian campaign. Which may have been a start to it, but that would lay the anti-British feeling that was developed in Bradley's HQ at the feet of Alexander who attempted to push the American's out of the final battles in Tunisia and it would also overlooks how livid Bradley was over Monty taking over a road that had been assigned to II Corps in Sicily, which the author does. He also shows the progression of this anti-British feelings that Bradley developed as going from II Corps, to 3rd Army and then to 12th US Army Group. An odd progression if Bradley was the root. Since Bradley went from II Corps, to 1st US Army and then 12th US Army Group.
The book is full of any number of ad hominim attacks directed at US officer, some of them with foundation and some less so. For example he points out Ike's relationship with Kay Summersby, although he makes it a sexual relationship without getting into the fact that it may or may not have been and it also seems to have made it so Ike could perform his duties better. The one that is on a less secure footing is when he points to Bradley as being a larger prima donna than Montgomery. I am not sure that anyone outside of Patton could have filled that bill in the ETO on the American side and maybe not even then.
Another way he tries to degenerate the US contribution to winning the battle of the Bulge is by comparing Monty and Patton moving troops to the field. He goes out of his way to point out that Monty moved the same number of divisions as Patton with no plan to the point of the Meuse river to protect the river crossings fast than Patton moved a Corps to Bastogne to help relieve the city. Of course his effort in this regards is somewhat defeated as he makes it clear that the units Monty was moving were in reserve, no real effort was made to supply them in the move and the only real direction they got was in regards to where to go and to stop the Germans. Compared to Patton, pulling troops out of the line, some actively engaged with the enemy and throwing them into another fight at the end of the move it doesn't quite have the same impact on the mind.
Lastly there is the 'Revenge' part of the book. Which seems to have been nothing more than Monty's speech at the Media get together where he explains how he won the Battle with the brave assistance of the poor US GI. But in covering the aftermath of that event it seems that if that was his revenge it was mostly revenge on himself. Since the aftermath was that he had finally pushed Ike to ignore him. It might be that it was meant to be revenge on the US Army for ignoring his demand for a full blooded narrow thrust into the heart of Germany under his command, but if so than he missed the mark by a full country mile. Whiting is a big proponent of the single thrust over the broad front, although he doesn't seem to realize that at the time Monty proposed the single thrust that would have left about seven Allied Divisions to cover the entire front that Monty was thrusting down. It also overlooks the object lesson of the two narrow thrust campaigns that are mentioned in the book. A narrow thrust runs the risk of being cut off and destroyed in detail by a foe that is allowed to have an operational reserve. Market-Garden was a good example of this, even if it didn't have the numbers that Monty wanted, he could have done more to put larger numbers into play or stress the need for following up and moving faster, neither seemed to be a high priority during the battle. The Battle of the Bulge, the Germans did have the numbers that Monty wanted for his Single Thrust Campaign and was seen early on the holding of the shoulders both North and South, the frustration of the inability to quickly seize either Bastogne or St. Vith, neither action of which had much to do with Monty in the early stages, caused everything on the German side to be thrown off track. To expect the Germans who had developed into the Masters of Ad Hoc defensive actions to have been able to do less is, in short, criminally optimistic.
As a book, it lacks from the lack of cohesion in telling the main thrust of the authors chosen subject and in not backing up some of his more declarative statements with supporting facts. A major disappointment in a learning sense although somewhat amusing in other regards.
Displaying 1 - 1 of 1 review