"Dennis Kux's book possesses a wealth of new information, based partly on fresh research in published and archival sources, but based even more impressively on the more than 100 personal interviews he conducted with former diplomats and defense officials in both the United States and Pakistan."--Robert J. McMahon, University of Florida "Kux's study is, to my knowledge, the first full-dress, comprehensive, and authoritative study of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Focused primarily on formal diplomacy between these two countries, it systematically chronicles the major events, deftly handles the primary issues, and sympathetically considers the key political and diplomatic figures on both sides."--Robert Wirsing, University of South Carolina U.S.-Pakistan relations have been extraordinarily volatile, largely a function of the twists and turns of the Cold War. An intimate partnership prevailed in the Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan years, and friction during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter presidencies. Since the Cold War ended, the partnership has shriveled. The blunt talking to delivered by President Clinton to Pakistan's military dictator during Clinton's March 25, 2000, stopover in Pakistan highlighted U.S.-Pakistani differences. But the Clinton visit also underscored important U.S. interests in Pakistan. The first comprehensive account of this roller coaster relationship, this book is a companion volume to Kux's Estranged Democracies, recently called "the definitive history of Pakistani-American relations" in the New York Times.
It is an authoritative text on the relationship between the US and Pakistan through five decades. I have not seen a better book on this topic till date.
An insightful history of US-Pakistani relations from 1947 to 2000, mostly from the US perspective. Kux concludes that the US “wishes Pakistan well but similarly perceives few compelling positive interests.”
Kux emphasizes the unpredictability of the relationship and how it is often affected more by events than by any shared long-term interests. The most well-known instances are the jihad against the Soviets and the aftermath of 9/11. In the 1980s Pakistan received billions in aid, support for its dictatorship, and Washington’s silence about Pakistan’s secret nuclear program. As soon as the Soviets left, the US imposed sanctions and cut aid even though it knew about the program before.
Much of Kux’s narrative deals with these shifts in policy. He describes how the Pakistanis valued a relationship with the US when the nation came into being, only for Truman to tilt towards India, and for diplomats’ recommendations to back Pakistan were frequently overruled in Washington. The Eisenhower administration saw a tilt towards Pakistan, while Democratic successors preferred India, and another tilt to Pakistan came under Nixon and, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, under Carter and Reagan. Kux argues that the instability of America’s involvement in the region is unproductive, and that the differing scale of America’s and Pakistan’s goals will have to be resolved.