For nearly two hundred years huge wooden warships called “ships of the line” dominated war at sea and were thus instrumental in the European struggle for power and the spread of imperialism. Foremost among the great naval powers were Great Britain and France, whose advanced economies could support large numbers of these expensive ships. This book, the first joint history of these great navies, offers a uniquely impartial and comprehensive picture of the two forces—their shipbuilding programs, naval campaigns, and battles, and their wartime strategies and diplomacy. Jonathan R. Dull is the author of two award-winning histories of the French navy. Bringing to bear years of study of war and diplomacy, his book conveys the fine details and the high drama of the age of grand and decisive naval conflict. Dull delves into the seven wars that Great Britain and France, often in alliance with lesser naval powers such as Spain and the Netherlands, fought between 1688 and 1815. Viewing war as most statesmen of the time saw it—as a contest of endurance—he also treats the tragic side of the Franco-British wars, which shattered the greater security and prosperity the two powers enjoyed during their brief period as allies.
This book is an example of what happens when an author tries to accomplish too much in a small format , only 177 pages ). The technical description and evolution of the ships of the line is briefly and superficially covered. The focus of the author is the description of the international situation of the period. This was an era of turbulence with numerous succession wars and a couple of revolutions occuring. Alliances were made and undone according to the needs of the moment. Ironically the French navy hit its peak during the American War of Independance providing the rebels with critical military support and effectively neutralizing the British navy . Ironic because it was the only time when that superiority occured and because a monarchy helped establish a republic by supporting a rebellion against another monarchy. This contradiction caught up with the French regime when la révolution française struck a few years later in 1789. Because of the rapid sequence of events it is sometimes confusing for the reader to follow all the events occuring at a very fast pace with no real in-depth analysis. One thing of note, we are reminded that many naval confrontations at sea were not always the most imminent danger in those days: health issues could render a whole fleet unable to accomplish its mission. When you have 600 men working closely within the confines of a wooden sailing ship of the line sicknesses could strike and decimate the crew and render the ship unable to manoeuver and fight. It occured quite frequently in those days. We are reminded that we live in an era where a pandemic is a lot more newsworthy.
I was expecting a book more on a topic of studying the two fleets in the title instead it was a magnificent survey of the political pressures faced by both fleets. The downside is the fleets the evolution of the ships, the economic of the ships etc are either in the background to the political history or non existent. The time period makes more sense to me and opened my eyes to the British declaring war on the Dutch during the American Revolution but I was left wanting more on the ships and ho the navies were affecting their respective nations. If you want an overview of the politics of 1650-1815 then you are in luck but if wanting a study of a major naval rivalry through naval policy go elsewhere.
Although this volume is billed as a history of the navies in question, much of it reads more as a sketch history of the foreign affairs and conflicts of the two countries, with emphasis on incidents where naval power influenced the outcome. It is an extended argument that ability to maintain a margin of power, through some mixture of economics and alliance, was the determinative factor in naval success.
Because of its brevity, the book at best alludes to factors like the transformation of ship design over the period, or even the divergent goals of France and Britain.
This is the sort of book one might have to read twice. Not because it’s so good, mind you. But because it’s so bad. The author’s name should have been a clue.
That’s a bit exaggerated, because there’s much gold here. The biggest problem is it’s crammed together, then become a 101 mph (163 kph) fastball aimed at your head. Without organization other than chronological. So it’s like reading an encyclopedia.
That’s not to say it’s a bad encyclopedia. It just could have been far better if organized by topic, or if the various wars were more separated, rather than segueing one to the next.
Still, there’s much interesting here: Mr Dull presents a good case that French Admirals were superior to overly-cautious English ones, at least until the war against Napoleon after Pitt returned as Prime Minister. And the author identifies Collingwood, who took command of the Med fleet after Nelson’s death, as even better than his late friend:
“The scale of Collingwood’s responsibilities was enormous, as the cabinet wisely left him great leeway. Fearless, selfless, a peerless ship handler, a superb strategist, a master of diplomacy . . . Collingwood had few equals in the age of sail.”
“[Once the fight was against Napoleon, the] British people finally were willing to fight a war to its conclusion whatever the cost; the wealthy were even willing to pay an income tax.… It approached being the kind of total war that demonstrates the strength of representative government.”
“Perhaps most important in the ultimate British victory…was the way popular support made possible the financing of a European coalition against Napoleon.”
Henry Dundas described war as “a contestation of purse. The British consistently won that contest.”
“Most naval historians [] treated the series of wars between 1688 and 1815 and proof of Britain’s greater skill at war and its superior political and social system. At least implicitly, Britain’s ultimate victory has been treated as proof of its moral superiority.”
But “[h]aving a share in government [through public debt], wealthy Britons were more willing than wealthy Frenchmen to pay taxes.”
Still, “Until the great war with Napoleon, the British taxpayer blinked before the kings of France