Great Britain and the Confederate Navy, 1861-1865

by Frank J. Merli

"A masterful account of Confederate naval strategy and personnel... [and] the response of Britain to the efforts of the Confederacy to acquire a navy in Britain and thus traverse Britain's neutral obligations." --American Historical Review

This book, originally issued in 1970, describes the frustrated, faltering, and sometimes heroic attempts of the Confederacy to circumvent British neutrality and build a navy in Great Britain during the American Civil War. The story possesses many of the elements of good fiction: there are the sharply rendered principal actors; the suspense and narrative excitement of the adventures of the Southern raiders; and the cunning appraisals of diplomatic intrigues, maneuverings, and oversights. This is a readable and illuminating account of the diplomatic maneuverings behind the Confederacy's failed attempt to enlist British aid for the secessionist cause.

Genres: History

342 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1970

Reviews

[John E · Rating 3 out of 5]

Shows the near impossibility of the South getting a favorable position in either Britain or France. Thus the impossibility of buying a navy (the only way the South could get one). A lot of sound and fury for a very few ships for the South that really never threatened the Union Navy nor the outcome of the war.

[Andrew · Rating 5 out of 5]

Merlis study of Confederate naval efforts in Britain and France, and the British, French, and American responses to it is a fascinating history. While not exhaustively long, this book covers the topic with surprising depth, which is no easy task. While giving cursory coverage to the military operations of the Confederate Navy in Europe (largely, escaping British and French ports with cruisers and blockaders), it gives the diplomatic game going on at the time the all-star treatment. The story is populated with engaging characters such as Lords Palmerston and Russell, Confederate agents Maury and Bulloch, and the American minister Charles Francis Adams. The diplomatic, espionage, and counter-espionage work of the aforementioned men and others had huge, far-reaching effects on the course and outcome of the American Civil War.

One of the standout features of Merlis work, is that he does not give in to illusions of Confederate grandeur. While other works also point out the incompetence, mismanagement, and self-delusion that plagued Confederate efforts in Europe, Merli is more honest than most about the likely chances of success or at least making a difference to the war effort, even if they had been more successful. His appraisal of British attitudes and goals is sober and realistic, and he gives a deeper, more condemning estimation of the infamous Laird and Clyde rams.

Overall, this is a great treatment of a Civil War subject that has not received as much attention as many others. There is much of interest to find here, not just for those interested in Civil War history, but British history, international relations, espionage, and legal history. Merli takes this broad sheet of fascinating material and conveys it in a concise, interesting, and entertaining manner.