The Presuppositions of Critical History Bound with Aphorisms: 1874/1930 Editions

by F.H. Bradley

This work combines two early pamphlets by F. H. Bradley (1846 1924), the foremost philosopher of the British Idealist movement. The first essay, published in 1874, deals with the nature of professional history, and foreshadows some of Bradley's later ideas in metaphysics. He argues that history cannot be subjected to scientific scrutiny because it is not directly available to the senses, meaning that all history writing is inevitably subjective. Though not widely discussed at the time of publication, the pamphlet was influential on historian and philosopher R.G. Collingwood. The second pamphlet is Bradley's critique of Henry Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick was the first to propose the paradox of hedonism, which is the idea in ethics that pleasure can only be acquired indirectly. Published in 1877, this work is divided into three parts, treating Sidgwick's definitions, arguments, and his view of ethical science.

Genres: Philosophy, History

99 pages, Paperback

First published February 1, 1996

About the author

Francis Herbert Bradley OM (30 January 1846 – 18 September 1924) was a British idealist philosopher. His most important work was Appearance and Reality (1893).

Reviews

[Steven H · Rating 5 out of 5]

SHOULD HISTORY CONTAIN “TRUE PRECONCEPTIONS CONSISTENTLY DEVELOPED”?

Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924) was a British idealist philosopher. He wrote in the Preface to this 1874 book, “The barbarous title of the following pages anticipates their method, and to some extent their conclusions. Their method consists in taking the existence of certain facts for granted, and in endeavoring to discover the conditions of that existence… critical history must have a criterion, and the next matter was to find that criterion… the canon of history was---the historian… And the historian who is true to the present is the historian as he ought to be. This is the main thought in what follows…”

He explains, “The heading, ‘Presuppositions of Critical History’ expresses briefly the doctrine which is the opposite of the uncritical, and anticipates the result that history without so-called prejudications is a mere delusion, that what does everywhere exist is history founded upon them, and what ought to exist is history with true preconceptions consistently developed throughout the entire field.” (Pg. 87)

He suggests, “History must ever be founded on a presupposition; and the scepticism which saw in the succession of historical writings a series of fictions, where the present was transported into the bygone age, was thus and so far justified: but the insight into the ground of the partial justification will exhibit, I hope, the source of the general mistake.” (Pg. 96) He concludes, “This much at present then seems to be clear---that critical history must have a presupposition, and that this presupposition is the uniformity of law. And we have accomplished here yet another stage of the present inquiry.” (Pg. 99)

He suggests, “Is the matter of history probable or certain? We believe it to be probable; but this does not mean that about all its contents there is practically a doubt. It means that, be there never so many converging lines of probable reasoning, yet these never transcend the region of practical certainty. The result is never theoretically proved.” (Pg. 113-114)

He summarizes, “We have seen so far that history is matter of inference; that every inference rests upon a presupposition; and that this presupposition is formed by present experience. We have rather shown that, although this experience is not always personal in the sense of that which we can immediately verify for ourselves, it yet is personal in the sense that upon the observation and judgement of our own mind it ultimately depends. We have shown that it is present, not in the sense of connexion with this or that moment, but in the sense of belonging to no moment in particular. We have shown that this character belongs alone to scientific testimony, that the material of history must hence be subject to analogy; and this distinction we have endeavoured to strengthen and defend.” (Pg. 121)

Not nearly as influential as Bradley’s “Appearance and Reality,” this essay is still of interest to students of the philosophy of history.

[Pedro Bonilla · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is a philosophical defense of history. It is a difficult read but the introduction makes it easier.