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New Cold War History
A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement
Demonstrating the centrality of diplomacy in the Vietnam War, Pierre Asselin traces the secret negotiations that led up to the Paris Agreement of 1973, which ended America's involvement but failed to bring peace in Vietnam. Because the two sides signed the agreement under duress, he argues, the peace it promised was doomed to unravel.
By January of 1973, the continuing military stalemate and mounting difficulties on the domestic front forced both Washington and Hanoi to conclude that signing a vague and largely unworkable peace agreement was the most expedient way to achieve their most pressing objectives. For Washington, those objectives included the release of American prisoners, military withdrawal without formal capitulation, and preservation of American credibility in the Cold War. Hanoi, on the other hand, sought to secure the removal of American forces, protect the socialist revolution in the North, and improve the prospects for reunification with the South. Using newly available archival sources from Vietnam, the United States, and Canada, Asselin reconstructs the secret negotiations, highlighting the creative roles of Hanoi, the National Liberation Front, and Saigon in constructing the final settlement.
By January of 1973, the continuing military stalemate and mounting difficulties on the domestic front forced both Washington and Hanoi to conclude that signing a vague and largely unworkable peace agreement was the most expedient way to achieve their most pressing objectives. For Washington, those objectives included the release of American prisoners, military withdrawal without formal capitulation, and preservation of American credibility in the Cold War. Hanoi, on the other hand, sought to secure the removal of American forces, protect the socialist revolution in the North, and improve the prospects for reunification with the South. Using newly available archival sources from Vietnam, the United States, and Canada, Asselin reconstructs the secret negotiations, highlighting the creative roles of Hanoi, the National Liberation Front, and Saigon in constructing the final settlement.
320 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 2002
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
March 13, 2023
This book is an account of the negotiations between America and North Vietnam and the peace agreement that allowed America to finally end its involvement in the Vietnam conflict. Pierre Asselin focuses mainly on the last two years, 1972 and 1973, dedicating only the first chapter to the post-Tet negotiations. Although I understand why he decided to do so – by 1972, the peace talks in Paris had not made any significant progress – I did not appreciate that he rushes through everything that happened before the Easter Offensive, which is a lot. It makes his narrative feel incomplete and disregards the importance of the earlier negotiations for the development of the situation in the final years.
North Vietnam's decision in 1968 to accept President Johnson's offer to negotiate was a turning point in the war. What the author does not mention is that it was not unanimous – the leadership was divided on this issue, mostly because China was pressuring it not to agree. Having agreed, though, the leaders of North Vietnam decided to quickly achieve a military victory to get a better position at the negotiating table. This is why, despite the fact that the first phase of Tet had failed, they made the questionable decisions to launch the second and third phases, which failed to give them the victory that they wanted. It became obvious then that they had not thought the issue of the peace talks through well – they sent their representatives in Paris conflicting, unclear instructions and dragged the negotiations into the next year. The Four-Party Conference finally convened in January, but it was mainly a show for the public, though, as the real talks were happening in private.
North Vietnam continued to pursue a much-needed military victory without success. On September 2, 1969, Ho Chi Minh passed away a disappointed man because the Communists was not even close to achieving his goal of reunifying the country, and the relationship between the Soviets and the Chinese had worsened. Ho's death surprisingly led to neither a power struggle in the government nor a deterioration of the Communists' resolve. There was even an improvement in North Vietnam's relations with China, whose previous displeasure had been because of the Tet strategy and the fact that North Vietnam was not supporting the Chinese in their dispute with the Soviets. Now, China kept encouraging North Vietnam to continue their struggle on the battlefield, and at the 18th Party Central Committee meeting, North Vietnam's leaders estimated that military efforts were becoming increasingly important for ending the war. They foresaw that the conflict in Laos would spread to Cambodia. The coup against Sihanouk, in which the American government played a part, expanded the war and forced the three Communist parties of Indochina into an uneasy alliance. Busy trying to get a military advantage and navigate its problematic relations with the Cambodian Communists, North Vietnam could not focus on the peace talks anymore. After Henry Kissinger and Xuan Thuy's meeting on September 27, 1970, they did not meet again until May 31, 1971, despite America's many requests for another meeting. Almost a year was wasted before the Communists, threatened by the visibly improving relations between America and China, decided to return to the negotiating table.
After Henry Kissinger made his famous visit to Beijing on July 9, 1971, he met Le Duc Tho on July 11, but North Vietnam, believing that the Americans and the Chinese were conspiring to pressure it into making compromises in Paris, acted even more uncompromisingly. They turned to the Soviets for support only to find out that President Nixon would be visiting Moscow soon. Feeling cornered, North Vietnam's leaders began planning the Easter Offensive in the hope of achieving military victory before the Chinese and the Soviets stopped sending aid.
All of this Asselin crams into the first chapter of his work. It is not surprising that the result is rather confusing and not particularly insightful. He does a good job chronicling what happened afterwards, but this is just the final part of the whole story. He depicts the aftermath of the Easter Offensive, in which North Vietnam finally accepted that they should pursue peace, not war. More secret meetings between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho followed, and, as the author reveals, North Vietnam's goal was to get a peace agreement before November 1972. They almost managed to achieve this, but President Nixon changed his mind in the last moment and unleashed a new bombing campaign, Linebacker II. Two months later, the Paris Peace Agreement was finally signed.
A BITTER PEACE is not a comprehensive work on the subject. Pierre Asselin draws on a large number of sources, and he does not neglect the Vietnamese perspective. However, I think that he could have written a more informative account with the materiel at his disposal. This book will be of interest to readers who want to learn about the last two years of negotiations. It requires knowledge of what happened before 1972.
North Vietnam's decision in 1968 to accept President Johnson's offer to negotiate was a turning point in the war. What the author does not mention is that it was not unanimous – the leadership was divided on this issue, mostly because China was pressuring it not to agree. Having agreed, though, the leaders of North Vietnam decided to quickly achieve a military victory to get a better position at the negotiating table. This is why, despite the fact that the first phase of Tet had failed, they made the questionable decisions to launch the second and third phases, which failed to give them the victory that they wanted. It became obvious then that they had not thought the issue of the peace talks through well – they sent their representatives in Paris conflicting, unclear instructions and dragged the negotiations into the next year. The Four-Party Conference finally convened in January, but it was mainly a show for the public, though, as the real talks were happening in private.
North Vietnam continued to pursue a much-needed military victory without success. On September 2, 1969, Ho Chi Minh passed away a disappointed man because the Communists was not even close to achieving his goal of reunifying the country, and the relationship between the Soviets and the Chinese had worsened. Ho's death surprisingly led to neither a power struggle in the government nor a deterioration of the Communists' resolve. There was even an improvement in North Vietnam's relations with China, whose previous displeasure had been because of the Tet strategy and the fact that North Vietnam was not supporting the Chinese in their dispute with the Soviets. Now, China kept encouraging North Vietnam to continue their struggle on the battlefield, and at the 18th Party Central Committee meeting, North Vietnam's leaders estimated that military efforts were becoming increasingly important for ending the war. They foresaw that the conflict in Laos would spread to Cambodia. The coup against Sihanouk, in which the American government played a part, expanded the war and forced the three Communist parties of Indochina into an uneasy alliance. Busy trying to get a military advantage and navigate its problematic relations with the Cambodian Communists, North Vietnam could not focus on the peace talks anymore. After Henry Kissinger and Xuan Thuy's meeting on September 27, 1970, they did not meet again until May 31, 1971, despite America's many requests for another meeting. Almost a year was wasted before the Communists, threatened by the visibly improving relations between America and China, decided to return to the negotiating table.
After Henry Kissinger made his famous visit to Beijing on July 9, 1971, he met Le Duc Tho on July 11, but North Vietnam, believing that the Americans and the Chinese were conspiring to pressure it into making compromises in Paris, acted even more uncompromisingly. They turned to the Soviets for support only to find out that President Nixon would be visiting Moscow soon. Feeling cornered, North Vietnam's leaders began planning the Easter Offensive in the hope of achieving military victory before the Chinese and the Soviets stopped sending aid.
All of this Asselin crams into the first chapter of his work. It is not surprising that the result is rather confusing and not particularly insightful. He does a good job chronicling what happened afterwards, but this is just the final part of the whole story. He depicts the aftermath of the Easter Offensive, in which North Vietnam finally accepted that they should pursue peace, not war. More secret meetings between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho followed, and, as the author reveals, North Vietnam's goal was to get a peace agreement before November 1972. They almost managed to achieve this, but President Nixon changed his mind in the last moment and unleashed a new bombing campaign, Linebacker II. Two months later, the Paris Peace Agreement was finally signed.
A BITTER PEACE is not a comprehensive work on the subject. Pierre Asselin draws on a large number of sources, and he does not neglect the Vietnamese perspective. However, I think that he could have written a more informative account with the materiel at his disposal. This book will be of interest to readers who want to learn about the last two years of negotiations. It requires knowledge of what happened before 1972.
April 15, 2022
A balanced and mostly solid history of the peace talks, though it doesn’t really offer much new information.
Much of the book deals with the convoluted negotiations, how they pitted America against both North and South Vietnam, and why the final peace settlement ultimately failed. The importance of diplomacy is emphasized, and Asselin notes how so many American, South Vietnamese and communist military campaigns of this period were conducted to influence the negotiations. Asselin shows how inflexible both the Americans and the North Vietnamese positions were, as well as how ruthless and cynical both sides were. Both sides signed the final peace agreement knowing it was extremely unlikely to last. “Finalizing an agreement,” he writes, “was more important than peace itself.” He argues that the North Vietnamese initially agreed to negotiations not because they were interested in a negotiated peace, but because they needed relief from American bombing. He notes that Thieu’s government (always hostile to the peace talks) resisted American pressure and rejected the agreement made in October; they were even willing to give up American aid if it meant rejecting the accords.
Asselin does assume a lot of prior knowledge about the war, and it does seem intended for a specialist audience (there is no background given when introducing Kissinger or Le Duc Tho, for example) It seems like he relies a bit too much on the often problematic memoirs of Nixon, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. There could have been some more coverage of the effect of the antiwar movement, on the NLF, and on America’s overall strategy. Also, most of the book deals with events in 1972. There is little coverage of the prior history of negotiations in Paris from 1968; Asselin calls this round of talks “largely cosmetic and conducted mainly for propaganda purposes.”
There’s also a few questionable assertions. At one point Asselin covers Nixon’s speech of November 3, 1969 but writes that it was in 1970. He also writes that Nixon only once considered promptly abandoning South Vietnam (weren’t there more occasions like that?) The NLF is called “more nationalist in character than it was communist” (it couldn’t have been both?). He also states that the Easter Offensive was a failure for the North Vietnamese; it was in some ways, but it shored up their position in the South. Asselin also argues that the Christmas bombing was a significant factor in starting the talks that led to the final peace agreement. However, Nixon authorized that campaign in order to assuage his hawkish critics and, more importantly, Thieu. America returned to the negotiating table and finalized an armistice that America (and North Vietnam) wanted, and one that wasn’t that different from what they agreed on earlier.
A thorough and interesting work, though a few parts could have been researched a little more carefully.
Much of the book deals with the convoluted negotiations, how they pitted America against both North and South Vietnam, and why the final peace settlement ultimately failed. The importance of diplomacy is emphasized, and Asselin notes how so many American, South Vietnamese and communist military campaigns of this period were conducted to influence the negotiations. Asselin shows how inflexible both the Americans and the North Vietnamese positions were, as well as how ruthless and cynical both sides were. Both sides signed the final peace agreement knowing it was extremely unlikely to last. “Finalizing an agreement,” he writes, “was more important than peace itself.” He argues that the North Vietnamese initially agreed to negotiations not because they were interested in a negotiated peace, but because they needed relief from American bombing. He notes that Thieu’s government (always hostile to the peace talks) resisted American pressure and rejected the agreement made in October; they were even willing to give up American aid if it meant rejecting the accords.
Asselin does assume a lot of prior knowledge about the war, and it does seem intended for a specialist audience (there is no background given when introducing Kissinger or Le Duc Tho, for example) It seems like he relies a bit too much on the often problematic memoirs of Nixon, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. There could have been some more coverage of the effect of the antiwar movement, on the NLF, and on America’s overall strategy. Also, most of the book deals with events in 1972. There is little coverage of the prior history of negotiations in Paris from 1968; Asselin calls this round of talks “largely cosmetic and conducted mainly for propaganda purposes.”
There’s also a few questionable assertions. At one point Asselin covers Nixon’s speech of November 3, 1969 but writes that it was in 1970. He also writes that Nixon only once considered promptly abandoning South Vietnam (weren’t there more occasions like that?) The NLF is called “more nationalist in character than it was communist” (it couldn’t have been both?). He also states that the Easter Offensive was a failure for the North Vietnamese; it was in some ways, but it shored up their position in the South. Asselin also argues that the Christmas bombing was a significant factor in starting the talks that led to the final peace agreement. However, Nixon authorized that campaign in order to assuage his hawkish critics and, more importantly, Thieu. America returned to the negotiating table and finalized an armistice that America (and North Vietnam) wanted, and one that wasn’t that different from what they agreed on earlier.
A thorough and interesting work, though a few parts could have been researched a little more carefully.
September 11, 2021
A Bitter Peace is the definitive book on the diplomatic side of the political war, and the lengthy process of negotiating the Paris Peace Accords. Practically a day by day account, Asselin compares how the negotiating positions of the various side shifted over the course of years-long negotiations. It's not exactly light reading, but it's an important look at how diplomacy functioned.
For Nixon and Kissinger, the goal was "peace with honor", a withdrawal mandated by the turn of American public opinion that would also return the POWs and not lead to the immediate collapse of South Vietnam. For Le Duc Tho and North Vietnamese government, there were memories of 1954 and the betrayal at Geneva, where the victory of Dien Bien Phu was wiped away by third party negotiators leading to partition and another 20 years of war. And in South Vietnam, President Thieu was acutely aware of the weakness of his government, and the need to hold the line against Communist infiltration.
In general terms negotiations can only succeed if the parties believe it is a better option than the alternatives, and the overall tempo of the negotiations were driven by North Vietnamese strength on the battlefield. The 1972 Easter Offensive saw initial gains that got bogged down by the overwhelming airpower of Operation Linebacker. Devastation on the home front encouraged Tho to be more flexible in his terms over language. This was also true in the Christmas Bombings, which helped convince Thieu that the treaty was the best alternative available to South Vietnam.
While the final Paris Accords were less than what North Vietnam hoped for (Theiu's resignation, open elections, and likely political reunification on Communist terms), it was also far from a guarantee of South Vietnam's territorial integrity, and indeed the county would survive less than 18 more months.
For Nixon and Kissinger, the goal was "peace with honor", a withdrawal mandated by the turn of American public opinion that would also return the POWs and not lead to the immediate collapse of South Vietnam. For Le Duc Tho and North Vietnamese government, there were memories of 1954 and the betrayal at Geneva, where the victory of Dien Bien Phu was wiped away by third party negotiators leading to partition and another 20 years of war. And in South Vietnam, President Thieu was acutely aware of the weakness of his government, and the need to hold the line against Communist infiltration.
In general terms negotiations can only succeed if the parties believe it is a better option than the alternatives, and the overall tempo of the negotiations were driven by North Vietnamese strength on the battlefield. The 1972 Easter Offensive saw initial gains that got bogged down by the overwhelming airpower of Operation Linebacker. Devastation on the home front encouraged Tho to be more flexible in his terms over language. This was also true in the Christmas Bombings, which helped convince Thieu that the treaty was the best alternative available to South Vietnam.
While the final Paris Accords were less than what North Vietnam hoped for (Theiu's resignation, open elections, and likely political reunification on Communist terms), it was also far from a guarantee of South Vietnam's territorial integrity, and indeed the county would survive less than 18 more months.
February 15, 2019
After the first chapter it was BS politics all over again
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews