This is a very useful book for anyone who wants to get a sense for how Melville is engaged with Platonic philosophy, and for how Melville prefigures some aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy, while packaging this into what is a human, and more humane, whole, than Nietzsche could, or did. But I have reservations, due to difficult questions regarding who exactly its proper audience is. In some respects, it seems its proper audience is the intermediate student of philosophy, someone who has had some study of the subject, but who is not an expert in the subject. It provides a lot of patient exposition of philosophical territory that is readable and clear, yet precise as well. However, I have significant reservations concerning the book's attempt to fit Melville too much into a very particular axis of thought formed along the Plato - Nietzsche polarity, a polarity that omits or renders very fuzzy indeed Melville's engagement with classes of ideas outside of that polarity. So, the Puritan Christianity that appears in Mapple's sermon, an important moment in the book, in the idea of obeying God and disobeying oneself, vs. disobeying God and obeying oneself, is on an idea of calling that is completely out of keeping with Plato's philosophy and represents the Puritan, Augustinian legacy; yet Anderson takes this moment as an opportunity to discuss Platonic opposition of soul and body, as if following the soul were "disoabeying oneself." But this cannot be so, since for Plato the soul is oneself, and the body is not oneself. Platonic philosophy cannot make sense of such Puritan -- that is, Augustinian -- problems because it locates problems in the division of body and soul, rather than in the will, whereas in Augustinian Christianity, it is the rebellion of the will that is the cause of the division of body and soul. Mapple's sermon is aimed entirely at this idea of rebellion in the will, and the need to confront the uncertainty of life by firm and complete commitment to one's calling. Second, there is a an idea that appears sometime in connection to Queequeg, the idea of a "mutual, joint-stock world." A "mutual, joint-stock world" is one in which one's fortunes rise and fall with the lot of others, due to our being interconnected with each other. Ishmael's friendship with Queequeg is just such an interconnection, and a significant one. These ideas are more associated with Dostoevsky than with Melville, but deserve significant commentary; yet, since these ideas are remote indeed for Plato and Nietzsche, they receive no significant attention. My worry is that the intermediate student is exactly the person who would be helped by drawing out these details, but this reader will receive no help with these, and indeed, will be left more ignorant of some aspects of Moby-Dick than before, insofar as the connections to the Puritans are obvious to the casual reader, but swallowed up by Platonism in Anderson's reading. Yet, for all that the Puritans have a relation to Augustine, and Augustine to Plato, they add a distinctive element to the picture, and an important one that Melville wrestles with in significant and interesting ways. This reservation aside, I learned a lot from Anderson's book, and I think any other reader of Melville will as well.