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Armored Combat in Vietnam
Comprehensive, detailed, and very readable, ARMORED COMBAT IN VIETNAM is an exciting survey of the history, nature, deployment and effect of armored units the United States Army utilized during the bitter course of the controversial Vietnamese War. It is based upon official war records of armored units and personal interviews with the men of those units and was compiled by a team of military experts.
ARMORED COMBAT IN VIETNAM discusses the military role and effectiveness of tank and mechanized infantry battalions and companies, armored cavalry squadrons and troops, and air cavalry squadrons and troops―all forces whose primary function was to fight mounted. It discusses American strategy in using armored units against the background of the generally unsuccessful French experience with similar weapons from the end of World War II until France's Indochinese defeat in 1954.
ARMORED COMBAT IN VIETNAM takes the reader from the earliest attempts by U.S. strategists to develop an armored force for the newly created Army of the Republic of Vietnam through eight years of hard fighting in a region in which tanks were once thought to be incapable of moving, in weather that was supposed to hinder armored operations, against an enemy who was deemed too elusive and too disorganized to be stopped by armored forces. It shows how such weapons emerged as powerful, flexible and essential military tools. The growth of U.S. armored forces in Vietnam, mechanized operations in the Mekong Delta, meeting the North Vietnamese "Tet" offensive, armored forces along the demilitarized zone, the invasion of enemy sanctuaries in Vietnam and then in Laos and Cambodia, and the deployment of armored divisions during the North Vietnamese spring offensive of 1972―all of these phases of the struggle are covered critically and in depth.
To add to the impact of the text, clear battle plans, exciting photographs, diagrams, maps, charts and a useful glossary are included. ARMORED COMBAT IN VIETNAM is essential reading for all professional military strategists, military buffs and anyone interested in the history of the U.S. engagement in Vietnam.
ARMORED COMBAT IN VIETNAM discusses the military role and effectiveness of tank and mechanized infantry battalions and companies, armored cavalry squadrons and troops, and air cavalry squadrons and troops―all forces whose primary function was to fight mounted. It discusses American strategy in using armored units against the background of the generally unsuccessful French experience with similar weapons from the end of World War II until France's Indochinese defeat in 1954.
ARMORED COMBAT IN VIETNAM takes the reader from the earliest attempts by U.S. strategists to develop an armored force for the newly created Army of the Republic of Vietnam through eight years of hard fighting in a region in which tanks were once thought to be incapable of moving, in weather that was supposed to hinder armored operations, against an enemy who was deemed too elusive and too disorganized to be stopped by armored forces. It shows how such weapons emerged as powerful, flexible and essential military tools. The growth of U.S. armored forces in Vietnam, mechanized operations in the Mekong Delta, meeting the North Vietnamese "Tet" offensive, armored forces along the demilitarized zone, the invasion of enemy sanctuaries in Vietnam and then in Laos and Cambodia, and the deployment of armored divisions during the North Vietnamese spring offensive of 1972―all of these phases of the struggle are covered critically and in depth.
To add to the impact of the text, clear battle plans, exciting photographs, diagrams, maps, charts and a useful glossary are included. ARMORED COMBAT IN VIETNAM is essential reading for all professional military strategists, military buffs and anyone interested in the history of the U.S. engagement in Vietnam.
250 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1980
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October 13, 2025
Very interesting monograph on use of armored forces in Vietnam. Please note this is only one in series of monographs about war in Vietnam, giving overview of operations and at the end list of recommendations on what needs to be improved based on the war experiences.
First of all, I have to admit I was not aware that Vietnam war had very prominent armor component to it. I was aware of Marines and Army 11th armored cavalry, but I was taking this just as a localized use of mechanized/armored forces in a war predominately based on infantry forces, helicopters and air forces. But, apparently this was not the case and armored forces were used in myriad of operations including incursions into Laos and Cambodia.
Only thing that was/is confusing is author's conflation of armored vehicle forces and helicopter/airmobile forces. How these two ended up on the same side of the equation is beyond me, but author is constantly looking at armored forces as combination of armored ground plus recon/strike/transport helicopter cavalry squads. Could be because of the keyword cavalry, but I am pretty sure that guys in UH1 did not feel as safe as those in M113 or ACAV strike vehicles or M48 tanks. This was the only point in the book that was mind boggling (especially since there is fully dedicated monograph in the series for airmobile operations), but OK, who knows what was doctrine/organizational approach at the time when the book was written.
Vietnam war was first time US armed forces were given chance to deploy their forces - air, sea and ground - to the fullest,and test both new vehicles together with new tactics and rules of engagement.
We follow US as they at first deploy very small armored forces (following the bad experiences of French that made everyone's mind that armor does not have place in Vietnam) and slowly as time goes start to increase the presence of armor. Reason is simple, it was empirically confirmed that (a) armor has its place on Vietnam's battlefield, ground is not all swamp and river (not to mention how French experience was due to use of tanks in support of infantry instead as concentrated armored units - this looks like error that constantly repeats itself when it comes to armor), and (b) armor was/is the only ground based (I mean, OK, author again conflates here chopper units so air is also included here) force that can/could exploit any air force strikes in order to attack, encircle and rout the guerillas and North Vietnam army units, using its organic armor protection and decent amount of firepower.
Very soon armored units of both South Vietnam and US (and other allies in the so called free world forces) have become a force to be reckoned with. They were the lifeline for various special forces and in general army bases surrounded by the North Vietnam forces and Viet Cong, and they were tasked with convoy security and making sure roads and communications are safe for transit and supplies.
When it comes to quality of forces, US units were always well trained and did require some changes of doctrine (like infantry fighting from within APCs, not dismounted) but all as expected, since a lot of things were not tested before.
South Vietnam forces (ARVN) though ..... well they are presented in a little bit schizophrenic way. First as conservative force that does not want to seek the opponent so it chooses garrison duty instead. When this changed, and they became more aggressive, then their level of organization and planning is questioned (obviously, same as in current eastern parts of Europe, without US intelligence and reconnaissance component not much can happen), but then - while on one side praised as well trained gunners, they end up as technologically ignorant and incapable (especially when it comes to range finders and tank devices for more precise shooting). For me, this looks like .... putting dirt on ARVN because of their incompetence of waging war without full US support. Author never mentions that withdrawal of US forces was reason for ARVN collapse, but ..... he tells it in a way that direct mention is not required.
All in all very interesting view of development of M113, ACAV version, various artillery (mortar) derivatives, use of tanks - both heavies like M41 and M48 but also light tanks with devastating firepower like M551 Sheridan. Then we get to dangers of anti tank mines (also proved in recent European battlefields) and lack of equipment to tackle this (I was surprised that author comments how equipment at the time was less effective than WW2 devices).
Also of great importance was logistics, and pains of unit commanders to obtain spare parts from repair centers hundreds of miles back.
Lots of new weapons were tested, including M114 and above mentioned M551 light tank, and US Vietnam command was made of some excellent professionals that did not hesitate to mark some weapons as waste of time and ask for their abandonment (as in case of same M114, and also light wheeled armored vehicles that could not withstand intensity of front-lines but could be used as rear area patrols). Author also stressed that use of allied armor in Vietnam worked under very specific circumstances - opposing force had no air force. Therefore while some things can be cherry picked for future use, author stresses how use of same tactics in the battlefields in Europe (against equal opponent) might prove disastrous.
Armor forces operations are described in great detail. Only issue I have is that friendly losses are not detailed. For opposition we are talking about dozens of tanks etc, but for friendly losses it is always few vehicles there, some here, all fixed and brought back, but no concrete numbers. I started noticing this in lots of books where preferable side seems like Superman on steroids, one shot dozen kills, while the other side loses tanks left and right, and is completely unable to hit the barn with 100mm gun.
Considering that Vietnam war was first conflict with guided AT missiles ...... this is weird. I can understand big losses of light tanks like PT76, but heavies ...... and all of this without friendly losses, especially M113 and derivatives (which were all aluminum hulled) ...... slightly weird to say the least. But, this was war against the Red Menace, so it is understandable.
Even with these weird elements, this is very good book about a dimension of Vietnam war I never thought existed. I am definitely on the lookout for other books on this subject and of course actions of 11th ACR (THE original Hammers Slammers).
Highly recommended.
First of all, I have to admit I was not aware that Vietnam war had very prominent armor component to it. I was aware of Marines and Army 11th armored cavalry, but I was taking this just as a localized use of mechanized/armored forces in a war predominately based on infantry forces, helicopters and air forces. But, apparently this was not the case and armored forces were used in myriad of operations including incursions into Laos and Cambodia.
Only thing that was/is confusing is author's conflation of armored vehicle forces and helicopter/airmobile forces. How these two ended up on the same side of the equation is beyond me, but author is constantly looking at armored forces as combination of armored ground plus recon/strike/transport helicopter cavalry squads. Could be because of the keyword cavalry, but I am pretty sure that guys in UH1 did not feel as safe as those in M113 or ACAV strike vehicles or M48 tanks. This was the only point in the book that was mind boggling (especially since there is fully dedicated monograph in the series for airmobile operations), but OK, who knows what was doctrine/organizational approach at the time when the book was written.
Vietnam war was first time US armed forces were given chance to deploy their forces - air, sea and ground - to the fullest,and test both new vehicles together with new tactics and rules of engagement.
We follow US as they at first deploy very small armored forces (following the bad experiences of French that made everyone's mind that armor does not have place in Vietnam) and slowly as time goes start to increase the presence of armor. Reason is simple, it was empirically confirmed that (a) armor has its place on Vietnam's battlefield, ground is not all swamp and river (not to mention how French experience was due to use of tanks in support of infantry instead as concentrated armored units - this looks like error that constantly repeats itself when it comes to armor), and (b) armor was/is the only ground based (I mean, OK, author again conflates here chopper units so air is also included here) force that can/could exploit any air force strikes in order to attack, encircle and rout the guerillas and North Vietnam army units, using its organic armor protection and decent amount of firepower.
Very soon armored units of both South Vietnam and US (and other allies in the so called free world forces) have become a force to be reckoned with. They were the lifeline for various special forces and in general army bases surrounded by the North Vietnam forces and Viet Cong, and they were tasked with convoy security and making sure roads and communications are safe for transit and supplies.
When it comes to quality of forces, US units were always well trained and did require some changes of doctrine (like infantry fighting from within APCs, not dismounted) but all as expected, since a lot of things were not tested before.
South Vietnam forces (ARVN) though ..... well they are presented in a little bit schizophrenic way. First as conservative force that does not want to seek the opponent so it chooses garrison duty instead. When this changed, and they became more aggressive, then their level of organization and planning is questioned (obviously, same as in current eastern parts of Europe, without US intelligence and reconnaissance component not much can happen), but then - while on one side praised as well trained gunners, they end up as technologically ignorant and incapable (especially when it comes to range finders and tank devices for more precise shooting). For me, this looks like .... putting dirt on ARVN because of their incompetence of waging war without full US support. Author never mentions that withdrawal of US forces was reason for ARVN collapse, but ..... he tells it in a way that direct mention is not required.
All in all very interesting view of development of M113, ACAV version, various artillery (mortar) derivatives, use of tanks - both heavies like M41 and M48 but also light tanks with devastating firepower like M551 Sheridan. Then we get to dangers of anti tank mines (also proved in recent European battlefields) and lack of equipment to tackle this (I was surprised that author comments how equipment at the time was less effective than WW2 devices).
Also of great importance was logistics, and pains of unit commanders to obtain spare parts from repair centers hundreds of miles back.
Lots of new weapons were tested, including M114 and above mentioned M551 light tank, and US Vietnam command was made of some excellent professionals that did not hesitate to mark some weapons as waste of time and ask for their abandonment (as in case of same M114, and also light wheeled armored vehicles that could not withstand intensity of front-lines but could be used as rear area patrols). Author also stressed that use of allied armor in Vietnam worked under very specific circumstances - opposing force had no air force. Therefore while some things can be cherry picked for future use, author stresses how use of same tactics in the battlefields in Europe (against equal opponent) might prove disastrous.
Armor forces operations are described in great detail. Only issue I have is that friendly losses are not detailed. For opposition we are talking about dozens of tanks etc, but for friendly losses it is always few vehicles there, some here, all fixed and brought back, but no concrete numbers. I started noticing this in lots of books where preferable side seems like Superman on steroids, one shot dozen kills, while the other side loses tanks left and right, and is completely unable to hit the barn with 100mm gun.
Considering that Vietnam war was first conflict with guided AT missiles ...... this is weird. I can understand big losses of light tanks like PT76, but heavies ...... and all of this without friendly losses, especially M113 and derivatives (which were all aluminum hulled) ...... slightly weird to say the least. But, this was war against the Red Menace, so it is understandable.
Even with these weird elements, this is very good book about a dimension of Vietnam war I never thought existed. I am definitely on the lookout for other books on this subject and of course actions of 11th ACR (THE original Hammers Slammers).
Highly recommended.
Displaying 1 of 1 review