If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War: An Analysis of World War II Naval Strategy

by John A. Adams Jr.

Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1660–1783) was one of the most influential books on military strategy in the first half of the 20th century. A core text in the naval war colleges of the United States, Britain, and Japan, Mahan's book shaped doctrine for the conduct of war at sea. Adams uses Mahan's ideas to discuss the great Pacific sea battles of World War II and to consider how well they withstood the test of actual combat. Reexamining the conduct of war in the Pacific from a single analytic viewpoint leads to some surprising conclusions about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Doolittle Raid, the Battle of the Coral Sea, the recapture of the Philippines, and the submarine war. Naval historians and armchair strategists alike will find much food for thought in these engrossing pages.

Genres: History, Military History

472 pages, Hardcover

First published June 15, 2008

About the author

John A. Adams, Jr. received a Bachelor’s Degree, Master’s Degree and Ph.D. in History from Texas A&M. He also completed the Southwestern Graduate School of Banking at Southern Methodist University and holds Certified Economic Developer (CED) credentials. Adams was a Captain in the United States Air Force and served as President and CEO of Enterprise Florida Inc., which is the only public-private statewide economic development organization in the nation.

Adams served as a delegate to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations in Geneva, an advisor to the World Trade Organization, Chairman of the Industry Sector Advisory council for trade policy review at the U.S. Department of Commerce and has provided Congressional testimony on U.S.-Mexico border infrastructure issues.

He was an Adjunct Professor of International Banking and Finance at Texas A& M International University in Laredo, Texas. Adams is the author of several books on Texas A&M and the Corps of Cadets, We Are the Aggies, Softly Call the Muster, Keepers of the Spirit and co-author of Texas Aggies Go To War as well as many other books on international trade, economic development and history.

Reviews

[William · Rating 4 out of 5]

At first, the title sounds very presumptuous. How can an airline executive who researched military history on the side speak for one of the giants of military history? Adams swings for the fences by applying a very thorough reading of Alfred Thayer Mahan to a re-examination of WWII/Pacific. The US and Japanese navies were both institutionally immersed in Mahan's "Influence of Sea Power Upon History," the bible of naval warfare. Of the two, the US Navy made the fewest mistakes applying Mahan to warfighting. Rather than playing the part of an armchair admiral, Adams does take the trouble to explain why. In doing so, King emerges as king and MacArthur as a petulant political general who lacked the vision to drive the blade home, unlike the USN.

Distilling Mahan's teaching to its essence, Adams stresses that the strategic goal of a naval war is the destruction of the enemy fleet. Once accomplished, all strategic apples fall into the winner's basket as his fleet is permitted totally unfettered movement across the world's oceans. After that key win, the victor can pick and choose how to pluck the assets of the loser's empire. And never divide the fleet.

Battleships were the vessels to sink prior to WWII. But the true measure of naval strength shifted to aircraft carriers around 1940, just as the strike potential of aircraft was finally beginning to be realized. Just sinking 10 ships can win the war--the enemy's carriers. The same rule applied to Japan.

That ruthless reduction to that essence becomes a clear prism through which the Pacific War gets refracted, and the resulting spectrum of options and operations then colors the book's narrative. Why should Japan waste assets seizing southeast Asia when it could gain all be default by using the same land forces to isolate Oahu by landing on Kaui and Hawaii? Why should the US waste time advancing through New Guinea and the Phillipines when advancing Marshalls/Marianas/Okinawa or Formosa can make the same line of supply cut faster for a lower expenditure in lives? Why should Japan bother with New Guinea if it can cut Australia's line of supply by advancing along the line of Solomons/Fiji? Why should Japan even bother raiding Ceylon?

Adams rates the commanders by applying that simple measure of strategic vision. King had it, Nimitz less so, Spruance not really, Mitscher hell yes. Yamamoto comes in second to Ozawa. MacArthur proves a sump on limited means, sucking effort away from the direct approach towards Japan, even if MacArthur's leapfrogging in New Guinea was brilliant. New Guinea, Cape Gloucester, Bougainville, Palau, Tarawa and Iwo Jima prove unecessary. Taking the Marshalls gains the intermediate base needed to pluck the Marianas from Japan and force the fleet battle--a move in the right direction. US should have gone for Formosa, then Luzon.

Adams is cognizant of changes in technology and resources, all the time reminding the reader that no matter how much technology changes, strategy remains constant while tactics always change. Bundling 6-10 Essex-class carriers into a strike force negates the supposed advantages of land-based air, a reality US commanders were slow to realize. That would give greater scope to US fleet movement, but the goal remained the same--destruction of the Japanese fleet.

Mahan is one of the few authors who deserves the five-star rating. Adams obviously could not top the captain, but he has earned his four stars. "if Mahan Ran the Pacific War" is a useful companion to any narrative on WWII/Pacific. Broader histories will lay out the who, what, when, where. Adams will go into why and how, and Mahan is the razor he uses to shave the problem down to its barest truth.

[Andrew Daniels · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Mahanian part is fantastic but the stuff about the Japanese character is racist nonsense - a grotesque caricature, but actually this is only a small part of the book. Ultimately, much of the work is extremely well done, well explained and insightful. He does offer some clear-headed analysis about the Japanese cabinet & high command.

He uses some expressions that perplexed me and probably some readers i.e. "he sent the ships to Davy Jones" = "sunk the ships", a tin can is I think a destroyer, still not sure what a dogleg is. Also, someone told him maru in Japanese means cows, I don't think it does, it just means round, circle, or boat.

Any one who is a casual reader in World War would thoroughly enjoy it, this is highly readable, exciting, informative, illuminating. I think many people would enjoy it.

[Seth · Rating 4 out of 5]

John A. Adams breaks down Alfred Thayer Mahan’s naval strategy principals and applies them to the Pacific War in If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War: An Analysis of World War II Naval Strategy. The perspective in this title is “What would Mahan think?” Considering Mahan and the Pacific Theater of WWII were separated by more than twenty-five years, it can be difficult to contemplate how Mahan would make use of the new aircraft carriers and naval aviation. None of Mahan’s primary arguments had to do specifically with how the goals were attained, just that they needed to be accomplished for a nation to become internationally powerful, thus making his theories on sea power applicable to the technology of the Second World War. Carrier groups changed the way strategy and tactics were formed at the operational level and no longer did the “big gun club” dominate strategic thinking when it came to campaign planning. Adams’ book on the Pacific War is a fresh perspective on an old subject.

[Michael Hayes · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very interesting analysis of naval combat in the Pacific during World War II. The minor flaws that appear in the book are more an indication of sloppy editing.