How the War Was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front: 1917-1918

by Tim Travers

"How the War Was Won" describes the major role played by the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front in defeating the German army. In particular, the book explains the methods used in fighting the last year of the war, and raises questions as to whether mechanical warfare could have been more widely used.
Using a wide range of unpublished material from archives in both Britain and Canada, Travers explores the two themes of command and technology as the style of warfare changed from late 1917 through 1918. He describes in detail the British army's defense against the German 1918 spring offensives, analyzes command problems during these offensives, and offers an overriding explanation for the March 1918 retreat. He also fully investigates the role of the tank from Cambrai to the end of the war, and concludes that, properly used, the tank could have made a greater contribution to victory.
"How the War Was Won" explodes many myths and advances newand controversial arguments. It will be essential reading for military historians and strategists, and for those interested in the origins of mechanical warfare.

Genres: History, World War I, Military History

264 pages, Hardcover

First published June 11, 1992

About the author

Tim Travers is a professor emeritus of history at the University of Calgary.

Reviews

[Mark · Rating 3 out of 5]

An important addition to the historiography of the war, however, Travers’ argument is unconvincing. Setting the debate of how to fight the war as between a traditional method (infantry and artillery) or a mechanical method (tanks) underestimates the complexities and limitations associated with the use of the first tanks; their limitations and the need to evolve new practices or doctrine were significant. Travers’ holds Haig responsible for many of the perceived failings, ignoring his often early support and adoption of emerging technology.

Some of Travers’ conclusions stand up, combined arms was evolving still, some commanders were better than others, but how he gets there is open to challenge.

Despite this, an important work that is needed for anyone wanting to understand the debate around how the war was won.

[David Sheedy · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book analyzes the English command structure from 1917 to 1918 and their attempts to reconcile the use of technology and World War I. Highly recommend, very well researched.

[Colin · Rating 3 out of 5]

A clear structured, deeply researched and well-argued account of the tactical factors which led to the British victories on the Western Front at the end of the First World War.

[Phillip Sawyer · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent history of the end of WW1 and the role played by the British forces. Highly recommended!

[Martin Samuels · Rating 4 out of 5]

When Tim Travers first book on the First World War, 'The Killing Ground', was published in 1987, it set a new standard for study of the period, due to his meticulous exploration of the manuscript sources and his penetrative analysis of the system of command used by the British Army. However, like many authors, Travers focused on the period of traditional trench warfare, largely overlooking the dramatic events of 1918. This sequel fills that gap and it is very welcome that Pen & Sword Books have made it available again to a wider audience.

As with his previous book, 'How the War was Won' draws from an intensive study of the original archive sources, with comparatively limited reliance on secondary published material. The result is a gripping analysis of the thinking and actions of the British High Command during the last year of the war, from Cambrai onwards. Travers' main hypothesis is that the British success in 1918 can in large part be explained by two key shifts in command. First, there was a significant 'letting go', with both GHQ and Army commands giving much more freedom to corps and divisional commanders to apply their knowledge and expertise to the local context. Where this was not the case, as in March 1918, the result was often disaster or delay. Second, elements of the army progressively realised that a system of attack combining tanks, artillery and infantry, using the advanced tactics then developed, was almost certain of success at limited cost in casualties. But that Haig and other senior commanders significantly downgraded the role of tanks after Amiens and relied on more traditional artillery/infantry attacks. These were successful but at higher cost.

This is a significant addition to the study of the First World War, though I was left with a sense that there was more that could have been said about the final months of the war, and that there was a deeper level to be considered around Haig's reversion to traditional tactics.

[Matt Caris · Rating 4 out of 5]

Read together with The Killing Ground: the British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918; combined, these two books present an authoritative perspective on how the BEF and its leadership fought World War I on the Western Front. This book is particularly instructive in trying to settle the debate between unabashedly pro-Haig historians like Terraine, who argue that the British Field Marshal requires the lion's share of the credit for the Hundred Days campaign, and others who attribute Allied victory to tanks, the Americans, or some combination thereof. While he takes a generally middle ground in that argument, Travers shows convincingly that Haig and many of his fellow BEF leaders did little after Amiens to reconstitute the kind of tank-focused forces that could have set up further exploitable victories, and instead returned to the kinds of high-casualty infantry-centered assaults on various German positions. However, since German strength had been spent in preceding years and especially in the various Ludendorff offensives, and the necessary reserves simply didn't exist, these attacks were far more operationally and strategically effective in the late summer and fall of 1918 than they had been in years prior.

[Jesse Callaghan · Rating 4 out of 5]

More Tim Travers gold. This guy and David Stahel would have to be my favourite military historians of the last decade.