Howe Brothers and the American Revolution

by Ira D. Gruber

By focusing on the Howe brothers, their political connections, their relationships with the British ministry, their attitude toward the Revolution, and their military activities in America, Gruber answers the frequently asked question of why the British failed to end the American Revolution in its early years. This book supersedes earlier studies because of its broader research and because it elucidates the complex personal interplay between Whitehall and its commanders.

Originally published in 1974.

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Genres: History, American Revolution

416 pages, Hardcover

First published June 1, 1972

About the author

Ira Gruber is professor emeritus of history at Rice University.

Reviews

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

A well-organized and clearly written dual biography of the Howe brothers, Gruber’s book provides a great deal of insight into the British view of the Revolution, especially in regard to their mindset and preconceptions. Gruber argues that the Howes failed to understand the reality of Britain’s political situation, and he describes at length the conflicts between the Howes and the government in London.

The book does have a few problems, though. Gruber writes that his study offers new material and examines factors previous historians have overlooked, although the book itself doesn’t really include anything that was new in 1973. And at times Gruber devotes more space on his own theories than on the Howe brothers themselves. He does, however,provide a thorough history of their aims and actions, even if his use of evidence for these is sparse at times (like claiming that Sandwich kept ships from Richard Howe in order to build a reputation for himself). He also argues that the Howes sought their commands in order to negotiate rather than fight. This is misleading: the Howes were given a degree of authority to negotiate, but the ministry in London limited it. Gruber suggests that this was all a cunning ploy on the Howes’ part, but it seems more like it was due more to confusion than anything else.

Interesting, precisely written and easy to read.

[Stephen Morrissey · Rating 4 out of 5]

Wars can founder on many shoals: logistics; delusions; wrong place, wrong time. Perhaps no shoal is as great as that of strategy, or mis aligned strategy by different policymakers and warlords. The Revolutionary War offers just such a case study in how critical strategy is to a successful war effort. As Ira Gruber shows in the meticulously-researched "Howe Brothers and the American Revolution," Sir William and Lord Richard Howe were impeccably credentialed warlords of 18th Century Britain, William as an acclaimed general on land and Richard and aggressive admiral at sea. Those epaulettes, though, meant nothing once they reached the shores of rebellious North America. William vacillated between strategies of conciliation, land reconquest, and military annihilation, while Richard often lacked the ships, and sometimes lacked the aggressiveness, to strangle the colonial economies from his meager naval blockades.

Gruber goes into great detail as to how William and Richard became ever more at odds with Lord George Germain, Prime Minister Lord North, and even King George III. The British ministry wishes for a knock 'em out war effort, slicing the colonies up through strict blockades, coastal raids, and close coordination between the armies in New York and Canada. The Howes favored conciliation, not wishing to annihilate so much as demonstrate the inability of the American army to hold land and win the war. Most emblematic of the strategic misalignment is Howe's decision to take the majority of his army in late summer 1777 by sea to Philadelphia, leaving General Burgoyne to defeat in the wilds of upstate New York before he could link up with the British army in New York. One wonders if Howe became enamored with glory in a new city one, a capital vanquished, and more territory nominally under the Union Jack than a militarily-effective conglomeration of the armies.

Gruber gets at the fundamental flaws in the war: it was not the great distance or 18th Century tactical tendencies that did the Howes' in, but rather their disgust and contempt of the Ministry's policies (reciprocated in term by Germain, Sandwich, and North). If war, as Clausewitz claimed, is politics by other means, the Howes' failed to ever connect their efforts to the policies of the civilian government they served.

[Lawrence · Rating 3 out of 5]

A very excellent look at the Howe brothers handling of the early days of the Revolutionary War and how the failure to carry the war to the rebels cost the English the American colonies. well documented and good for history students.

[L.B. Joramo · Rating 4 out of 5]

Although I enjoyed reading this book, some of it was based off secondary research, which has since been proven to be a bit misleading. Still, great book!