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The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson
Eric Goldman, special consultant to the President from 1963 to 1966, examines the decisions and discusses the events of the Johnson Administration
- GenresBiography
531 pages, Hardcover
First published June 1, 1969
2 people are currently reading
36 people want to read
About the author
Eric F. Goldman
22 books4 followersEric Frederick Goldman was an American historian, Rollins Professor of History at Princeton University, and Presidential advisor.
A graduate of Johns Hopkins University with a Ph.D. in history at age 22. He wrote on national affairs for TIME magazine.In addition ,throughout the course of his life, his works appeared in Harper's Magazine,Holiday,Saturday Review,and The New York Times.
He joined Princeton University as an assistant professor in 1942. He became a full professor in 1955, until retirement in 1985. He was special advisor to President Lyndon B. Johnson from 1963 to 1966.He served as president of the Society of American Historians from 1962 to 1969.From 1959 to 1967, he was the moderator on the television program, The Open Mind, on NBC network.
He married Joanna R. Jackson (died 1980). His papers are held at the Library of Congress, and the University of California, Los Angeles.
A graduate of Johns Hopkins University with a Ph.D. in history at age 22. He wrote on national affairs for TIME magazine.In addition ,throughout the course of his life, his works appeared in Harper's Magazine,Holiday,Saturday Review,and The New York Times.
He joined Princeton University as an assistant professor in 1942. He became a full professor in 1955, until retirement in 1985. He was special advisor to President Lyndon B. Johnson from 1963 to 1966.He served as president of the Society of American Historians from 1962 to 1969.From 1959 to 1967, he was the moderator on the television program, The Open Mind, on NBC network.
He married Joanna R. Jackson (died 1980). His papers are held at the Library of Congress, and the University of California, Los Angeles.
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
March 21, 2022
In his book, Eric F. Goldman, who worked in Lyndon Johnson's White House during the President's second term, presents his own take on the question of why Johnson, an able, hard-working President, eager to work for the interests of the American people and willing to do a lot to gain their support, left the White House in disgrace, with a reputation tarnished by his second term in office.
White House aides kept telling Johnson that the only source of the Americans' disaffection was his courageous stand on Vietnam. Any war fosters frustration and resentment, they reasoned, and the discontent is always directed at the leader. Modern limited wars, which are especially frustrating, aggravate the public's displeasure. Such words were consoling to the President, but, as Goldman points out, the facts told a different story.
First, as early as 1965, when Johnson was at the height of his success and before the Vietnam disaster became the main foreign policy issue, there was already widespread dissatisfaction with him. Second, American wars had never made American Presidents unpopular in their own time. On the contrary, as the Commander in Chief, the President gained more support and enthusiasm than ever. Franklin Delano Roosevelt is an apt example. Third, important aspects of the public's disaffection had little to do with the Vietnam failure. As Goldman observes, many Americans were annoyed with Lyndon Johnson not because they were sure that his policy toward Vietnam was wrong but because they saw him as the kind of man to commit a foreign policy blunder and not admit it or try to correct it. During the 1964 campaign, when it was clear that he would win the election, Johnson, puzzled, asked visitors, "Why don't people like me?" One guest replied, "Because, Mr. President, you are not a very likeable man."
Strange as it may sound, this was indeed a major part of Johnson's problem with the American people. The fact that he was not a very likeable man, that he lacked John Kennedy's charm, could not be hidden from the public. Johnson might have achieved a lot: he was the head of a family he loved, a multimillionaire, and the leader of the United States and the free world, but alas, he remained deeply insecure. "Having started out as a mama's boy, overloved, overprotected and overpraised, he was thoroughly unprepared for a world that did not view him in such a glow," explains Goldman. And the American public loved ferreting out the shortcomings of its Presidents. All the time those eminent men sat in the Oval Office, Americans knew that Franklin Roosevelt was an incorrigible political manipulator; that Dwight Eisenhower often tended to grin away massive problems; and that John Kennedy's personality of a charmer was as much his weakness as it was his strength. Nevertheless, Americans could also be remarkably indulgent provided that the virtues of the President outweighed his deficiencies. If the man in the White House was fundamentally decent and prioritized the nation's prosperity, then he was a good President. Most Americans deemed Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy good Presidents – but not Lyndon B. Johnson. His background of a machinator from Texas, his long years as a congressional manipulator, his family's accumulation of substantial wealth from a government-regulated television station, his awkward appearance and manners – all made Americans skeptical of his motivations as soon as he entered the White House. Afterward, nothing happen that could have changed their minds.
Johnson felt that he had established his right to the presidency by his landslide victory over Barry Goldwater in 1964, but millions felt that he had rather established his right to talk vaguely about anything, including the involvement of America in a foreign war, to protect his votes. He thought that the great legislative success of his Great Society program after the election had earned him the trust and admiration of the nation, but his impressive political skills, combined with the negative impression he already had on the public, further convinced Americans that he did everything for self-fulfillment and personal gain. This distrust rose against Johnson's whole presidential leadership. It not only denied him much of the acclaim he deserved for his domestic policies, but it also dulled the American people's desire to help him make the laws, which he toiled to pass through Congress, work. "Why don't people, especially young people, really jump into the poverty program, roll up their sleeves and get it roaring, like we did back in the New Deal," wondered the President. No one in the administration had the heart to tell him that he was no Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
In foreign policy, which was already not Johnson's forte and where he should have been given the benefit of doubt by the people, worried Americans, having faced two world wars and the Korean conflict, were hesitant to oppose the President. Ironically, their suspicion towards him notwithstanding, they believed that he had greater knowledge of the situation than them and reasoned that the odds were that he was right. Thus, those who dared to question and oppose his Vietnam policy in its initial stages were few and far between.
THE TRAGEDY OF LYNDON JOHNSON is a great portrait of Johnson the troubled President as seen through the eyes of a member of his administration. Goldman describes the President's character insightfully and objectively, analyzing the qualities that made Johnson his own worst enemy and contributed greatly to the tragedy of his presidency. This book benefits immensely from the perspective of an insider the author offers. I highly recommend it.
White House aides kept telling Johnson that the only source of the Americans' disaffection was his courageous stand on Vietnam. Any war fosters frustration and resentment, they reasoned, and the discontent is always directed at the leader. Modern limited wars, which are especially frustrating, aggravate the public's displeasure. Such words were consoling to the President, but, as Goldman points out, the facts told a different story.
First, as early as 1965, when Johnson was at the height of his success and before the Vietnam disaster became the main foreign policy issue, there was already widespread dissatisfaction with him. Second, American wars had never made American Presidents unpopular in their own time. On the contrary, as the Commander in Chief, the President gained more support and enthusiasm than ever. Franklin Delano Roosevelt is an apt example. Third, important aspects of the public's disaffection had little to do with the Vietnam failure. As Goldman observes, many Americans were annoyed with Lyndon Johnson not because they were sure that his policy toward Vietnam was wrong but because they saw him as the kind of man to commit a foreign policy blunder and not admit it or try to correct it. During the 1964 campaign, when it was clear that he would win the election, Johnson, puzzled, asked visitors, "Why don't people like me?" One guest replied, "Because, Mr. President, you are not a very likeable man."
Strange as it may sound, this was indeed a major part of Johnson's problem with the American people. The fact that he was not a very likeable man, that he lacked John Kennedy's charm, could not be hidden from the public. Johnson might have achieved a lot: he was the head of a family he loved, a multimillionaire, and the leader of the United States and the free world, but alas, he remained deeply insecure. "Having started out as a mama's boy, overloved, overprotected and overpraised, he was thoroughly unprepared for a world that did not view him in such a glow," explains Goldman. And the American public loved ferreting out the shortcomings of its Presidents. All the time those eminent men sat in the Oval Office, Americans knew that Franklin Roosevelt was an incorrigible political manipulator; that Dwight Eisenhower often tended to grin away massive problems; and that John Kennedy's personality of a charmer was as much his weakness as it was his strength. Nevertheless, Americans could also be remarkably indulgent provided that the virtues of the President outweighed his deficiencies. If the man in the White House was fundamentally decent and prioritized the nation's prosperity, then he was a good President. Most Americans deemed Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy good Presidents – but not Lyndon B. Johnson. His background of a machinator from Texas, his long years as a congressional manipulator, his family's accumulation of substantial wealth from a government-regulated television station, his awkward appearance and manners – all made Americans skeptical of his motivations as soon as he entered the White House. Afterward, nothing happen that could have changed their minds.
Johnson felt that he had established his right to the presidency by his landslide victory over Barry Goldwater in 1964, but millions felt that he had rather established his right to talk vaguely about anything, including the involvement of America in a foreign war, to protect his votes. He thought that the great legislative success of his Great Society program after the election had earned him the trust and admiration of the nation, but his impressive political skills, combined with the negative impression he already had on the public, further convinced Americans that he did everything for self-fulfillment and personal gain. This distrust rose against Johnson's whole presidential leadership. It not only denied him much of the acclaim he deserved for his domestic policies, but it also dulled the American people's desire to help him make the laws, which he toiled to pass through Congress, work. "Why don't people, especially young people, really jump into the poverty program, roll up their sleeves and get it roaring, like we did back in the New Deal," wondered the President. No one in the administration had the heart to tell him that he was no Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
In foreign policy, which was already not Johnson's forte and where he should have been given the benefit of doubt by the people, worried Americans, having faced two world wars and the Korean conflict, were hesitant to oppose the President. Ironically, their suspicion towards him notwithstanding, they believed that he had greater knowledge of the situation than them and reasoned that the odds were that he was right. Thus, those who dared to question and oppose his Vietnam policy in its initial stages were few and far between.
THE TRAGEDY OF LYNDON JOHNSON is a great portrait of Johnson the troubled President as seen through the eyes of a member of his administration. Goldman describes the President's character insightfully and objectively, analyzing the qualities that made Johnson his own worst enemy and contributed greatly to the tragedy of his presidency. This book benefits immensely from the perspective of an insider the author offers. I highly recommend it.
December 21, 2022
Works of history usually are the result of enough time for the author to gauge his subjects’ relevance in the grand scope of things. Not so with Eric Goldman’s book on Lyndon Johnson which was written mere months after LBJ announced that he would not be running for a second term as president. That’s not history…that is journalism.
But this work reads like serious history due to the hefty intellectual chops of the author who served in the Johnson administration. This is one of the first glimpses into the golden beginning stuffed with domestic legislative success and then the burning dumpster fire of an ending that was the Johnson presidency.
Goldman has a good sense of self awareness as the liberal intellectual in residence of the administration…and thusly his criticism of the liberal intolerance of not only Johnson’s Vietnam policy but Johnson himself during the 60’s has instant credibility. Goldman seems not to pile on but instead seeks to add some balance so that we might understand the unique pressures that LBJ was going through during this time of upheaval.
Very well written and a bit clunky but only compared to the previous intellectual in office Arthur Schlesinger which is a high bar.
Better works on LBJ would be written but the first glimpse into this White House makes for some compelling reading indeed.
But this work reads like serious history due to the hefty intellectual chops of the author who served in the Johnson administration. This is one of the first glimpses into the golden beginning stuffed with domestic legislative success and then the burning dumpster fire of an ending that was the Johnson presidency.
Goldman has a good sense of self awareness as the liberal intellectual in residence of the administration…and thusly his criticism of the liberal intolerance of not only Johnson’s Vietnam policy but Johnson himself during the 60’s has instant credibility. Goldman seems not to pile on but instead seeks to add some balance so that we might understand the unique pressures that LBJ was going through during this time of upheaval.
Very well written and a bit clunky but only compared to the previous intellectual in office Arthur Schlesinger which is a high bar.
Better works on LBJ would be written but the first glimpse into this White House makes for some compelling reading indeed.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews