In the summer of 1940, all Britain was convinced the Germans would invade. The Germans had, in five weeks, crushed France and taken Belgium. Now they stood on the Channel coast, waiting. The Luftwaffe was bombing an almost defenceless island by day and night - yet the Germans never came. Why not? In this intriguing new German analysis, Egbert Kieser explores the German perspective to reveal the fatal indecision that in the end may have lost them the war.
It was refreshing to find a treatment of this subject from the German perspective. British and American authors tend to characterize Sea Lion preparations as a haphazard affair that was doomed to failure if the Germans had been crazy enough to try and invade. Kieser addresses these issues in detail, leading one to understand that the war in 1940 was a lot different (and newer) than it was in 1944. Accordingly, comparing Sea Lion to D-Day is not entirely instructive. Add to this the prowess of the German war machine, especially its planning apparatus, and one can imagine circumstances where an invasion could have presented serious difficulties for the British.