Although this book is often, and self-admittedly, repetitive of his early works, as usual Fischel is an indubitably sharp and witty writer, who leads his readers through the thickets of contemporary law and economics relating to land with panache.
One of the main insights of this book is that much of land use regulation is "demand driven" and not "supply driven." While historians tend to focus on the major planning advocates and judges, like Edward Bassett and Justice George Sutherland, in reality city planning and zoning emerged in hundreds of different cities beginning in the nineteen teens, and paid little heed to planners or jurists. Although planners long lamented "grandfathering" non-conforming uses, cities ignored them and kept them in place. When a New Jersey court declared zoning a taking of property in 1927, the voters passed a constitutional amendment the same year legalizing the practice, and a similar reaction against a court ruling happened in Georgia. In all of these cases, it was millions of different people, and not conspiracies from on-high, that created our modern zoning system in the Progressive Era. Fischel argues that the footloose truck caused residential suburbs to push zoning and resist annexation to keep out unwanted industrial uses. This had little to do with race, as mixed race and purely white areas embraced zoning similarly, but everything to do with protecting property values.
Fischel also argues that the "Quiet Revolution" of growth management since 1970 is a result of a combination of the increase in automobile ownership from 59% in 1950 to 82% in 1970, bringing more poor residents to outlying areas, an increase in land values caused by inflation, along with the creation of new organizations emerging from the anti-highway revolt and environmental movements. These new groups succeeded in using courts to fight development, and also succeeded in creating "double veto" regional bodies that could foil most new development, especially on rivers and along the coasts, and most especially in California (such as the 1972 referendum for the California Coastal Commission). Instead of "fiscal zoning," where cities tried to attract the right mix of land-uses to protect land that paid property taxes, many suburbs in the 197s0 became completely opposed to any additional use, vastly driving up land prices, while property taxes declined as a proportion of revenue.
There are dozens of little stories and insights here, from the demand curve of monopolistic suburbs, to the problems with equitable solutions to zonings takings, and a few sensible, minor solutions for reform (scale back the imputed rent subsidy to homeowners; allow courts to act more like Pennsylvania's, to force injunctions for excessive zoning if not reformed). The book should be read by anyone and everyone concerned with local politics and housing issues in America.