A new analysis of the notorious Battle of the Somme, using archives from both sides not previously available, finds some positive the battle may have hurt the Germans even more than the British, and it taught an inexperienced British army the hard way how to fight a modern war.
Gary Sheffield is Professor of War Studies at the University of Wolverhampton. He is President of the International Guild of Battlefield Guides and a Vice President of the Western Front Association. He has published widely on the First World War and regularly broadcasts on television and radio as well as contributing to numerous journals, magazines and newspapers. Previous books include the acclaimed Forgotten Victory and The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army, which was shorlisted for the presigious Duke of Westminster's Medal.
Sheffield provides a welcome counter to the host of books which concentrate saolely on the first day of what would be a four and half months opffensive. There was so much more to it than the disasters of July 1st. Overtime the British Army became a much more impressive fighting force over those months and its leadershp improved commensuratley. Sheffield is no apologist for higher command incomptence, and there was plenty of that, but his book does provide much food for thought about the dilemmas facing the higher echelons. This was a new type of war fare for all concerned and of necessity officders were promoted to positions vastly in excess for that for which they had been trained. Perhaps the nost suprising thing is that the British Army not only did not collapse but went onto to stunning victory. The Somme was a bloody stepping-sto9ne to that.
There is, or was for a long time, a popular view in Britain of the First World War. It was of idiotic generals uncaring about the fate of their men herding them off time and again to futile attacks which accomplished nothing but leaving many of them dead. July 1st, 1916, the first day of the battle of the Somme, when the British Army suffered 57,000 casualties for small territorial gain, was the apotheosis of this.
This view of the war has now been largely discredited in serious historical circles. As Gary Sheffield argued in a previous book, Forgotten Victory, the British Army went from a small, colonial police force in 1914 to a mass army of 2 million men which played perhaps the major part in winning the war in 1918. This was no small achievement and the men and their commanders responsible deserve to be remembered as more than either boobs or butchers.
This book focuses on the battle of the Somme in that thesis. Rather than a disaster followed by a pointless slogging match, Sheffield makes the convincing case that the Somme was a major staging post on the British Army's journey to a war winning force in 1918. In short, the Somme didn't win the war, but the war would not have been won without the Somme.
I'm fascinated by the Somme, find the events of the first day riveting, but find the rest of the battle confusing and hard to get a trip on. Sheffield successfully managed to preserve the drama of the battle while stitching together a coherent narrative that provides a compelling argument that the Somme was not only unavoidable but also necessary, and a key factor in bringing about the defeat of the German army.