This book is a counter to the conventional wisdom that the United States can and should do more to reduce both the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategies and the number of weapons in its arsenal. The case against nuclear weapons has been made on many grounds―including historical, political, and moral. But, Brad Roberts argues, it has not so far been informed by the experience of the United States since the Cold War in trying to adapt deterrence to a changed world, and to create the conditions that would allow further significant changes to U.S. nuclear policy and posture. Drawing on the author's experience in the making and implementation of U.S. policy in the Obama administration, this book examines that real world experience and finds important lessons for the disarmament enterprise. Central conclusions of the work are that other nuclear-armed states are not prepared to join the United States in making reductions, and that unilateral steps by the United States to disarm further would be harmful to its interests and those of its allies. The book ultimately argues in favor of patience and persistence in the implementation of a balanced approach to nuclear strategy that encompasses political efforts to reduce nuclear dangers along with military efforts to deter them.
Read because I frequently attend virtual seminars hosted by the author through Lawrence Livermore National Lab. I find him unusually thoughtful and even-handed. The book is often redundant and full of so many details that it is easy to lose the forest for the trees, but ultimately I found his case compelling. Interestingly enough, I came away with both a stronger sense of need for the weapons complex as well as a deeper appreciation for the nonproliferation regime. I also have higher regard for Obama's nuclear posture (the reality, not the marketing), including his Prague speech.
I learned a lot about the United States's policies on nuclear weapons, and while I didn't agree with some of the messaging in this book - and still feel that abolition is the solution, there were good arguments for replacing defunct and struggling nuclear infrastructure in the United States that is very close to be dangerously undermaintained.
Whether or not you agree with the conclusions, this book does a fantastic job of clearly laying out the breadth and depth of the role of nuclear weapons in strategic stability, deterrence, assurance, arms control and non-proliferation.
This book could be called "The 1, 2, 3, ... 's of nuclear weapons in the 21st Century" - I was amazed just how many times (uncountable? :) there was an enumerated list of points. While a bit unusual, it actually helped with following a rather complicated (and dry) set of arguments.
If you are interested in the topics of strategic stability, nuclear weapons, international politics, arms control, etc., I recommend reading this book.