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Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918
Describing the radical transformation in German Infantry tactics that took place during World War I, this book presents the first detailed account of the evolution of stormtroop tactics available in English. It covers areas previously left the German Infantry's tactical heritage, the squad's evolution as a tactical unit, the use of new weapons for close combat, the role of the elite assault units in the development of new tactics, and detailed descriptions of offensive battles that provided the inspiration and testing ground for this new way of fighting. Both a historical investigation and a standard of excellence in infantry tactics, Stormtroop Tactics is required reading for professional military officers and historians as well as enthusiasts.
Contrary to previous studies, Stormtroop Tactics proposes that the German Infantry adaption to modern warfare was not a straightforward process resulting from the top down intervention of reformers but instead a bottom up phenomenon. It was an accumulation of improvisations and ways of dealing with pressing situations that were later sewn together to form what we now call Blitzkrieg. Focusing on action at the company, platoon, and squad level, Stormtroop Tactics provides a detailed description of the evolution of German defensive tactics during World War I―tactics that were the direct forbears of those used in World War II.
Contrary to previous studies, Stormtroop Tactics proposes that the German Infantry adaption to modern warfare was not a straightforward process resulting from the top down intervention of reformers but instead a bottom up phenomenon. It was an accumulation of improvisations and ways of dealing with pressing situations that were later sewn together to form what we now call Blitzkrieg. Focusing on action at the company, platoon, and squad level, Stormtroop Tactics provides a detailed description of the evolution of German defensive tactics during World War I―tactics that were the direct forbears of those used in World War II.
232 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 1989
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
April 27, 2014
This book contains a good number of summaries of some important battles during World War I in which the Germans changed the way we fight wars. This was a pivotal moment in history, as the world transitioned from on-line face to face type battles with centralized execution, to a decentralized execution combining maneuver with fire support assets. This is a great read for any military leader, and will come off as a very dry read of just about anyone else.
March 16, 2026
Overly detailed dive into just how German tactics in WWI came to be world-beating. There’s a tension between pushing down authority enough to allow officers on the ground to experiment and discover best practices, and knowing when you have a good thing to scale up training. The French, British and Italians also had creative officers who knew the “march forward and die” strategy wasn’t smart or sustainable and came up with other versions of infiltration tactics that pushed decision making down to the squad level. The Italians set up in 1915 a single compagnia di volontari della morte (Company of the Volunteers of Death), but none of them really figured out how to disseminate their learnings.
The key quote: “A self-educating officer corps with the freedom to train their units as they saw fit gave the German Army a capacity for self-reform that no other military organization of the time could approach.”
Also:
An important lesson here that best practices from even ten years prior can be completely obviated by technological advances. One of the main reasons armies preferred closed ranks (standing in a line) vs open ranks (advancing as a ‘cloud’, which became increasingly standard even by the second half of the US Civil War) was to urge on undisciplined troops to make it to the line of contact.
The fear of losing control of troops in battle reinforced an entrenched belief in the moral value of the bayonet charge. The battles of the second half of the nineteenth century provided numerous examples of close formations attacking with the bayonet prevailing over rifle-firing skirmish lines. That the close formations had suffered horrific casualties was rarely considered cause to worry. European wars of the second half of the nineteenth century were so short and infrequent that a regiment might only fight one battle in a generation. So distributed, the loss of half of a regiment’s effectives in less than half an hour tended to contribute to, rather than diminish, belief in the Furor Teutonicus…
With a front of about 25 meters, it permitted the company commander to keep his entire company in sight and within the sound of his voice. At the same time, it could easily be deployed into a dense firing line in which every rifle could be employed against the enemy. (9)
But this didn’t fly in the age of the machine gun. In 1915, “One German machine gun crew reported having fired 12,500 rounds a the battle around Loos [where 8000 British died]. When the British started to retreat, the Germans stopped firing out of pity.”
Akin to how the Chinese military brought in rural troops to put down Tiananmen, German command brought in units from other parts of the line to spice things up when both sides decided it didn’t make sense to keep killing each other.
“most British officers worked hard to maintain an air of detached amateurism and snubbed the ‘mug’ who neglected hunting and polo in favor of maps and military history. This became even more true as the war progressed and those few regular officers who tooke their profession seriously found themselves concentrated on staffs leaving small unit leadership to enthusiastic but tactically incompetent schoolboys.”
Ultimately, of course, these cute tactical breakthroughs couldn’t do anything at the operational level on the Western Front as there was no way to transport troops into a breach in the lines faster than the French or British could reinforce.
If we focus on the operational level, the weapon that kept the German Army from winning a war of maneuver on the western front was not the machine gun but the railroad. As thousands of raids and attacks ‘with limited objectives,’ as well as the successful breaking through of heavily fortified positions at Caporetto and the great offensives of 1918 proved, stormtroop tactics were an efficient way of releasing the German Army from the “grip of Hiram Maxim.” No tactical system, however, could solve the fundamental operational problem that the German Army faced in the west — the fact that the enemy’s railroads and motor transport columns could always bring up more fresh troops.
The means of dealing with this problem would have to wait until the next war. The innovation wasn’t the tank, rather it was the mobility of complete formations that could quickly exploit gaps in the enemy disposition. As long as the following formations depended on muscle power for mobility, those holes could never be turned into war-winning victories. In the absence of suitable transport, the stormtrooper and his tactics remained Germany’s forlorn hope. (178)
The books also has an endearing acknowledgements section: “I would like to thank my older brother, First Lieutenant Brian Gudmundsson, USMC, who read and commented on every single draft of this work, and who was a great help in ensuring that what I wrote was of use to the serving officer.”
The key quote: “A self-educating officer corps with the freedom to train their units as they saw fit gave the German Army a capacity for self-reform that no other military organization of the time could approach.”
Also:
An important lesson here that best practices from even ten years prior can be completely obviated by technological advances. One of the main reasons armies preferred closed ranks (standing in a line) vs open ranks (advancing as a ‘cloud’, which became increasingly standard even by the second half of the US Civil War) was to urge on undisciplined troops to make it to the line of contact.
The fear of losing control of troops in battle reinforced an entrenched belief in the moral value of the bayonet charge. The battles of the second half of the nineteenth century provided numerous examples of close formations attacking with the bayonet prevailing over rifle-firing skirmish lines. That the close formations had suffered horrific casualties was rarely considered cause to worry. European wars of the second half of the nineteenth century were so short and infrequent that a regiment might only fight one battle in a generation. So distributed, the loss of half of a regiment’s effectives in less than half an hour tended to contribute to, rather than diminish, belief in the Furor Teutonicus…
With a front of about 25 meters, it permitted the company commander to keep his entire company in sight and within the sound of his voice. At the same time, it could easily be deployed into a dense firing line in which every rifle could be employed against the enemy. (9)
But this didn’t fly in the age of the machine gun. In 1915, “One German machine gun crew reported having fired 12,500 rounds a the battle around Loos [where 8000 British died]. When the British started to retreat, the Germans stopped firing out of pity.”
Akin to how the Chinese military brought in rural troops to put down Tiananmen, German command brought in units from other parts of the line to spice things up when both sides decided it didn’t make sense to keep killing each other.
“most British officers worked hard to maintain an air of detached amateurism and snubbed the ‘mug’ who neglected hunting and polo in favor of maps and military history. This became even more true as the war progressed and those few regular officers who tooke their profession seriously found themselves concentrated on staffs leaving small unit leadership to enthusiastic but tactically incompetent schoolboys.”
Ultimately, of course, these cute tactical breakthroughs couldn’t do anything at the operational level on the Western Front as there was no way to transport troops into a breach in the lines faster than the French or British could reinforce.
If we focus on the operational level, the weapon that kept the German Army from winning a war of maneuver on the western front was not the machine gun but the railroad. As thousands of raids and attacks ‘with limited objectives,’ as well as the successful breaking through of heavily fortified positions at Caporetto and the great offensives of 1918 proved, stormtroop tactics were an efficient way of releasing the German Army from the “grip of Hiram Maxim.” No tactical system, however, could solve the fundamental operational problem that the German Army faced in the west — the fact that the enemy’s railroads and motor transport columns could always bring up more fresh troops.
The means of dealing with this problem would have to wait until the next war. The innovation wasn’t the tank, rather it was the mobility of complete formations that could quickly exploit gaps in the enemy disposition. As long as the following formations depended on muscle power for mobility, those holes could never be turned into war-winning victories. In the absence of suitable transport, the stormtrooper and his tactics remained Germany’s forlorn hope. (178)
The books also has an endearing acknowledgements section: “I would like to thank my older brother, First Lieutenant Brian Gudmundsson, USMC, who read and commented on every single draft of this work, and who was a great help in ensuring that what I wrote was of use to the serving officer.”
December 12, 2023
Very interesting book about the evolution of modern infantry combat during WW1. Author shows how use of assault squads for probing and penetrating enemy lines was not something that was developed only in specialized Rohr Batallion or under Hutier's patronage.
As author clearly shows concepts of fast hitting specialized infantry squads was something that would eventually develop on the German side even without dedicated specialized and experimental units (which is proved by evolution of Jaeger and specific infantry regiments and divisions that did not have much contact with Rohr Batallion).
Using examples from Western and Eastern front author paints a very vivid picture of transformation of tightly boxed infantry with repeating rifles advancing and firing in columns, into squads armed with automatic weapons, machine guns, hand grenades and flamethrowers, and exceptional development of artillery and its use - which will culminate in one way with introduction of new battle machine, tank, machine that will define and play a very important role in next war.
Again it is visible that none of the above would be possible with small armies - by relying on small armies none of the warring parties would be able to develop in any meaningful way. This dream that persists 'til current days grew from nauseating feeling of mass slaughter in WW1 but proved faulty in both WW2 and in any real (non-counter-insurgency) conflict, from Africa to Asia and Europe.
Book is full of information and is a slight counterbalance to "Command or Control". It does not take much of a critical view of UK troops training and management and is more oriented towards going over every historical point related to Stormtrooper development. it is not as detailed account as "Command or Control" but again accent here is on development of land combat, specific to infantry, and not in going into detail into the nature of command and training of Germany and Allied troops or development of other arms.
Recommended.
As author clearly shows concepts of fast hitting specialized infantry squads was something that would eventually develop on the German side even without dedicated specialized and experimental units (which is proved by evolution of Jaeger and specific infantry regiments and divisions that did not have much contact with Rohr Batallion).
Using examples from Western and Eastern front author paints a very vivid picture of transformation of tightly boxed infantry with repeating rifles advancing and firing in columns, into squads armed with automatic weapons, machine guns, hand grenades and flamethrowers, and exceptional development of artillery and its use - which will culminate in one way with introduction of new battle machine, tank, machine that will define and play a very important role in next war.
Again it is visible that none of the above would be possible with small armies - by relying on small armies none of the warring parties would be able to develop in any meaningful way. This dream that persists 'til current days grew from nauseating feeling of mass slaughter in WW1 but proved faulty in both WW2 and in any real (non-counter-insurgency) conflict, from Africa to Asia and Europe.
Book is full of information and is a slight counterbalance to "Command or Control". It does not take much of a critical view of UK troops training and management and is more oriented towards going over every historical point related to Stormtrooper development. it is not as detailed account as "Command or Control" but again accent here is on development of land combat, specific to infantry, and not in going into detail into the nature of command and training of Germany and Allied troops or development of other arms.
Recommended.
November 9, 2021
A truly brilliant description of the transformation of open order tactics in WW1. I would read this once a year and get my hands on anything else the author produces.
November 6, 2016
This is a fascinating account of the development of revolutionary tactical concepts (and the equipment and training needed to carry them out) and adaptation in the midst of combat. Does an excellent job of refuting basic claims about German tactical innovation in the First World War such as "just the product of a genius officer [Hutier, Ludendorff, etc.]," "stole it from a French pamphlet," "they needed it more due to inferior numbers," etc., and showing how a combination of factors were required to make this revolution successful.
Perhaps its best service is in refuting the popular perception (as exemplified in Horne's account of an unthinking Prussian NCO infiltrating Fort Douaumont) of German troops as the Kaiser's automatons; the tolerance of dissent and discussion at all levels and command climate required for tactical adaptations to "infiltrate" their way up to the top from lower echelons are more "democratic" than the military cultures in the Western democratic states opposing Germany. Certainly nothing similar occurred in the French or British armies. All in all, the comparison of the German officer corps - steeped in military education and history, but with a less well-rounded education than his generally aristocratic peers in the UK and France (or the inducted college kids of the US Army in both World Wars) makes for a fascinating contribution to the debate on officer selection and education.
Finally, the impact of these "bottom-up" adaptations on the development and procurement of new weapons makes for an interesting comparison with the experiences of Western democracies as well - compare, for instance, German development of trench mortars in response to urgently communicated infantry needs to how the US Army's Ordnance Board overruled or ignored feedback from the front on artillery (World War I; the disastrous 3-inch M1916) or tanks (World War II; the Ordnance Board resistance to re-arming the Sherman or replacing it entirely in 1943).
Perhaps its best service is in refuting the popular perception (as exemplified in Horne's account of an unthinking Prussian NCO infiltrating Fort Douaumont) of German troops as the Kaiser's automatons; the tolerance of dissent and discussion at all levels and command climate required for tactical adaptations to "infiltrate" their way up to the top from lower echelons are more "democratic" than the military cultures in the Western democratic states opposing Germany. Certainly nothing similar occurred in the French or British armies. All in all, the comparison of the German officer corps - steeped in military education and history, but with a less well-rounded education than his generally aristocratic peers in the UK and France (or the inducted college kids of the US Army in both World Wars) makes for a fascinating contribution to the debate on officer selection and education.
Finally, the impact of these "bottom-up" adaptations on the development and procurement of new weapons makes for an interesting comparison with the experiences of Western democracies as well - compare, for instance, German development of trench mortars in response to urgently communicated infantry needs to how the US Army's Ordnance Board overruled or ignored feedback from the front on artillery (World War I; the disastrous 3-inch M1916) or tanks (World War II; the Ordnance Board resistance to re-arming the Sherman or replacing it entirely in 1943).
January 21, 2023
Interesting review of the evolution of tactics in the 1st World War. Yes, there was evolution - and on both sides. Nice details and a quick, informative read. The book succeeded in stoking a quickly increasing interest in the military history of the Great War, as well as the general history of the period.
Want to read
November 21, 2008Recommended by my professor for HIS 3543 History of Modern Warfare.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews