The End of Apartheid: Diary of a Revolution

by Robin Renwick

In 2 February 1990, FW de Klerk made a speech that changed the history of South Africa. Nine days later, the world watched as Nelson Mandela walked free from the Viktor Verster prison. In the midst of these events was Lord Renwick, Margaret Thatcher's envoy to South Africa, who became a personal friend of Nelson Mandela, FW de Klerk and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, acting as a trusted intermediary between them. He warned PW Botha against military attacks on neighbouring countries, in meetings he likens to 'calling on the führer in his bunker'. He invited Mandela to his first meal in a restaurant for twenty-seven years, rehearsing him for his meeting with Margaret Thatcher - and told Thatcher that she must not interrupt him. Their discussion went on so long that the British press in Downing Street started chanting 'Free Nelson Mandela'.In this extraordinary insider's account, Renwick draws on his diaries of the time, as well as previously unpublished material from the Foreign Office and Downing Street files. He paints a vivid, affectionate, real-life portrait of Mandela as a wily and resourceful political leader bent on out-manoeuvring both adversaries and some of his own colleagues in pursuit of a peaceful outcome.

Genres: History, South Africa

288 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 29, 2015

About the author

Robin William Renwick, Baron Renwick of Clifton was a British diplomat, author and a member of the House of Lords who served as British ambassador to South Africa (1987−1991) and the United States (1991−1995).

Reviews

[David Kenvyn · Rating 2 out of 5]

The first thing that has to be said about this book is that, despite its subtitle, it is emphatically not a diary. It is a memoir. It may have started life as a diary, but it has clearly been edited. The layout is in the form of a diary, giving specific dates (or at least indicating the month) for events. These entries, however, include references to events that happened after the date in question or which could not have been known at the date in question. There is, for instance, a specific reference to an entry in the journalist Patti Waldmeir's diary. which the author could not have known about until she published it. And this is not the only example of this kind, especially where the author is using hindsight to justify his government's, and especially his Prime Minister's, approach at the time.

It is a memoir. It has all the need for self-justification that is usually at the root of memoirs. It has a tendency to over-emphasise the importance of the advice given by the author. For instance, it is likely that Terror Lekota intended going to the Ciskei, following the coup on 4th March 1990, without being encouraged to do so by the British Ambassador. There is also a tendency to ignore the relevance of factors in which the author had not involvement. The author refers to an intervention by Mrs Thatcher in July 1988 calling for the release of Nelson Mandela, but does not mention that this was in the context of the 1988 Wembley Concert, calling for Mandela's release, the Nelson Mandela Freedom March from Glasgow to London, the fact that 100s of 1,000s turned out in Hyde Park for a rally addressed by Archbishops Desmond Tutu and Trevor Huddleston, nor that millions upon millions were boycotting apartheid goods. The Anti-Apartheid Movement is only mentioned once in the book, as organising a picket at Chequers (I was there), and it does not merit an entry in the Index.

All of this does not make it valueless. It is interesting to see how the British Ambassador was able to influence events, or thought that he was influencing events. The only way that this can be judged is to compare his account with those of others, such as Aziz Pahad's "Insurgent Diplomat" or, of course, Nelson Mandela's "Long Walk to Freedom".

Some of his conclusions are disingenuous. He says for instance that Margaret Thatcher never called Mandela a "terrorist". This is true, but she did call the ANC a "typical terrorist organisation" and this at a time when Mandela refused a qualified offer of freedom with the words "I am a member of the African National Congress". It is difficult to see how you can regard an organisation as terrorist, but not one of its imprisoned leaders as a terrorist especially when he was the commander-in-Chief of the armed wing. The argument is specious, and as a seasoned diplomat, Robin Renwick must know that.

Renwick's account of the reasons for Margaret Thatcher wanting a settlement in South Africa, and therefore the end of apartheid, is interesting. He identifies the protection of the investments of British companies in South Africa, and the need to avoid an evacuation of British citizens from the country. He presents Thatcher's argument against sanctions, that it would do economic damage to the country, well. He does not recognise that her intransigence in this respect delayed the end of apartheid and therefore cost thousands of lives. The counter-argument is not alluded to at any stage.

Another interesting fact is that apartheid South Africa had acquired nuclear weapons by the 1980s. Renwick mentions a conversation with Barend Du Plessis in which the latter said that they could hardly bomb Lusaka or Soweto. The really suspicious might conclude from this that these were precisely the targets being considered by the South African military at the time. John Major apparently was particularly keen to get South Africa to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Renwick does not indicate at any stage how South Africa came to acquire nuclear weapons, although there was plenty of evidence at the time that this was through military cooperation with Israel. Nor does he suggest any reason why the British Government was keen to get South Africa to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty before the first democratic elections in that country. It does seem rather obvious that they were fearful of an ANC government which had nuclear weapons in its arsenal.

But there is no reference in the book to why the British Government was pursuing this or other issues. It is all rather taken for granted, as if the ordinary reader should know, or just trust that they were doing the right thing. Only a Foreign Office Mandarin could write like this.

That is the problem with this book. Michael Psellus wrote a brilliant account of the reigns of several Byzantine emperors. He understood the minutiae of the reigns because he was at the heart of government. Psellus' account shows no understanding of the reasons for the decline of the Byzantine Empire, and therefore is not able to offer remedies. This book is like that. It understands the detail, but does not deal with the forces that were bringing change about. It attempts to suggest that Mandela was separate, different from the ANC. This is incorrect. Mandela was able to achieve what he did because he was a leader of the ANC, because he worked with people like Tambo, Sisulu, Thabo Mbeki and countless others to numerous to mention, many of whom gave their lives in the struggle.

This is an account of how the British Embassy was able to intervene to facilitate the process that brought about the transition in South Africa. As such, it has to be judged as a piece of evidence against other pieces of evidence. It should not be taken as an authoritative account of what actually happened.

[Marie (UK) · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is a very important facet of South African History and how Britain and particularly Margaret thatcher wielded influence on it. However it is a very dry account that, in my opinion, the author fails to breathe life into the flesh of the narrative