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Heroes or Traitors: The German Replacement Army, the July Plot, and Adolf Hitler

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When a German victory became impossible, the July 1944 conspirators plotted to bring a quick end to the war, hoping to negotiate a peace with the Western allies and possibly to join them in a war against Russia. Because the Allies would not negotiate with Hitler, the plotters planned to assassinate him and seize control of the government, using the Replacement Army to overcome the S.S. and the Nazi Party.

This army would also maintain order within Germany, a task that would require more than half-a-million trained men. The conspirators convinced key Replacement Army officers to withhold men from the Field Army in the spring of 1944 in preparation for taking over the country. The result was a German army that lacked enough reserve divisions to counter the invasion of France and the Red Army attack in Russia. Although the plotters failed to kill Hitler, they hastened the war's end by weakening the German army. Dunn examines the 1944 July Plot from a manpower and logistics perspective to demonstrate that the conspirators did, in fact, achieve their goal of hastening the war's end.

200 pages, Hardcover

First published May 30, 2003

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About the author

Walter S. Dunn Jr.

14 books3 followers
WALTER S. DUNN, JR. had a 40-year career directing museums, including the Buffalo & Erie County Historical Society and the Iowa Science Center. His books include The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945 (1995), Hitler's Nemesis: The Red Army (1994), and Second Front Now, 1943 (1981).

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January 20, 2012
This is a difficult book to rate.

The premise is intriguing, that the replacement army helped shorten the war by withholding replacements for the field army prior to the summer campaigns of 1944 thereby speeding up the catastrophic defeat that occurred then. But even the author admits that there is no smoking gun and the evidence presented is at best circumstantial.

I can accept that the replacement army was sitting on a larger than normal reserve. But merely pointing this out does not explain why this happened.
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