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Modern War Studies
Thunder and Flames: Americans in the Crucible of Combat, 1917-1918
November 1917. The American troops were poorly trained, deficient in military equipment and doctrine, not remotely ready for armed conflict on a large scale--and they'd arrived on the Western front to help the French push back the Germans. The story of what happened next--the American Expeditionary Force's trial by fire on the brutal battlefields of France--is told in full for the first time in "Thunder and Flames."
Where history has given us some perspective on the individual battles of the period--at Cantigny, Chateau Thierry, Belleau Wood, the Marne River, Soissons, and little-known Fismette--they appear here as part of a larger series of interconnected operations, all conducted by Americans new to the lethal killing fields of World War I and guided by the battle-tested French. Following the AEF from their initial landing to their emergence as an independent army in late September 1918, this book presents a complex picture of how, learning warfare on the fly, sometimes with devastating consequences, the American force played a critical role in blunting and then rolling back the German army's drive toward Paris. The picture that emerges is at once sweeping in scope and rich in detail, with firsthand testimony conjuring the real mud and blood of the combat that Edward Lengel so vividly describes. Official reports and documents provide the strategic and historical context for these ground-level accounts, from the perspective of the Germans as well as the Americans and French.
Battle by battle, "Thunder and Flames" reveals the cost of the inadequacies in U.S. training, equipment, logistics, intelligence, and command, along with the rifts in the Franco-American military marriage. But it also shows how, by trial and error, through luck and ingenuity, the AEF swiftly became the independent fighting force of General John "Blackjack" Pershing's long-held dream--its divisions ultimately among the most combat-effective military forces to see the war through.
Where history has given us some perspective on the individual battles of the period--at Cantigny, Chateau Thierry, Belleau Wood, the Marne River, Soissons, and little-known Fismette--they appear here as part of a larger series of interconnected operations, all conducted by Americans new to the lethal killing fields of World War I and guided by the battle-tested French. Following the AEF from their initial landing to their emergence as an independent army in late September 1918, this book presents a complex picture of how, learning warfare on the fly, sometimes with devastating consequences, the American force played a critical role in blunting and then rolling back the German army's drive toward Paris. The picture that emerges is at once sweeping in scope and rich in detail, with firsthand testimony conjuring the real mud and blood of the combat that Edward Lengel so vividly describes. Official reports and documents provide the strategic and historical context for these ground-level accounts, from the perspective of the Germans as well as the Americans and French.
Battle by battle, "Thunder and Flames" reveals the cost of the inadequacies in U.S. training, equipment, logistics, intelligence, and command, along with the rifts in the Franco-American military marriage. But it also shows how, by trial and error, through luck and ingenuity, the AEF swiftly became the independent fighting force of General John "Blackjack" Pershing's long-held dream--its divisions ultimately among the most combat-effective military forces to see the war through.
457 pages, Hardcover
First published March 6, 2015
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About the author
Edward G. Lengel
28 books126 followersIndependent historian, hiker, and voracious reader. As an author, I'm delighted to have reached the stage where I can write purely for personal enjoyment and interest, as my forthcoming works will attest!
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
October 4, 2017
As we progress through 2017 American attention is starting to refocus on this nation’s role in the First World War. This has proven a fruitful time for new scholarly work on the subject, and Edward Lengel’s Thunder and Flames (University Press of Kansas: 2015) is a fine addition to the literature.
Lengel’s book is “a study of AEF operations under French command” (9), excluding campaigns where Americans fought on their own. This means Thunder and Flames covers November 1917 through August 1918, and the battles over Seicheprey, Cantigny, Chateau-Theirry, Belleau Wood, the defense of the Marne River line, Soissons, and Fismette.
One of Lengel’s major concerns is to revise a popular view of Americans as heroic strivers who saved the Allies from dilatory and incompetent French forces. The text goes to great lengths to establish the French as very skilled and effective fighters, whose achievements and generosity key American players ignored, downplayed, or publicly slandered (87, 199-200, 300). Meanwhile, American units all too often failed to learn from the French of even from each other; “each green unit entering combat had to learn the principles its predecessors had imbibed in blood.” (10) This appeared in a number of reversals, such as stark defeat at Seicheprey , a failed attack at Fismette and brutal, potentially disastrous casualties in Belleau Wood (169). All too often American forces marched in the open exposed to well-sited enemy fire (120). Coordination with artillery and air power was slack (284-5, 322). Americans didn’t make enough use of infiltration tactics (333). The French, despite being very kind to their inexperienced allies, privately expressed fears that Yank units might not hold up under the Western Front’s terrible stresses (65).
Thunder and Flames does a good job depicting those awful pressures, and how American soldiers coped. The account is deeply sympathetic to the AEF’s men. Doughboys sometimes turned to dirty tricks, such as shooting apparently surrendering Germans, pretending to surrender in order to cause enemy soldiers to lower their guards (190), or “us[ing] captured Germans as human shields to approach enemy machine gun nests, ‘as they would not shoot on their own men’” (175). The Germans played similarly foul, occasionally dressing up in American uniforms (182).
Above all, Lengel is generous to the fighting spirit and learning curve of Americans, but is also quite critical of their leaders and the effort’s subsequent reputation. He argues that some of the battles were less important than many accounts have argued, such as legendary Belleau Wood, where “it is clear that the Americans never stopped a German drive on Paris” (117, 202-3). A substantial number of units spent time in training or otherwise occupied in rear areas even when the titanic Ludendorff Offensive was under way (35). General James Harbord comes in for frequent criticism (101, 120, 183, 288). He and others often failed to coordinate with French commanders, and internally had a difficult time making large units work together (214, 218, 298). To be fair, later in the war the French failed to coordinate effectively as well (229). American supplies frequently ran short, especially of food and water; the French were much better at this, due in part to the post-Nivelle reforms of 1917 (276, 366).
Meanwhile, when they finally got into battle, doughboys and lower level officers learned how to fight the hard way (151), including employing gas discipline and determining how best to use combined arms (196). American troops soon won the admiration of their adversaries. Lengel isn’t convinced that German sources called the marines teufelhunde (“devil dogs”), but does show that the enemy grew impressed by Americans’ eventual fighting prowess (192). Some French took to calling them “Soldats le Terrible.” (331) Americans played a key role in the Marne River line defense. As one participant put it in almost Churchillian style,
Lengel sums up: “the doughboys performed extraordinarily well. They had nothing to hang their heads about.” (374)
Historiographically, Thunder and Flames is excellent. Lengel draws deeply on multiple primary sources, including – thankfully – those from German and French archives (viii). We read many assessments and accounts from participants, which gives us personal details, along with interesting observations from complementary allies or enemies in battle. Well chosen personal accounts bring the war’s horror vividly home:
As a physical book, this one is fairly satisfying. It offers a short but good selection of historical photographs (156-162). Maps are interesting and sometimes useful, being drawn from a 1938 American Battle Monuments Commission work, as well as a more recent Center for Military History series. Lengel’s narrative sometimes mentions details those maps do not present, which can be frustrating. Otherwise they are well situated in the text, and do a decent job of letting the reader follow the general flow of combat. Lengel also points us to a very rich University of Alabama archive of division history maps.
Strongly recommended.
Lengel’s book is “a study of AEF operations under French command” (9), excluding campaigns where Americans fought on their own. This means Thunder and Flames covers November 1917 through August 1918, and the battles over Seicheprey, Cantigny, Chateau-Theirry, Belleau Wood, the defense of the Marne River line, Soissons, and Fismette.
One of Lengel’s major concerns is to revise a popular view of Americans as heroic strivers who saved the Allies from dilatory and incompetent French forces. The text goes to great lengths to establish the French as very skilled and effective fighters, whose achievements and generosity key American players ignored, downplayed, or publicly slandered (87, 199-200, 300). Meanwhile, American units all too often failed to learn from the French of even from each other; “each green unit entering combat had to learn the principles its predecessors had imbibed in blood.” (10) This appeared in a number of reversals, such as stark defeat at Seicheprey , a failed attack at Fismette and brutal, potentially disastrous casualties in Belleau Wood (169). All too often American forces marched in the open exposed to well-sited enemy fire (120). Coordination with artillery and air power was slack (284-5, 322). Americans didn’t make enough use of infiltration tactics (333). The French, despite being very kind to their inexperienced allies, privately expressed fears that Yank units might not hold up under the Western Front’s terrible stresses (65).
Thunder and Flames does a good job depicting those awful pressures, and how American soldiers coped. The account is deeply sympathetic to the AEF’s men. Doughboys sometimes turned to dirty tricks, such as shooting apparently surrendering Germans, pretending to surrender in order to cause enemy soldiers to lower their guards (190), or “us[ing] captured Germans as human shields to approach enemy machine gun nests, ‘as they would not shoot on their own men’” (175). The Germans played similarly foul, occasionally dressing up in American uniforms (182).
Above all, Lengel is generous to the fighting spirit and learning curve of Americans, but is also quite critical of their leaders and the effort’s subsequent reputation. He argues that some of the battles were less important than many accounts have argued, such as legendary Belleau Wood, where “it is clear that the Americans never stopped a German drive on Paris” (117, 202-3). A substantial number of units spent time in training or otherwise occupied in rear areas even when the titanic Ludendorff Offensive was under way (35). General James Harbord comes in for frequent criticism (101, 120, 183, 288). He and others often failed to coordinate with French commanders, and internally had a difficult time making large units work together (214, 218, 298). To be fair, later in the war the French failed to coordinate effectively as well (229). American supplies frequently ran short, especially of food and water; the French were much better at this, due in part to the post-Nivelle reforms of 1917 (276, 366).
Meanwhile, when they finally got into battle, doughboys and lower level officers learned how to fight the hard way (151), including employing gas discipline and determining how best to use combined arms (196). American troops soon won the admiration of their adversaries. Lengel isn’t convinced that German sources called the marines teufelhunde (“devil dogs”), but does show that the enemy grew impressed by Americans’ eventual fighting prowess (192). Some French took to calling them “Soldats le Terrible.” (331) Americans played a key role in the Marne River line defense. As one participant put it in almost Churchillian style,
We did not drive the Boche back; we killed him by the thousands and those that we did not kill we took prisoners. We killed them before they crossed the river; we killed them in the river and we killed them on the south bank as fast as the machine guns and rifles could pump lead into them. (237)
Lengel sums up: “the doughboys performed extraordinarily well. They had nothing to hang their heads about.” (374)
Historiographically, Thunder and Flames is excellent. Lengel draws deeply on multiple primary sources, including – thankfully – those from German and French archives (viii). We read many assessments and accounts from participants, which gives us personal details, along with interesting observations from complementary allies or enemies in battle. Well chosen personal accounts bring the war’s horror vividly home:
We groped forward through the roaring, flashing thunder. Men stumbled over each other in the trench bottoms. The darkness was now violet and now splotched with green, yellow, and red flames of fire. Gravel rained on our helmets, trees fell, we choked in swirls of dust. We tripped over a figure, whose piercing screams sounded muffled in the terrifying din. Now shadowy, now vivid forms forms huddled against the walls of the fire trench… Flashing detonations filled the woods, the whine of shells half-obscured by the thundering noise. We staggered through stretches of trench and crawled around a series of erupting bayous. (221-2)
[A]n old Frenchman (he looked at least 50) in a tattered blue uniform was walking slowly down the road carrying on his back, toward the dressing station, a wounded American Doughboy. Every time I have felt annoyed since then at France, this picture comes to my mind and my anger softens. (277)
As a physical book, this one is fairly satisfying. It offers a short but good selection of historical photographs (156-162). Maps are interesting and sometimes useful, being drawn from a 1938 American Battle Monuments Commission work, as well as a more recent Center for Military History series. Lengel’s narrative sometimes mentions details those maps do not present, which can be frustrating. Otherwise they are well situated in the text, and do a decent job of letting the reader follow the general flow of combat. Lengel also points us to a very rich University of Alabama archive of division history maps.
Strongly recommended.
December 7, 2023
A really great book about the AEF and it's growth into an army that was combat experienced before the Meuse-Argonne offensive. I found it interesting how the American high command had such bitter issues with the French; it seems that the American Army's focus on diplomatic relations with the allies was not as important as it became during World War Two. I wanted to read something on the AEF, as I haven't studied it much, and this was pretty good. I would say that the book is focused more on military history and thus it takes a more detailed look at the battles that gave the AEF experience before Meuse Argonne. This book focuses on regiments, battalions, and sometimes companies; it is not like David Glantz where you scratch your head in boredom. I haven't read Richard Faulkners book on the AEF, which seems more generalized, but I will have to check it out.
June 28, 2018
It sounds like the AEF didn't have a learning curve so much as a learning ladder; sometimes they'd voluntarily take a step down. Stepping on the hands of the French who tried to push them up.
It makes the Doughboys, or their CO's at least, look as incompetent ingrates. Luckily, weeding took place.
Chatigny was a village in a salient overlooked by ridges, devoid of any military value. It was garrisoned by a second-rate unit softened up by French flank attacks.
Chateau-Thierry involved one Machine Gun Battalion facing a secondary attack in a secondary offensive to Reims. It did not stop the drive on Paris and almost left a railroad bridge over the Meuse in enemy hands.
Belleau Wood disproved the time-honoured motto Every Marine a rifleman!" but still gave the Corps all the glory, to the detriment of the Army formations involved in the later stages of the wood's gradual cleansing. Tactical lessons learned here were disregarded on a greater scale at the "Rock of the Marne" and taught anew at Soissons.
November 25, 2018
This book is not for a beginner, the type of person who wants to know what America did in the First World War. The reason for this, the author gets mired down in the details about what regiment was where, what they were doing… It got tedious after a while.
I gave this book 5 stars because it is obvious the author did a lot of research and percents a lot of solid arguments in the book. I feel at times he is extremely critical of the The US Military’s Performance However he is also quick to explain why units performed the way they did on the battlefield.
Overall he thoroughly researched well-documented book.
I gave this book 5 stars because it is obvious the author did a lot of research and percents a lot of solid arguments in the book. I feel at times he is extremely critical of the The US Military’s Performance However he is also quick to explain why units performed the way they did on the battlefield.
Overall he thoroughly researched well-documented book.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews