Civil War Infantry Tactics: Training, Combat, and Small-Unit Effectiveness

by Earl J. Hess

For decades, military historians have argued that the introduction of the rifle musket-with a range five times longer than that of the smoothbore musket-made the shoulder-to-shoulder formations of linear tactics obsolete. Author Earl J. Hess challenges this deeply entrenched assumption. He contends that long-range rifle fire did not dominate Civil War battlefields or dramatically alter the course of the conflict because soldiers had neither the training nor the desire to take advantage of the musket rifle's increased range. Drawing on the drill manuals available to officers and a close reading of battle reports, Civil War Infantry Tactics demonstrates that linear tactics provided the best formations and maneuvers to use with the single-shot musket, whether rifle or smoothbore.
The linear system was far from an outdated relic that led to higher casualties and prolonged the war. Indeed, regimental officers on both sides of the conflict found the formations and maneuvers in use since the era of the French Revolution to be indispensable to the survival of their units on the battlefield. The training soldiers received in this system, combined with their extensive experience in combat, allowed small units a high level of articulation and effectiveness.
Unlike much military history that focuses on grand strategies, Hess zeroes in on formations and maneuvers (or primary tactics), describing their purpose and usefulness in regimental case studies, and pinpointing which of them were favorites of unit commanders in the field. The Civil War was the last conflict in North America to see widespread use of the linear tactical system, and Hess convincingly argues that the war also saw the most effective tactical performance yet in America's short history.

Genres: Civil War, History, American Civil War, War, Military History, Military Fiction

328 pages, Hardcover

First published April 13, 2015

About the author

Earl J. Hess is Stewart W. McClelland Chair in History at Lincoln Memorial University and the author of numerous books on the Civil War.

Reviews

[Sean Chick · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hess sets out to disprove three myths. One is that rifled muskets revolutionized the battlefield, a point he made previously in his other books. The second is that Civil brigades and regiments achieved a high-level of articulation. Lastly, the linear tactical system was appropriate, and even useful useful today. He proves each of these points, with detailed discussions of tactical maneuvers and battlefield experiences.

However, the book has a somewhat narrow scope. This is about infantry, but the lack of discussion of entrenchments, cavalry, and artillery makes the the tactical discussions at times limited. More importantly, he shows that Civil War armies were rather poor on the grand-tactical level, yet still says we have perhaps been too hard on the armies in this regard, even after giving numerous examples of their inability. However, the more I have studied the era, the less impressed I am with grand tactics in the war. No army save the Potomac in 1865 achieved proficiency in grand tactics. This can be traced to training, but also a lack of cavalry, assault tactics, and the proficiency of American armies in defense, due to West Point's curriculum, terrain, and the American tactical tradition.

In short, this is a good book that proves its three thesis points, but one with an oddly limited scope considering the subject matter. Entrenchments are not discussed, but World War I tactics are. The classic account of Civil War tactics still has yet to be written, but Paddy Griffith remains the best all around, even if he lacks Hess' detailed knowledge of formations.

[Steven Peterson · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a very helpful book on Civil War tactics. We are looking at the combat training and small unit work in actual battles.

There are a number of interesting takes on tactics. For one thing, the author notes that standard criticisms that with the use of rifled muskets the Napoleonic linear movement was obsolete and destined to create massive injuries and death. He makes a strong case that this is a mistaken notion. Theoretically, rifles have a much longer range and could hit the enemy at a considerable distance. However, in practice, long range shooting was seldom effective.

There is also a nice discussion of the role of skirmishing in battle. This is a tactic that was widespread, as both Confederate and Union soldiers tried to figure out where enemy main lines were and so on. The frightening aspects of being a skirmisher are well told, too.

The variety of manuals on tactics are described--whether Hardee or Scott or others. Fascinating discussion. It didn't occur to me how important such manuals could be.

And so on. . . .

A very useful volume on Civil War tactics.

[Jim · Rating 5 out of 5]

Earl Hess really hits the target with this in-depth work about Civil War tactics. He takes aim at prior assumptions about the "attack and die" mythos of the Confederate army particularly, and notions that Civil War armies were just armed mobs.

With his meticulous eye, Hess shows how field manuals for both sides incorporated the most current and effective methods, and how Civil War officers did (or did not) carry these out. He makes a strong case that American linear tactics were a logical response to the prevailing environment, part of a long tradition of western warfare, adapted to American circumstances albeit not with perfection. He shows us across many battles how these tactics were applied, and their natural shortcomings and advantages under fire.

[Gregory · Rating 4 out of 5]

Makes the reader think about Civil War battles in a different way. Emphasizes the role of tactics and drill to infantry movement, formation, and combat. Claims most units and commanders did fairly well with this considering their minimal preparation. Hess argues that the rifle was not revolutionary to Civil War tactics. It really did not increase the accuracy, firepower, or speed of fire. The rifle offered distance, but few officers, men, or units fired at that range. Chapters describe the different tactical moves through numerous case studies.

[TS Allen · Rating 5 out of 5]

The best book written on the conduct of the American Civil War in decades. A must-read. Revisionist in the best way possible. Hess understands the Civil War battlefield better than anyone else alive.

[Christian Ovsenik · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very dry

[Matthew Bartlett · Rating 5 out of 5]

As the plethora of Civil War studies goes on, many narratives attempt to explain the intricacies of infantry tactics as they occurred within a battle or campaign. There are a select few books on infantry tactics themselves, most of which are reproductions of existing tactics manuals from the period. In his book, Civil War Infantry Tactics, Earl J. Hess explains the very nature of how tactics evolved into what they become for the time of the Civil War from European Influences to Early American Tactics and even mentions the difficulties of the introduction of the rifled musket. Throughout this book, all aspects of infantry tactics are explained in detail and with sheer excellence that this book is a welcome addition to the lack of modern tactical study.
Earl J. Hess is the Stewart W. McClelland Chair in History at Lincoln Memorial University and is the author of many works. Some of his most famous works include his three part study on field fortifications which includes In the Trenches at Petersburg. He is also the author of Kennesaw Mountain: Sherman, Johnston, and the Atlanta Campaign; The Knoxville Campaign: Burnside and Longstreet in East Tennessee and The Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from the Appalachians to the Mississippi. He is also the author of one of the most esteemed works on Pickett’s Charge: The Last Attack at Gettysburg, which was the 2001 winner of the James I. Robertson Jr. Prize from the Civil War Library and Research Center.
There are many places in this book which causes it to shine. First and foremost, the book is solely dedicated to the study of infantry tactics during the Civil War and the immense amount of knowledge which he placed to help the reader understand what was being said. The narrative is aided by the tables which commanders used, or did not use, to employ the tactic at the time. Certain chapters were dedicated to certain tactics such as skirmishing, training and columns. He even ends his work with an analysis of tactical development after the war. But one of the most enjoyable parts of the work was the look into the evolution of tactics from European influences and early American as well. While battles were used to create explanations for certain tactics being explained, Hess never goes into a chronological detail of battles and campaigns and how they morphed the decisions taken at combat. Furthermore, the narrative is quite engaging for any reader, even the most schooled Civil War student. There are new bits of information spread all over the work which shine with the excellence Hess has been known to bring to his work. The end effect of this book is a work which should accompany any reproduction of an infantry manual owned by Civil War readers and students.
I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in Civil War studies, especially strategy and tactics. Hess brings excitement to the study and he brings light to things which may have caused confusion for some readers and it is a welcome addition to a study which has been ignored in other works. I cannot remember the last time a work was written about infantry tactics as well as this one here. Finally, we have a modern study on these tactics and I cannot be happier for this addition to the realm of Civil War academia.

Matthew Bartlett - Gettysburg Chronicle

[Shrike58 · Rating 4 out of 5]

Having previously spent some time debunking the impact of the rifled musket on the conduct of the American Civil War, in this monograph Hess takes up the challenge of defending the "fundamental adequacy of the linear system" of tactics used in the conflict, and demonstrating how this system usually measured up to the test of the day of battle.

The question then begged is if the Federal and Confederate units were generally proficient at the battalion and brigade level, why the lack of operational decision? Hess sees this partly as a result of the raw political determination of both sides, partly due to the sheer size of the armies that Richmond and Washington were able to raise and partly, admittedly, due to the basic American lack of experience with the higher levels of field command.

Hess also comments on the tendency to make the military experience of the American Civil War more modern than it was; the real crucible of military modernity in his opinion is World War I (and even that gets exaggerated in his view).

To get the most out of this book you should probably have read a couple general overviews of the war and have half a dozen or so battle histories under your belt.

Originally written: April 18, 2019.

[JerryDeanHalleck · Rating 2 out of 5]

Interesting if somewhat dry book on Civil War Infantry tactics. Hess asserts the formations used were probably the best available and that the rifled musket didn't change the battlefield as much as previous authors claimed. This ties in with Paddy Griffith's view that Napoleonic battles were just as bloody and often indecisive and that most firing in the Civil war was at 100 yards or less.

Further, any attempt to loosen the formations or go to a thick skirmish line or a one line assault, while reducing casualties would have lacked the neccessary punch to break through an enemy line.

The book details how difficult it was in the Civil war to attack successfully. Whereas the defender had to simply stand his ground and shoot, the attacker had to coordinate the assualt with adjacent unts, retain its formation over broken ground or thick forest, and maintain momentum and hit the enemy with enough force to breakthrough. At the same time it had to retain unit cohension and allow the officers the ability to command and control. Needless to say this often didn't happen and most attacks were failures.

Anyway, if you're curious about what "by the flank" meant, this book is for you.