Bruce Vandervort’s Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914 is a sweeping look at the origins and conduct of colonial warfare from both the European and African perspectives. Vandervort aims to demonstrate the long and short term effects of this era of conflict on military theory and practice, as well as European and African societies and political structures. He accomplishes this using the “New Military History”, an approach that focuses on the impacts of war on society and culture, while still discussing the traditional “guns and drums” aspect of military history. Overall, Vandervort seeks to turn the traditional narrative of European moral, racial, and vast military superiority on its head and deliver a more measured perspective on colonial warfare.
The first two chapters set the stage for the rest of the book. Vandervort establishes the extent of the European presence in Africa, as well as the major social and military trends that were occurring in Africa pre-1830. The book is then divided into chronological sections, the first covering the period from 1830 to 1880. In this section Vandervort examines the shift that Europeans made from a minor merchant influence to a major military player on the continent. He uses four case studies, the French in Algeria and Senegal and the British wars against the Ashanti and the Zulu, to demonstrate this shift. Jumping from famous battle to famous battle, Vandervort expertly explains what prompted the conflicts, how they were fought, their outcomes and why they happened. He employs this case study method throughout the entirety of the work.
The next section highlights the years 1880 to 1898, the “Scramble” for Africa. Vandervort covers a lot of ground in this chapter, from the French in West Africa to the Portuguese in Gazaland, and in doing so demonstrates the transition by European governments in this period from private imperialism, in which they were not formally involved in territorial conquest, to state imperialism, in which they were the ones driving the effort to conquer and colonize. Furthermore, Vandervort notes that the gap in military technology between European and African armies would never be greater than in this period, signalling a “burgeoning European hegemony in…African wars” (Vandervort, 114).
The book’s penultimate chapter takes readers to 1914. Here Vandervort explains that new trends in African warfare began to emerge. Armies became larger, the technology gap between European and African forces closed, and strategies of guerrilla warfare and total war were taken up by African and European armies respectively.
The final chapter is perhaps Vandervort’s most interesting, as it examines the legacy of colonial warfare in Africa. He explains that Europeans had created military institutions separate from African societal and political systems, which, once the Europeans left, remained a divisive force in African societies and spawned local distrust of and hostility towards African militaries. Indeed, Vandervort describes that colonial warfare imparted a destructive ethos in which ideas about how to win and hold power are strictly interpreted in a military sense and that this has contributed the endless cycle of military coups that continue to plague African nation-states.
Vandervort’s book is not without blemish though. He devotes significant space to refuting the technological determinist argument that Europeans conquered Africa because of their vastly superior military arms. For example, he credits the downfall of the Ashanti to internal division and a lack of political will, the defeat of the Zulu to internal division and a failure to adapt their traditional tactics, and the most significant failing of the Mahdist at the decisive battle of Omdurman as poor leadership and ineffective tactics.
Yet at the same time, Vandervort stresses the importance of logistics in almost every one, if not all, of his case studies. He pinpoints the main reason that the French were successful in Senegal and that the Belgians were successful in the Arab Wars as their control of the waterways, which greatly enhanced their abilities to transport, supply, and communicate with their armies. Furthermore, he explains that logistics held up the French conquest of the Tukulor Empire and emphasizes the importance of railroads and armoured steamboats in the success of the British campaign in the Sudan. What Vandervort fails to realize is that railroads, gunboats, and field telegraphs are also technology. Limiting his definition of technology strictly to firepower appears to serve his purpose, but by stressing the key role that logistics played in European campaigns, Vandervort seriously undermines one of the main arguments of his work. Rather than proving that the technological determinist argument is fundamentally flawed, he instead proves that technology was a vital factor in the European conquest of Africa.
Vandervort also fails to explore the role of Africans in European-lead armies. This is significant because European armies in Africa were primarily comprised of African soldiers and thus the European conquest of Africa would not have been possible without them. Besides mention of the slaves that served in the Tirailleurs Sénégalais and the African mercenaries that made up the vast majority of the Belgian Force Publique there is little to no discussion of the motivation, the training, or the general incorporation of African soldiers into European colonial armies. For a book that purports to employ a European and African perspective, as well as a “New Military History” approach, this aspect is conspicuously missing. Considering the significant effects that the incorporation of African soldiers into European colonial armies had on colonial warfare, and more importantly on African societies and cultures, I believe it would have been valuable for Vandervort to include a discussion of this aspect of colonial warfare.
Yet, there is only so much space in a book with the scale and scope of Vandervort’s War of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914. Overall the author succeeds in offering an engrossing account of the evolution of military theory and practice across 84 years of colonial warfare, as well as poignant insights into the legacies of this warfare, the effects of which we are still seeing today.