The Brisbane Line controversy: Political opportunism versus national security 1942-45

by Paul Burns

The story behind the Brisbane Line controversy - the idea that parts of Australia above a line just north of Brisbane would be surrendered to the Japanese without firing a shot. It is a tale of political deceit, manipulation, cowardice and betrayal by politicians on all sides for electoral gain, culminating in the scapegoating of innocent army officers.

254 pages, Paperback

First published February 1, 1998

Reviews

[Andrew Carr · Rating 3 out of 5]

Burn's 1998 book remains the most substantial 'myth-busting' account of the Brisbane Line controversy. A book that focuses on the politics and is inherently political, it still serves as an important and under-appreciated contribution to understanding Australia in the Second World War.

Burns sets out to show that the Brisbane Line (the idea the northern half of Australia would be abandoned infront of a Japanese invasion, with the defence mounted north of Brisbane) never existed. In this he completely succeeds. Through a thorough review of both the defence files and attitudes of military and political leaders from the 1930s to 1940s, he shows there was no such plan. This is important, given many Australians still believe there was such a goal.

Yet the clear, if often undesired impression given by Burns' thorough account, is that Australia's north really could not be defended or adequately re-enforced. The most sensible policy was that given Australia's limited resources in troops and equipment, the key was concentration of forces to protect the South East of the continent. If Darwin was captured, the country could fight on. That would be much less likely if Sydney and the major industrial ports of Newcastle and Wollongong were claimed. So there was no specific Brisbane line, but the military logic that Australia would not be able to defend the north, and would focus on the south was very real.

Burns tells that tale, but is slightly circumspect in doing so because he has a clear ambition throughout the book to exonerate the Menzies government. He is right to show the dishonest partisanship that drove Eddie Ward to first raise the allegations. Yet he shies away from engaging with the recognition that the military and political leaders were forced to make a difficult judgement because far too little had been done in the 1930s to prepare the country for war.

Burns ardently wants to share any blame for this situation with Labor, reveling in the chance to show its support (through the Advisory War Council) and its continuation of this military logic once in government. This is an important part of the story, though often pushed too far, such as the absurd claim that 'Conservative parties could be blamed for Australian defence preparedness...during WW2 only because they were in office for eighteen of the twenty inter-war years' (p.19).

Well, yes.

This distortion aside, this is a detailed, thoughtful and valuable book. It shows the way the political and military logic can diverge. It explodes one major myth from Australia's experience in the Second World War, while demonstrating a significant civil-military crisis that directly affected how the war was conceived and fought.

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

Burns' book is rather dated however I would be surprised if anyone has done a more recent and better study of the political history of the 'Brisbane Line'. He has, with this very well argued and researched monograph, pulled apart much of the mythos surrounding what was supposedly the key Australian defence strategy up to and including the events of the so-called 'Battle of Australia', and in the process shown how antagonistic Australian wartime politics were.

The author focuses on the political aspects of the Brisbane Line controversy, with some useful examination of the corresponding bureaucratic and upper level military decisions, and as a result the reader is given a very 'top down' view of the historical issues. This is not problematic of itself, however this means that there are things left unsaid. For example, almost all the arguments about the possible implications for a Japanese attack on Australia are posited in grand strategy. There is nothing said in the book about the actual dispositions of Australian forces on the continent during the months immediately following the Japanese launching their campaigns in the Pacific. Burns does make a brief mention of tank traps being constructed, however he gives no more information as to how and why they were built. Also, it must be said that this book does not give any real insight into the actual Japanese threat to the mainland which is the kind of information that a more fulsome examination of the Brisbane Line should include.

Taking into account these historical omissions, I can still state with confidence that Burns' work is a landmark in the study of the Brisbane Line controversy, and a major text in understanding Australian political leadership during World War II. Neither the ALP nor the right wing parties come out of this examination with much glory. In fact it leaves the reader with the distinct impression that neither political side were as good at the governance of Australia's war effort as one may have thought. Also the Australian Army at its highest levels is shown to be a rather divided group of general officers who were either very good or very naive when it came to playing politics. As for Macarthur, well his reputation as Australia's saviour is deservedly left a bit more tarnished.

In conclusion, if one is looking for the best study of the Brisbane Line as a major Australian historical controversy, this is it.