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Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic

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The violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia & its aftermath, highlight the importance of a detailed understanding of the Balkan region. The political outlook & behavior of the Serbs & Serbian elites has been particularly bewildering to Western citizens & decision-makers. Serpent in the Bosom provides an analysis of Serbian politics from 1987 to 2000 that centers on an examination of Slobodan Milosevic's rise to power, his pattern of rule, the war in Kosovo & the recent democratic 'revolution' in Serbia. Lenard Cohen examines Milosevic's shrewd admixture of Serbian nationalism & socialism & his utilization of the media, & other agencies, as part of his 'technology of rule'. He also explores Milosevic's complex relationship with Serbia's intelligentsia, the Serbian Orthodox church, the police & the army, as well as Serbian-Albanian relations, & the Belgrade regime's ongoing controversy with Montenegro's political leadership. What emerges is a clear understanding of Serbia's enigmatic leader, his influence on the Balkans & the process of political transition in Yugoslavia.

458 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2000

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Lenard J. Cohen

12 books1 follower

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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
Profile Image for Vic Lauterbach.
578 reviews2 followers
March 31, 2020
This is a very informative, scholarly work. You will learn far more than you ever expected to know about the history of Serbian nationalism, the nature of the Titoist "brotherhood and unity" style of Socialist autocracy, why his successors failed to prevent the disintegration of Yugoslavia and why they embraced the wars it precipitated. That said, it's a very dry book. Mr. Cohen informs but doesn't inspire or excite. I'm sure he did exactly what he intended, but this isn't a book for anyone who wants a superficial treatment of the subject. In the unlikely event you need more information, it has copious end notes. The most interesting part was the view of U.S. foreign policy seen through the lens of a Balkan crisis no one in Europe or North America wanted to deal with. How the Clinton administration moved ever so reluctantly toward intervention primarily through the persistence of Richard Holbrooke is a case study in unintended consequences. We watch as NATO and the United States vie for the prize of most reluctant participant. As a central figure, Milosevic shows considerable charm and wit to balance his ruthlessness, but ultimately he underwhelms in the true spirit of an apparatchik whose ambition outgrew his abilities. Cohen's book was published five years before Milosevic's anticlimactic demise in a comfortable prison hospital in the Hague, so it's a bio-pic without a final reel. It ends with the collapse of Milosevic's "soft dictatorship" after its election defeat by a coalition of 'Democratic Nationalist' parties. His real legacy is a Serbian state whose populace still includes a significant plurality that embraces a fictionalized version of its heroic past and chafes under the restraints imposed by the Western Powers. Milosevic and his clique embodied the banality of evil, but their fall was brought about by Western leaders who convinced themselves that 'aggressive nationalism' can be cured by removing a few evil leaders and allowing the naturally good nature of the people to be expressed in free elections. Only time will tell if this policy has resulted in a permanent peace for the Balkans.
Profile Image for Erik Graff.
5,171 reviews1,474 followers
December 3, 2012
This book, written at the very end of 2000 upon the election of Vojislav Kostunica to the Serbian presidency, was a Christmas gift from my stepbrother. Finishing up a few books yet incompleted at the time, I went to this one immediately thereafter, finishing it in four or five days. Although just over 400 pages in length, it is not fast going. Cohen is a serious political scientist and expert on Yugoslavia. His writing is dry and packed with well-documented information, much of it from foreign-language sources. This is not a book to read through quickly. Nor, perhaps, should it be read by those unfamiliar with postwar Yugoslav history, particularly political events since the death of Tito in 1980. Indeed, Cohen addresses both previous scholarship as well as popular literature about these matters, most particularly Misha Glenny, Noel Malcolm and Robert Kaplan--figures who have had a demonstrable effect on contemporary decision-makers such as Bill Clinton and members of his administration as well as on Tony Blair and others. This is, after all, an evidentiarily deeply-rooted study intended to influence both policy makers and voters in the countries which have chosen to intervene in Balkan events.

Although avoiding defined extremes of opinion defined by, for instance, Malcolm on one end and Kaplan on the other, Cohen does not avoid controversy. One of his main points is that US, UK, NATO and UN policies towards Yugoslavia in general and Kosovo in particular have been ill, if not mis-, informed, created unintended consequences and collateral damage which might have been avoided by better understanding and, given ostensible concerns with human rights and democracy, more respect for the peoples directly involved.

Milosevic does not come across well. Indeed, Cohen basically treats him as one increasingly only interested in power for its own sake. Neither driven by ideology (unlike, perhaps, his wife--who deserves her own study) nor material greed, Milosevic fell into power almost by accident upon his revelatory experience with the Serb minority in Kosovo leading to a political formula which led to his hegemony in Serbia and the rump Yugolavia through the late eighties and throughout the nineties. Although brilliant as a tactician, he revealed himself incompetent as a strategist, effectively destroying the state(s) and people he identified with and, finally, in an overwhelming electoral defeat, virtually all political credibility.

The only flaws of this book are poor editing--there are many typographical errors, sometimes entire words missing, and the lack of an annotated bibliography. One must read the extensive footnotes following each chapter to construct the latter.
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